Introduction to the Philosophy of Research

Plato among the Greeks, like Bacon among the moderns, was the first who conceived a method of knowledge. The sciences of logic and psychology are based upon the analyses of Socrates and Plato. The principles of definition, the law of contradiction, the fallacy of arguing in a circle, the distinction between the essence and accidents of a thing or notion, between means and ends, between causes and conditions; also the division of the mind into the rational, concupiscent, and irascible elements, or of pleasures and desires into necessary and unnecessary --these and other great forms of thought are all of them to be found in the Republic, and were probably first invented by Plato. Research or inquiry according to Aristotle is to “find and produce a demonstration of whatever admits of demonstration, and if something does not admit of demonstration, to make this evident also”. Kettering says research is an effort to do things better and not to be caught asleep at the switch. It is the problem-solving mind as contrasted to the let-well-enough-alone mind”. Stenhouse defines research as systematic critical inquiry made public. The OECD defines research as the creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications. Research is often assumed to be scientific research. Churchman says science is inquiry (research), but not all inquiry (research) is scientific. The remaining part of this paper will cover mostly what constitutes scientific research but will also refer to other methods of research as well.

What is Scientific Research?

Churchman says science differs from other inquiry by virtue of what it inquires into, or how it inquires; content or method or both. Science differs from common sense not by virtue of content, but by virtue of method. Science is controlled inquiry, and common sense is not. Science is really an organized way of obtaining knowledge. Control is defined as the degree of how efficiently the inquirer uses the method in solving problems. Efficiency refers to the inquirer leading the method, not the method leading him. In so far as the scientist can examine the adequacy of his steps and make an efficient selection, then he leads or controls his steps. A method of inquiry is under complete control when every aspect of the activity is itself subject to inquiry with respect to its adequacy for the problematic purpose. The result is that a controlled inquiry is more apt to produce correct answers than uncontrolled answers.

How does Philosophy and Epistemology Differ from Research?

Kuhn says history is the truth about what happened at a particular time and place-- it is presented in a narrative form; whereas philosophy is the truth at all times and places--

it is presented in the form of arguments. Abraham Kaplan (American philosopher, Betrand Russell’s student) said the word philosophy means the love of wisdom (from Greek “philosophia”. And the love of wisdom, I suppose, is like any other sort of love -- the professionals are the ones who know the least about it. The school of Thomas Aquinas says that philosophy is the highest of sciences, the discipline that explores the ultimate “ground” or explanation of everything.

A philosophy is a system of beliefs about reality. It is one's integrated view of the world. It includes an understanding of the nature of existence, man, and his role in the world. Philosophy is the foundation of knowledge. It is the standard by which ideas are integrated and understood.

Philosophy is a necessary product of man's rational mind. To live, man must gain knowledge of the world. To understand the world, man must form conclusions about its very nature. For instance, to gain knowledge of particular objects, man must recognize that objects have identity. He must recognize that conclusions are possible because the world does exist, and exists in a particular way.

Philosophy provides the framework for which man can understand the world. It provides the premises by which man can discover truth, and use his mind to support his life. Every man has an understanding of the world. Every man must have a philosophy, even if it is never made explicit. Philosophy is historically divided into the following categories:

Metaphysics – Study of Existence

The word "metaphysics" derives from the Greek meta ta physika (literally, "after the things of nature", an expression used by Hellenistic and later commentators to refer to Aristotle's untitled group of texts that we still call the Metaphysics. Classical and medieval philosophers took this title to mean that the subjects discussed in the Metaphysics came after the things of nature because they were further removed from sense perception, therefore, more difficult to understand. Since Kant, "metaphysics" has often meant a priori speculation on questions that cannot be answered by scientific observation and experiment. Popularly, "metaphysics" has meant anything abstruse and highly theoretical - a common eighteenth century usage illustrated by Hume's occasional use of "metaphysical" to mean "excessively subtle". The term has also been popularly associated with the spiritual, the religious, and even the occult. In modern philosophical usage "metaphysics" refers generally to the field of philosophy dealing with questions about the kinds of things there are and their modes of being. Its subject matter includes the concepts of existence, things, property, events; the distinctions between particulars and universals, individuals and classes; the nature of relations, change, causation, and the nature of mind, matter, space and time. Metaphysics is neither a priori nor empirical, though it makes constant use of both deductive and probable reasoning. A metaphysician is concerned to advocate, articulate, and apply a set of basic interpretative principles, categorical principles perhaps. These principles cannot be grounded in either conceptual considerations or an appeal to empirical fact. Apart from anything else there are no absolutely neutral data in the study of metaphysics. The metaphysician has the duty of explaining all the facts as he sees them, he also has the privilege of being able to decide what really is to count as fact.

Epistemology – Study of Knowledge

Epistemology is the study of the valid forms of knowledge. Epistemology is the explanation of how we think. It is required in order to be able to determine the true from the false, by determining a proper method of evaluation. It is needed in order to use and obtain knowledge of the world around us. Without epistemology, we could not think. More specifically, we would have no reason to believe our thinking was productive or correct, as opposed to random images flashing before our mind. With an incorrect epistemology, we would not be able to distinguish truth from error. The consequences are obvious. The degree to which our epistemology is correct is the degree to which we could understand reality, and the degree to which we could use that knowledge to promote our lives and goals. Flaws in epistemology will make it harder to accomplish anything. It comes from the Greek "episteme" which means knowledge. It is sometimes called "theory of knowledge". It must be noted that epistemology as a distinct branch of philosophy is of recent origin. Usually Descartes is considered the first philosopher to seriously work in epistemology. The validity of knowledge was more or less taken for granted by previous philosophers. It was only when Descartes began to systematically doubt the veracity of knowledge that problems of knowledge became apparent. Questions put forward by epistemology include: What are the sources of knowledge? What is the nature of knowledge? Is our knowledge valid?

Ethics – Study of Action (Axiology – The Study of Value)

Ethics is the branch of study dealing with what is the proper course of action for man. It answers the question, "What do I do?" It is the study of right and wrong in human endeavors. At a more fundamental level, it is the method by which we categorize our values and pursue them. Do we pursue our own happiness, or do we sacrifice ourselves to a greater cause? Is that foundation of ethics based on the Bible, or on the very nature of man himself, or neither? Ethics is a requirement for human life. It is our means of deciding a course of action. Without it, our actions would be random and aimless. There would be no way to work towards a goal because there would be no way to pick between a limitless number of goals. Even with an ethical standard, we may be unable to pursue our goals with the possibility of success. To the degree which a rational ethical standard is taken, we are able to correctly organize our goals and actions to accomplish our most important values. Any flaw in our ethics will reduce our ability to be successful in our endeavors.

Politics – Study of Force

Politics is ethics applied to a group of people. Politics tells you how a society must be set up and how one should act within a society.

Esthetics

Esthetics is the study of art. It includes what art consists of, as well as the purpose behind it. Does art consist of music, literature, and painting? Or does it include a good engineering solution, or a beautiful sunset? These are the questions that aimed at in esthetics. It also studies methods of evaluating art, and allows judgments of the art. Is art in the eye of the beholder? Does anything that appeals to you fit under the umbrella of art? Or does it have a specific nature? Does it accomplish a goal? Art has existed through all of recorded human history. It is unique to humans because of our unique form of thinking. Its importance is based on this nature, specifically, man's ability to abstract. Art is a little understood tool of man to bring meaning to abstract concept. Esthetics is important because it delves into the reason why art has always existed, the burning need of mankind through the ages to see the world in a different, clear way. It further evaluates art by the standard of human life, and whether it accomplishes the job of satisfying man's intellectual needs, or whether it tends to hurt or make worse those needs.

In philosophy, the method of inquiry (research) is studied under the branch of “epistemology”, which existed long before modern science. So epistemology includes the study of how research is conducted. With the development of modern science, epistemology became more and more interested in the scientific method because epistemology asks the question “do we know what we know?” So today, the preoccupation of epistemology is the philosophy of science. This paper is about epistemology focusing on the philosophy of science. Two schools of thought emerged, the rationalists in Europe and the Empiricists in England.

The Legacy of Descartes and Rationalism

When science underwent its rebirth during the renaissance, modern man wanted no dogmas handed down to him that he could not check by his own faculties, so he turned to humanism – the organizing force that reside in man himself – his faculty of reason. Reason for Plato is that faculty which deals with the ultimate forms (truth) of things, and not their copies in the world of sense. Aristotle was the first to articulate the use of reason to categorize things in terms of their essence. The Christians (Augustine and Aquinas) tried to reconcile reason with revelation. Descartes was struck by the sharp contrast between the certainty of mathematics and the controversial nature of philosophy, and came to believe that the sciences could be made to yield results as certain as those of mathematics. He wanted to sweep away all questionable knowledge temporarily in order to see if he could get back to those truths which all of us as rational beings must accept, making the judgment of truth in individual and internal process. He was the first to write about the mind based on physiology. Descartes proposed a mechanism for automatic reaction in response to external events (the reflex theory). In Descartes' conception, the rational soul, an entity distinct from the body and making contact with the body at the pineal gland, might or might not become aware of the differential outflow of animal spirits brought about through the rearrangement of the interfibrillar spaces. When such awareness did occur, however, the result was conscious sensation -- body affecting mind. In turn, in voluntary action, the soul might itself initiate a differential outflow of animal spirits. Mind, in other words, could also affect body. Descartes stands for the most explicit and uncompromising dualism between mind and matter (The Cartesian model). His position is not only clearly stated, but defended in detail. He distinguishes mind and body as two substances separate and incompatible. The essence of body, he says, is "extension"; and the essence of mind is "thought." These two substances are known in different ways; they form the subject-matter of different scientific interests; they are investigated by different methods. The method of the physical sciences is mathematics. Here Descartes, the philosopher, opened up a new vista to modern thought. The method of psychology, the science of mind, on the contrary, is introspection, inner observation of the events of consciousness (his contribution to modern psychology). The point of novelty in the Cartesian statement consists is that the dualism becomes an ontological one; it does not remain merely logical, religious, practical, but becomes metaphysical -- a formula of reality, the presupposition of future science and philosophy. However, in his effort to make things certain, he left many questions: 1. How can anyone continue to learn if the only thing that he is sure of is that he exists, but he cannot be sure of anything else? 2. How can minds and bodies interact when the two are so different? Thoughts seem to be in time but not in space, how then can they affect something like a pencil which is in space? Bodies are both in time and in space, but, as spatial objects, how can they have an effect on something which is only in time? For Descartes, the only way out was for him to say that God is the guarantee of the validity of the clear and distinct ideas generally, since we cannot suppose he would deceive us. Thus the certainty of the object of knowledge rests upon the certainty of the existence of God (the Cartesian circle).

The Rationalists after Descartes (Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz)

The first answer to Descartes’ problem was answered by Malebranche (called occasionalism) in which he argued that both of Descartes' substances, mind and body, are causally ineffective. God is the one and only true cause. Not only is there no influence of mind on body or of body on mind, there is no causality operative at all except insofar as God, the one true cause, intervenes to produce the regularities that occur in experience. Thus, for example, when a person wills to move a finger, this serves as the occasion for God to move the finger; when an object suddenly appears in a person's field of view that serves as the occasion for God to produce a visual perception in the person's mind.

In order to retain the notion of God as the one true cause without sacrificing the idea of causality as operative in both the mental and the physical spheres, Spinoza abandoned Descartes' two-substance view in favor of what has come to be called double-aspect theory. Double-aspect theories are based on the notion that the mental and the physical are simply different aspects of one and the same substance. For Spinoza, that single substance was God. While agreeing with Descartes that the world of consciousness and that of extension are qualitatively separate, Spinoza rejected the Cartesian view that consciousness and extension are attributes of two finite substances in favor of the notion that they are attributes of only one infinite substance. That substance, God, is the universal essence or nature of everything that exists. The direct implication of Spinoza's view is that while mental occurrences can determine only other mental occurrences and physical motions can determine only other physical motions, mind and body nonetheless exist in pre-established coordination, since the same divine essence forms the connections within both classes and cannot be self-contradictory.

Spinoza defined the kinds of knowledge using his propositions (e.g. “The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.” “Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve”). “From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses; I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things. I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things and; this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition, which proceeds from the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the, false. The guarantor of the adequate idea for Spinoza is God. Churchman defines Spinoza’s method as (1) looking at what comes before, (2) construct a universal axiom from experience, (3) using mathematical inference, (4) using proportions.

Leibniz presented the famous articulation of psychophysical parallelism in which he adapted an occasionalist metaphor to support the view that soul and body exist in a pre-established harmony. Comparing soul and body to two clocks that agree perfectly, Leibniz argued that there are only three possible sources for this agreement. It may occur through mutual influence (interactionism), through the efforts of a skilled workman who regulates the clocks and keeps them in accord (occasionalism), or by virtue of the fact that they have been so constructed from the outset that their future harmony is assured (parallelism). Leibniz rejects interactionism because it is impossible to conceive of material particles passing from one substance to the other and occasionalism as invoking the intervention of a Deus ex machina in a natural series of events. All that remains is parallelism -- the notion that mind and body exist in a harmony that has been pre- established by God from the moment of creation. This harmony is in the form of monads, or spiritual atom, which are self-active, self-contained simple (without parts) elements that exist at different levels from the lowest of creation to God, the ultimate monad. This monistic concept explains the harmony of world-activities as well as the pluralism of individualities as social entities creating more complex higher level entities.

The method that the rationalists used to discover knowledge was Aristotle’s formal logic (syllogism) with the help of Pythagoras’s science of geometry, and Euclid’s deductive methods. However, there were problems with rationalism including:

The human mind can defy intuition, common sense and experience and can create irrational worlds.
Aristotle said that syllogism as a method cannot determine the truth of premises, so can be created to prove anything (infinite regress and tautology)
The Sophists said that the products of rationalism were artificial (knowledge and sensation becomes the same thing in rationalism, creating the relativism of knowledge (each man is his own measure of truth)
Bacon said that syllogism does not allow us to penetrate any new domain because the conclusion is contained in the premises so it is good only as a demonstrative form of something one already knows

Aristotle admits that observations are essential to stop infinite regress in syllogism because we need a fixed and immediate truth as a starting point. Plato believed that the ability for man to acquire first principles (ideas) is innate in man. Aristotle disagrees because if man possesses these first principles, how could they not know something that is more accurate than something they want to demonstrate? On the other hand, if it is acquired, how could we have acquired them without any first principles? Aristotle believed that we must have a capacity of some sort to acquire them. He concludes that it is sense-perception that man keeps in memory, which later becomes experience is where man gets his knowledge. So his conclusion is that our basis for knowledge is sensation. Aristotle disagrees with Protagoras that knowledge is relative because he says that mental motions and images are the same for all men. Syllogism cannot be used to create knowledge because syllogism needs two principles before it can conclude. Aristotle concludes that it is by means of intellectual intuition we can jump from an incomplete set of sensations to an absolutely general universal – process of induction.

The Rationalists Method of Discovering Knowledge

Problems with the Rationalists’ Methods

The English Empiricists

The earliest work in empirical science was done by Bacon (1561-1626) who is credited with the scientific method (inductive method) to investigate all cases, avoiding theories based on insufficient data. Bacon coined the expression “knowledge is power” not theoretical or speculative, and man's capacity to act is in proportion to his knowledge. It was to lead man to the discovery of the realm of nature, and to allow him to establish over it the "regnum hominis," the dominion of man over nature. He rewrote Aristotle’s Organon to redefine a new science where discoveries will not be the work of chance, as in the past, but the result of systematic experiments to discover the hidden possibilities of nature. His method involved freeing the minds from all prejudice and errors (the negative process, the idols), the interpretation of the phenomenon (the positive process) where three tables are built, the table of presence (what is being sought exists), the table of absence (what under analysis is not observed), and the table of degrees (the increase or decrease of certain phenomenon in objects observed). In 1620, he planned for an enormous work called Magna Instauratio, a culmination of all Bacon’s thought on subjects ranging from logic and epistemology to practical science (or what in Bacon’s day was called “natural philosophy,” the word science being then but a general synonym for “wisdom” or “learning”).

Gassendi (1592-1655) developed the atomism of Epicurus, but admitted the possibility of a sort of soul-molecule in the primitive matter. He also made reason the function of a special immaterial soul created, as the atoms were, by God.

Hobbes (1588-1679) attacked the dualism of Descartes. Mind, said Hobbes, is a function of body, and reason is a product of sensation. The world is made up of matter in motion under mathematical laws; and consciousness is one of the aspects or characters of the living organism. There is, then, no separate substantive soul or spirit as the dualists declare. Further, sensation is the one conscious event, and upon it knowledge is founded. Sensation is based upon physiological processes, stirred up by external stimulation. Hobbes describes these organic processes, making the heart the centre. By the compounding of sensations -- the process so greatly developed by later sensationalists and associationists -- all the modes of intelligence are produced. With sensation goes an original form of impulse -- identified with the preservation of life -- and also feelings of pleasure and pain. These, like the sensations, are compounded under the laws of association. The whole results in a conception thoroughly naturalistic and mechanical in spirit, but its carrying out is inadequate and sketchy (”By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry: first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call science. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable, science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another; by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: because when we see how anything comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects” – Leviathan).

Hobbes divided knowledge according to the following categories:
SCIENCE, that is, knowledge of consequences; which is called also PHILOSOPHY

1) Consequences from accidents of bodies natural; which is called NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

2) Consequences from accidents common to all bodies natural; which are quantity, and motion.

3) Consequences from quantity, and motion indeterminate; which, being the principles or first foundation of philosophy, is called philosophia prima

a) PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA

i) Consequences from motion, and quantity determined

ii) Consequences from quantity, and motion determined

(1) By figure, By number

(a) Mathematics,

b) GEOMETRY

c) ARITHMETIC

4) Consequences from motion, and quantity of bodies in Special Consequences from motion, and quantity of the great parts of the world, as the earth and stars,

a) Cosmography

b) ASTRONOMY

c) GEOGRAPHY

5) Consequences from motion of special kinds, and figures of body,

a) Mechanics, doctrine of weight

b) Science of ENGINEERS

c) ARCHITECTURE

d) NAVIGATION

e) PHYSICS, or consequences from qualities

6) Consequences from qualities of bodies transient, such as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish

a) METEOROLOGY

7) Consequences from qualities of bodies permanent

8) Consequences from qualities of stars

9) Consequences from the light of the stars. Out of this, and the motion of the sun, is made the science of

a) SCIOGRAPHY

10) Consequences from the influence of the stars,

a) ASTROLOGY

11) Consequences of qualities from liquid bodies that fill the space between the stars; such as are the air, or substance etherial

12) Consequences from qualities of bodies terrestrial

13) Consequences from parts of the earth that are without sense,

14) Consequences from qualities of minerals, as stones, metals, etc.

15) Consequences from the qualities of vegetables

16) Consequences from qualities of animals

17) Consequences from qualities of animals in general

18) Consequences from vision,

a) OPTICS

19) Consequences from sounds,

a) MUSIC

20) Consequences from the rest of the senses

21) Consequences from qualities of men in special

22) Consequences from passions of men,

a) ETHICS

23) Consequences from speech,

a) In magnifying, vilifying, etc. POETRY

b) In persuading, RHETORIC

c) In reasoning, LOGIC

d) In contracting,

24) The Science of JUST and UNJUST

a) Consequences from accidents of politic bodies; which is called POLITICS, AND CIVIL PHILOSOPHY

b) Of consequences from the institution of COMMONWEALTHS, to the rights, and duties of the body politic, or sovereign

c) Of consequences from the same, to the duty and right of the subjects

Locke’s Contribution to Research

Locke sees the universe as made up of material bodies, which in turn are made of "insensible particles," which interact mechanically. Immaterial bodies have sense organs, which when stimulated produce "ideas of sensation." These ideas are operated on by our minds to produce "ideas of reflection." These two types of ideas are the material of our thoughts, perception, and consciousness, which are all derived from experience; we can have no knowledge beyond our ideas. In perception, according to this view, we are not directly aware of physical objects; we are directly aware of the ideas that objects "cause" in us and that "represent" the objects in our consciousness. Our ideas of primary qualities of objects, or the mathematically determinable qualities of an object, such as shape, motion, weight, and number, actually exist in the world. Secondary qualities, those which arise from the senses, do not exist in objects as they exist in ideas (we give them the qualities). According to Locke, secondary qualities, such as taste, "are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce ideas in use by their primary qualities." One conclusion of Locke’s theory is that genuine knowledge cannot be found in natural science, because the real essences of physical objects that science studies cannot be known. Simple ideas cannot be described in terms of anything else. For example, solidity is a simple idea, and cannot be defined, it can only be sensed or pointed to. Yet ideas of sensation are not immutable because our judgment of them can change. He solved the problem that Descartes had with deceiving sense experience (bent pencil in water) by saying that a pencil bent in water is perceived as straight because on the basis of previous experience we pass judgment that it is straight. We can also confirm our judgment by feeling the pencil in the water. This is the same with a mirage. We do not doubt that we perceive the idea of water on the road; we can only doubt its existence with properties corresponding to our ideas inside our minds (reflection). This is Locke’s theory of knowledge – simple ideas arise from one or more senses, or from reflection, or from the combination of sense and reflection.

In order to perceive these similarities and dissimilarities Locke suggest that we use intuition – “the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other” (this sounds like Aristotle’s intuition, and it also smells of rationalism). “ This kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of” (Locke)

According to Locke, the validity of sensation cannot be checked. Its very existence constitutes its validity. The validity of intuitions is self-contained and not subject to check because to check them requires another more basic criterion. Just as sensations provide factual information which cannot be doubted, so intuition acting on these facts provides generalizations which likewise cannot be doubted. Locke disagrees with the rationalists by making observations play a fundamental role in science, but he agrees with them in making intuition a basic criterion of general scientific truth.

Locke says that we only have an imperfect knowledge of the outside world because we are restricted to a mere appearance of agreement and disagreement. Based on such appearance, our judgments provide us with information to which only a degree of probability, not absolute certainty, can be attached. Only subjective knowledge is perfect, objective knowledge is not. The notion of probability as a substitute for knowledge becomes a central theme in subsequent philosophy.

Problems with Locke’s Ideas (Berkeley and Hume)

Berkeley, a bishop, disagreed with Locke that space is a simple idea. Locke did not provide any criteria for defining simple ideas since to him, it was self-evident. Space to Locke can be sensed using sight and touch. Berkeley states that even the simple idea of distance of objects is not a sensation, but of judgment, because the distance of considerably remote objects cannot be sensed. The idea of distance for Berkeley depends on experience rather than sensation, and because experience requires memory and generalization, it is not a simple idea. Berkeley raises the issue of how do we actually determine what is immediately and irreducibly given? This is fundamental to the empiricist because they were trying to show how all our knowledge can be constructed from the irreducible senses. If we do not have a good basis for deciding what the simple ideas actually are, then the description of science in terms of them is futile. If not by intuition, is there a more basic mental act that evaluates intuition?

The problem of intuition wasn’t serious with Locke, Berkeley or Hume. All of them appealed to the individual’s own judgment of what goes on in his mind, in order to establish the truths of the mental processes. Such psychological procedures of using deeper insight into one’s own mental states are called “introspective”. Introspective psychology was the only available method during their time. Only when the weakness of their conclusions became apparent was there a need to find a non-introspective psychological method.

Berkeley examined the ability of the mind to develop abstract ideas such as happiness, beauty and triangularity (“wholeness?”). Why? Because Locke said that all complex ideas can be created using the three processes of abstracting, compounding and relating. Locke tried to show that empiricism (immediate observation and mental operation) is capable of building any complex idea. Berkeley said that the “abstract” image of a house in the form of figures, colors and shapes are not abstract because you are calling up actual images of the house. Abstraction requires that not even the image of the body be present in the mind. To Berkeley, such “abstract” ideas do not exist. Instead, there is the “general” idea of beauty, characterized by a vague image of a couple of objects. So Locke’s process of abstracting from simple ideas does not work. So the building of science based on sensation and reflection is not as easy as Locke put it. In fact, a world that is based on sensation and reflection is much less than the world we have today. Locke said that by abstracting and compounding the simple ideas of color, size and shape we are able to figure out the “substance” called sugar (“united in one object”). This is the material substance. For Locke, material substance constitutes external (primary quality) objective reality. Mental substance constitutes subjective and internal (secondary quality) reality. The gap between the two is perception (or observation). Berkeley instead says that objective reality is actually non-existent, because if we can only know based on sensations, and by combining and abstracting simple ideas, objects exist only when we perceive these simple ideas. “To exist is to be perceived”. For Berkeley, material substance (that require observation) do not exist independently, only subjective reality remains. Their reality is internal in that they exist only as perceptions. Primary qualities do not exist because to believe in primary qualities is to believe in something that observation can never confirm. In other words, if we believe that all knowledge arises from observations, it is ridiculous to talk about what the world looks like when no one is observing it.

The problem with Berkeley’s arguments is (1) if we cannot prove that material substances exist independently, how can we prove that mental substances or minds exist? (2) Locke depended on the mind perceiving simple ideas (sensations) without the need to explain them because they are just sensed. This is something Berkeley could not do because if we say we can know mental substances directly, we are going against the empirical stand that requires both sensation (an indirect knowledge) and ideas, and since we are not always conscious of these ideas, there is no object of our thought than can have permanent existence, (3) the two most important aspects of our world (according to Spinoza), causality and substance, can NEVER be known because to show that a material substance exists, we have to “get outside” our perceptions, and this we can never do (“introspection shows clearly that we never perceive directly the substance of our minds”).

Hume partly solved the problem of causality for empiricism by explaining it as follows:

1. All objects causally related are in physical contact with each other.

2. The cause is always prior to the effect in time.

3. The cause and effect are “necessarily” connected. By this Hume is explaining sufficiency and necessity. If A causes B, if A is present, B must be present as well (A is “sufficient” for B). This is the one most problematic. How sure are you that a noise you hear was caused by a prior event (someone dropping something)?

Hume presents three questions that need to be answered:

1) How sure are we that there are such a thing as universal laws and if there is, we can know of them? (The first general question -- why is there need to be a cause to everything?)

2) Even if there are universal laws, we cannot confirm them except by experience

3) Even if we can experience some of these laws, we have no way of saying that we will observe the same experiences in the future because universal law is sure to cover an infinite number of possible causes throughout possible space and time, and therefore will go beyond actual and possible experience (the second specific question – why is there any necessary connection between specific events in time?)

Here we see that we cannot observe any necessary connection between two events directly. All we actually observe directly are the two events themselves.

There is no logical or essential relationship between the events. We cannot answer the three questions logically (using reason). To answer the first question (what is the observational origin of causality – or what observations of the actual causes, leading to what was sensed, do we need to make?), Hume says the origin does not lie in direct observations of single events, it can only lie in a repetition of events.

Answer to the first question: It is the conjoined events that cause the idea of causality.

Answer to the second question: We get to the notion of causality from observation by the action of the mind. Causal relation is a relation that resides in the mind, and not in the objects themselves. Hume developed a psychological theory of association which had extremely important consequence for any scientific theory of knowledge. To Hume, causality in science is based on how we react to our impressions (experiences). Here, Hume escapes the problem of empirically showing actual cause and still defends the empiricists’ notion that belief in causality (or the idea of causal relations) is acquired through experience. Second, Hume was able to make a distinction between valid and invalid beliefs about the connection of events. Rationalists would say that valid events are what actually conform to natural events. Hume and the empiricists instead say that natural events are impressions or observations, and then they put the law of causality into a tendency of the mind to react in a certain way to its impressions. Causality is “internal” not external. So the question is, what distinguishes true from false internal beliefs? Hume says that the valid internal beliefs are those that work well in experience. This brings us to the next step in beliefs, that we adopt the attitude that the event is likely to follow, or has some chance of following (probability).

Our beliefs are of two kinds (1) those that are entirely free of doubt, (sun rising tomorrow), (2) those that are uncertain, or based on “probabilities” of events. The first kind is the kind that numerous impressions have proven to be true. The second kind involves probability, which is a combination of causality and chance. To understand them we have to explain beliefs in chance events. The mind is indifferent as to what will happen because not enough impressions were made in the past (e.g. tossing a coin). Chance is our indifference. Chance is one extreme of the “continuum” of belief, at the other is causality. This differentiates the empiricists’ method from the non-scientific method such as hearsay and rumor.

Empiricists Contribution to Discovery of Knowledge

How do you justify any belief? Hume proposes the following:

The cause and effect must be contiguous in time (no gap)
The cause must be prior to the effect
There must be a constant union between the cause and the effect
The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause
Where several different objects produce the same effects, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them
The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular, in which they differ (sugar and salt, both white, but the color is not what causes the different taste)
When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or diminution of its cause, ‘tis to be regarded as a compound effect, derived from the union of the several different effects, which arise from the several parts of the cause

However, since necessity resides only in our mind, there is still no reason to believe that the rules will hold. Science for the empiricist does not make any guarantee for the future, but merely describes an internal state of belief in necessary connections, by formalizing experiments designed to increase our belief in the connection between two events.

Problems with the Empiricists Methods of Creating Knowledge

1) Extreme skepticism such as:

a) Many phenomenon (e.g. atomic or sub-atomic particles) that are not accessible by direct observation cannot be studied

b) Empiricism requires that observations be repeated many times before justified belief can be concluded, and even then, it is unable to predict future occurrences.

Kantian Contribution to Knowledge (A Priori Assumptions)

Kant attempted to synthesize both rational intuition and direct observation. Kant corrects the error of both dogmatic rational metaphysics (such as in Descartes) and dogmatic scientific determinism (such as Hobbes). Kant overcomes this dualism with a new dualism -- the dualism of reality and appearance. According to Kant, there is a difference between the way things are in themselves (e.g. the reality of fire) and the way things appear to us (the feeling of hotness). Science is not reality; it is simply the best interpretation of reality. We cannot know things as they really are in themselves (noumena); we only know them as appearances (phenomena). Knowledge is not the transparent viewing of "bare facts." The mind is not a window, through which objects pass unaltered. Rather, knowledge is the making of a product. The mind converts the raw material of beings as they are into the finished product of objects, or beings as they are for us in perception and knowledge. To know is to reconstruct, to interpret reality. Knowledge is objective interpretation of reality, but it is not reality itself. According to Kant, human knowledge is a process that includes both sensibility (perception) and understanding (conception).

Kant was one of the earliest to define objective science “still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to be sought only in the sciences properly so called, that is, in the objective sciences” (Critique)….”It is only of objective validity in regard to phenomena, because these are things which we regard as objects of our senses. It no longer objective we, make abstraction of the sensuousness of our intuition, in other words, of that mode of representation which is peculiar to us, and speak of things in general.” (Critique)

To provide certainty, he says that neither intuition by itself nor observation by itself is sufficient. A certain combination of both is required. This phenomenal world, however, is produced a priori by the activity of consciousness, reacting on that external reality whose eternal nature cannot be known. His method was to “individuate” the measurements of observation using time and space. He claims that these two are general assumptions that remain fixed for all investigations that everyone has to use in making observations. Locke, Berkeley and Hume assumed that time and space is derived from sensation and/or reflection. To Kant, time and space is not empirical. So for Kant, two ingredients make up his psychology, sensuous intuitions (something immediately perceived) and principles of understanding (general rules that are applied to the earlier sensuous intuitions, supplying the pure “form” and phenomena of the world, the synthetic). Space and time are a priori because they help shape sensuous intuitions. He called them a priori. Taken together they form a mold in which we shape the impressions coming from the unknowable, transcendent reality. To the rationalist he says, “It is true that there are certain a priori notions that are essential in the understanding of the world; but it is wrong to say that these carry any validity beyond the realm of possible experience”. To the empiricist, he says, “It is true that we must have sensuous intuitions in order to determine anything whatsoever about the real world; but it is wrong to say that such sensuous intuitions are all that we need, for we must also require in addition certain general rules of the understanding in order to convert observation into experience”.

Kant therefore had to show how these “general rules” can be applied to sensuous intuitions. He also had to show how we can determine what the general rules of understanding actually are. He could not answer both satisfactorily. For the first, he suggested we use time as both the general and specific mediator. For the second, since we need a priori laws to create the general understanding, how can we validate those a priori laws? They cannot be validated by experience because they are prior to experience. Kant says that “if we have a proposition which in being thought is thought as necessary, it is an a priori judgment…if then a judgment is thought with strict universality, that is, in such a manner that no exception is allowed as possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori”. Basically Kant resorted like the rationalist before him, to say that certain sciences (such as Euclidean geometry and arithmetic) could be validated by direct intuition (“all geometrical knowledge, grounded as it is in a priori intuition, possesses immediate evidence”). But as history showed, both these sciences were shown to be lacking and did not carry their own truths with them. After Kant, we cannot go back to the native notion that the experimenter merely makes his direct observation undisturbed by any assumptions. Every observation demands prior assumptions. The scientific problem becomes one of showing how such a description of science can progress and solve problems, even though it must always make a priori judgments at each step. Further we need to show how it can examine the validity of these judgments, that is, bring them under control.

Non-Rational and Non-Empirical Methods

Inquiry (research) can be categorized into three methods:

Speculation – stems from the rationalist tradition (Aristotle) and argues that some truths are to be discovered by thought, speculation, insight, intuition, faith or some other uncontrolled observation.
Positivistic method – stems from empiricism and argues that truths are either analytic (depends solely on logic or language) or else must be verified directly or indirectly by empirical observation, and
Pragmatic method – truths is based on considerations of efficiency of action for accomplishing objectives

The speculative method says that in many fields of inquiry, it is not possible to make controlled observation (life on Mars, age of the Earth, what vocation to pursue, when will the next war come?) and only speculation can be adequately used and can provide truth. These areas include:

1) Metaphysics

a) Ontology -- concerned with ultimate reality and what stuff ultimate reality consists. School in this camp include Materialism (reality is made only of matter, and mind or God can be reduced to matter if they are real), Idealism (only minds and their properties are real, and matter is just perception), Nominalism (reality is composed of concrete individuals only and that general ideas and concepts have no existence), Conceptualism (ideas do exist by themselves, independent of concrete reality), Monism (reality is ONE kind of thing), Dualism (two kinds of reality – mind and matter) and pluralism (many kinds of realities)

b) Ultimate knowledge or epistemology – nature of the ultimate assumptions of science. Schools in this camp include naturalists (science make no ultimate assumptions or it can evaluate its own assumptions and epistemology is therefore the philosophy of science), anti-naturalists (there is an ultimate basis of knowledge that cannot be established within science), coherence theory (knowledge is ultimately a consistent body of relations and need no reference outside of itself), correspondence theory (truth is what corresponds to reality and the source of truth lies outside the system of truth)

c) Ultimate Origins – Theology includes Theism (there is a divine Being who transcends out finite minds), Deism (the ruler of the universe must have properties we can understand), agnosticism (there is no proof one way or another), and atheism (there is definite argument against any such creator)

d) Ultimate Values – generally divided into sub-class of human behavior including ethics, esthetics (art and beauty), hedonism (ultimate values are what brings pleasure), perfectionism (values lie in the perfection of the human race), altruism and egoism (different source and nature of moral value), formalism (a subclass of esthetics saying that beauty resides in forms) and functionalism (beauty resides in efficiency)

We can take two approaches, either argue that there is really no meaningful problems beyond natural sciences and that the problems of metaphysics and ethics are reducible to those of natural sciences, which is the view of positivism, or we may argue that some problems of metaphysics are meaningful and that the scientific method should not be restricted to a purely logical and observational discipline and it should embrace both metaphysical problems as well as those of the natural sciences. This is the position of pragmatism.

Hegel’s Speculative Method

Hegel was the one that gave impetus to the speculative method after Kant. Hegel says that the process of reason is NOT a deductive and analytic process (reduce a problem to its simplest parts), but a synthetic one in which the mind builds up to the solution by a series of steps, each of which in itself is inadequate. Hegel’s method is called dialectical. The dialectical method is as follows:

1. Choose a thesis (a position regarding a problem)

2. Recognize the inherent contradiction in the position and recognize the opposing position (the anti-thesis)

3. Proceed to the new position (the synthesis), which absorbs the first two but becomes far richer than either

Arguments for the speculative method includes;

1. Eddington differentiates physical from epistemological knowledge, which is above the physical since the physical is based on observation and the epistemological dictates the plan for good observation

2. Whitehead says that faith in nature cannot be justified by any inductive generalizations and that induction is based on metaphysics since the process of induction is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. We must observe the immediate occasion and use reason to elicit a general description of its nature, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism, it presupposes metaphysics.

Hall proposes a method for metaphysics. Revelation is an option also lacking in consistency (Christian revelation). Intuition is another, although it suffers from weaknesses. Common sense is a possible source provided we can examine the doctrines critically. Metaphysics can also use direct experience, not in the manner science does, but imaginative insight, covering broad areas of experience in one step, making use of the collective faculty of experience. Modern metaphysics uses the ability of the mind to grasp wholes and generalities on the basis of wide experience, which have claim to meaning and truth.

The Positivistic Method

Positivism is an attempt to establish the scientific method purely on empirical grounds and a frontal attack on deductive and speculative metaphysics. It combines elements of rationalism, empiricism and criticism with a focus primarily on empiricism. Hume set the tone in the early eighteenth century and was carried on by “positivists” in the nineteenth century. Comte published in 1830 his Positive Philosophie which is a historical analysis reminiscent of the dialectical methods of Hegel, and showed that the mind developed in three stages: the religious, the metaphysics and the positive. The positive is the recognition that:

“the impossibility of obtaining absolute notions; we give up the search for the origin and destination of the universe”

and restrict ourselves to the discovery of the relations between phenomena “by the combined use of reason and observation”. Science for Comte was tied down to observations; it began with and continually returned to data and does not invoke “cause”" to explain events. We observe, describe events and generalize laws, which are essentially descriptive, not explanatory. To Comte, metaphysical explanations were not useful.

Comte’s system had the following characteristics which were later absorbed into logical positivism:

1) The descriptive generalizations (laws) are always subject to doubt, although “virtually” certain

2) The sciences are classified according to the order in which they attained the positivistic level (in decreasing order): mathematics (the simplest), astronomy, physics, biology, and ethics and society (the most complex -- which he believed have not arrived)

Other philosophers such as Mill, Spencer, Clerk-Maxwell, Clifford and Pearson adopted his system. Mill had the greatest contribution when he formulated the system of “inductive logic” which resolved Hume’s problem of induction.

Mills Inductive Logic

Mills defined cause by saying that:

“We should believe not only that the antecedent always has been followed by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution of thing endures, it always will be so”. In other words, cause is something that must be a sufficient, and not merely a necessary condition (Blood is necessary for life, but having blood does not mean you will have life). We say x is sufficient for y if the presence of x guarantees the presence of y. If all the necessary parts taken together become sufficient, hence the total collection can be said to cause the effect. An indispensable part of the cause is a necessary condition for the effect. The devised the canons of induction:

The Method of Agreement

This explains a sufficient condition or cause (i.e., look for a variable that is common to all observations having the same outcome).

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	No	Yes

After two observations, we might conclude that the number of guns and violent media is the “cause” of the high rate of deaths from firearms. However, when we add another observation, the conclusion using the Method of Agreement will change.

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	No	Yes
Europe	High rate of deaths from firearms	No	Yes	Yes

Here, violent media seems to be the “sufficient” cause of the high rate of deaths

Are there any other reasons for the high rate of deaths?

The Method of Difference

This explains the necessary condition for illness, but not the sufficient conditions. The word ‘cause’ is used in the sense of ‘sufficient condition’ when we are interested not in the elimination of something undesirable but rather in the production of something desirable. So to have a successful information system, we should work on the sufficient conditions for such a system, including all necessary conditions.

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canada	Low rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	No

These two cases suggests that violent media is a necessary condition of deaths because it is the only missing variable to cause the difference.

Joint Method of Agreement and Difference (Indirect Method of Difference)

We can also combine both canons to build a third canon to demonstrate both sufficiency and necessity. Combining the two strengthens our argument

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	No	Yes
Europe	High rate of deaths from firearms	No	Yes	Yes

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canada	Low rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	No

However, you may not be able to figure out which of these are clearly the causes for the effect. After doing some research and finding out various causes for some effects, there might be some other effects not accounted by the causes you have found. So to find the causing variable, you should try to eliminate or rule out all possible causes (by a systematic process of elimination). The remaining (or residual) variables are the cause of the effect.

The Method of Residues

This was the method used to find the cause of some remaining effects on the motion of the Planet Uranus, after explaining the other effects based on known causes. The residual effect was explained by the existence of another planet, Pluto.

Method of Concomitant Variations

In situations where the variables cannot be completely isolated or combined at will to show causation, we can use this method. For example, if we want to investigate the effect of temperature on the density of water, but we cannot separate other variables such as air pressure, we can observe the changes in the variation of the density in relation to the variation in the temperature, while the air pressure remains constant, so temperature and density can be said to be casually connected.

Currently, this method takes the form of the well-known statistical method called “correlation analysis”.

Limitations of Mill’s Inductive Logic

1) We cannot change or retain many aspects of the experiment at will. To solve this problem Mill suggested that we either assume that we have identified all the causes or ignore those aspects that are known not to have any influence on the result using our basic intuition

2) It assumes that certain events follow other events in time, otherwise we will confuse causes with effects

3) The causes work independently of each other, otherwise we can have a situation that an interaction of two causes is the sufficient and/or necessary event to cause the effect

4) Even granting that a particular time two events are necessarily connected, how can we show that they will always be so? The methods “depend on the assumption that every event must have some cause, some antecedent, on the existence of which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent” (the Universal Law of Causation). However, the scientist cannot be described as building up an inference to causal connections from observations alone, because he needs some assumption of causality in nature to start the process of induction.

5) The cause is viewed as deterministic, not probabilistic, whereas no matter how careful a scientist controls his causal experiments, errors creep in, such as errors of observation. That is why experiments should be repeated. This raises the question of how many observations should be taken before we can be sure. The critical problem is to find scientific techniques for making probability judgments.

Logical Positivism (20^th Century Empiricism)

This movement is an effort to distinguish the contemporary school of “logical empiricism”, which uses language and statements that is verifiable from the earlier, more psychologically oriented types of empiricism (depended on sensuous direct observation).

For logical positivists the meaning of a statement was simply the conditions under which it could be verified. That is to say if a statement did not describe an ‘experiential proposition’ (i.e. a sensation or objective sensory event reflecting some feature of reality) then it could carry no significance. The consequence of this position was to render all philosophical speculation about ethics, religion and aesthetics meaningless since none of these areas had propositions that could be verified by experience. It also solved Hume’s point that one cannot sanction a logical or probable inference from observed cases to unobserved cases. Using a formal system, the positivist brings explanation back into science because a formal system has an interpretation. Its axioms thus become necessary laws. Although these laws cannot be empirically confirmed, we can deduce theorems which can be tested empirically. Within the framework of such a formal system, a consequence or theorem which is empirically valid can be said to be “explained” by the laws of the system.

The upshot of all this was that statements like ‘force equals mass times acceleration’ were seen to be meaningful because we can agree on how to define ‘force’, ‘mass’ and ‘acceleration’, we can measure them and we can test this proposed relation amongst them. In other words the statement is verifiable and a science can be built on that basis. However, a statement like ‘truth is beauty, and beauty truth’ is not verifiable because we cannot define ‘truth’ and ‘beauty’ and measure this relationship between them. Statements like ‘childhood trauma leads to adult neuroses’ were seen to be too vague and imprecise and therefore could not be verifiable, and such had no place in science (so thank you and goodnight, psychoanalysis). By contrast, the statement ‘an animal given food pellets for pressing a lever will increase the frequency of lever pressing’ just might be verifiable and just might form the basis of a science of behaviour (so come on down, behaviourism!).

So, if the deduced consequences of a formal system have been observed to be true, then the laws from which they have been deduced are “indirectly confirmed” and the formal system which provides the deductive procedure has proven its worth. This is called the hypothetico-deductive method.

Thus in logical positivism there is a fundamental commitment to empiricism, which is, checking ideas against the world. Claims that have no empirical consequences are treated as meaningless. Building on this, the logical positivists argued that science should seek to describe the regularities of cause and effect in order to explain the world. All that was required was a theory to be expressed as a set of axioms (i.e. basic assumptions) with rules to link them systematically to objective measurements of the real world. Logical positivism came to the US in early 1930s and established relationships with American pragmatism. Popper and Kuhn published their most known and seminal works in neopositivist's series. This fact does not prove that Popper and Kuhn were neopositivists; but it shows the broad-mindedness, the kindly disposition and the lasting influence of logical positivism.

Logical positivists perform a reduction when defining protocol statements (atomic sentences, observation sentences, or elementary sentences). For examples when a biologists wishes to specify a new species of an animal, he reduces the sentence, “the animal belongs to…” to “the animal has ___ hair, or ____ tail and therefore belongs to …” To solve the problem of induction (the notion of a scientific theory cannot be confirmed) the positivists say that we need to use both syntax and semantics. By syntax we mean finding what could and could not be deduced from the formal system of axioms and postulates. By semantics we mean, “interpreting” the system of postulates and axioms so that at least some of the consequences (theorems) can be tested directly in experience, i.e. so that some of the consequences are reduced to protocol statements. Science to the positivists is not showing the necessity of any sequence of perceptions (to avoid Hume), but the formal system is given an explanation, and although these “laws” cannot ever be confirmed empirically, we can deduce theorems which we can test empirically. Within this “limited” framework, a consequence or theorem which is empirically valid can be said to “be explained” by the laws of the system.

Hempel explains this “The main function of general laws in the natural sciences is to connect events in patterns which are usually referred to as explanation and prediction… The scientific explanation of the event in question consists of

1) A set of statements asserting the occurrence of certain events, C1…Cn at certain time and places (e.g. cracking of an automobile radiator during a cold night. So set of statements states the initial and boundary conditions: the car was left in the street all night. Its radiator was completely filled and the cap was screwed tightly. The temperature dropped to 25F, the air pressure was normal. The bursting pressure of the radiator material is so and so much)

2) A set of universal hypotheses (Empirical laws stating that below 32F, the pressure of a mass of water increases if the volume remains constant with a quantitative law), such that

a) The statements of both groups are reasonably well confirmed by empirical evidence (by observation)

b) From the two groups of statements the sentence asserting the occurrence of events can be logically deduced (an explanation of the event has been established)

According to the positivists, if the deduced consequences of a formal system have been observed to be true, then the laws from which they have been deduced are “indirectly confirmed” and the formal system which provides the deductive procedure proves its worth.

Pragmatism

Pragmatists say that attempts to found science on combining observation and theory has failed. Pragmatisms avoids the problems associated with looking at first principles, supposed necessities (a priori), and instead looks towards last things, consequences, and facts (James 7, p. 53). ? Science is viewed as a means (an instrument) for obtaining objectives, and the various aspects of science are themselves viewed functionally as means for enabling science to work effectively in the task assigned to it. The process of inquiry is as follows:

1. There is a problem (indeterminate, disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, obscure, conflicting)

2. Formulate the problem properly – this determines what suggestions are entertained, what data is selected and what hypotheses are relevant. The suggested solution for the problem is an idea.

3. Apply the process of reasoning on ideas – anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to observed conditions” (3:109). Dewey uses a pragmatic transformation and defines ideas according to its functionality, that is with respect to its purpose in problem solving.

4. Invent symbols, words, numbers or signs so that in reasoning we can talk about it with ourselves and use these ideas in directing observation and in ascertaining the relevant facts. The rationalist school saw that “facts” cannot be separated from ideas, and treated ideas as the ultimate structure of reality. The positivists reduced suggestions to mental copies of physical things and assume that they are identical with ideas. The Kantian says that “perceptions are blind and conceptions empty” saw the need to bring them together, but could not formulate a solution that could accept that they are from different. For Dewey, the conceptual and perceptual are correlatives: they interact and arise together. Both are evaluated not from where they came from (the mind or the outside world), but by their usefulness in solving the problem at hand. In science, the final idea is stated as an hypothesis.

5. Formulate the hypothesis – framed in familiar terms and make use best what is already known. Reason related the present problem to the past. This is done by taking observed facts, not as given, but taken with forethought for the sake of solving the problem. They serve as evidence and serve as a basis for testing suggested solutions, not as the answer themselves. We must therefore find relevant facts.

6. If there are conflicting goals for an inquiry, Dewey and Peirce say that “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth”. Singer goes further and argues for a coherent theory of truth that go beyond individuals or societies and called it “non-relativistic”.

Non-Relativistic Pragmatism

1. All problems of science are interrelated (science is anti-hierarchical)

2. It is necessary to evaluate scientific efforts with respect to a criterion of progress that is not relative to particular individuals or societies (answers “exists”, they just need to be found)

3. Although science cannot give absolutely certain answers to any question, this does not mean that an individual cannot feel certain (truth depends on the purpose of the investigation – difference between ends and ideals, between responses and answers)

4. Use prior information effectively. An experiment is just an element in a chain of experiments. The true meaning of a scientific concept is as much a problem of science as the method used to study any problems of science. Some concepts are not based on purely physical notions. Researchers have to resort to non-physical notions from fields such as psychology as the bases for some aspects of experiments. Poincare defined these concepts as “conventions”. These conventions are true not on physical grounds but on psychological or social grounds and they are adopted because they efficiently serve the explanation of the world; and the problem of finding out whether a certain law will or will not prove convenient and simple is a psychological or sociological problem. So the goal of finding prior knowledge is so that he finds methods whereby the maximum information will go into the experiment with the minimum waste of time and energy on the researcher.

5. Build a scientific model -- Positivism has been helpful in defining the language for this scheme. A complete scientific model would encompass all the possible concepts and relations and hence is an ideal of science. To systematize the methods of checking, we cannot rely on “direct observation” or basic rational intuitions, we must be able to find definitions for those ideas themselves. According to Singer, all concepts of science are defined in terms of one another. The problem of scientifically defining a concept is to show how it effects inquiry when it is involved in that inquiry.

6. Collect Pertinent Data -- We must approach the task of gathering observations equipped with the criterion that tells use how to gather our data, otherwise we are just collecting chaotic facts. To the pragmatist, not only so-called elementary forms of experience, such as color, smells and tastes, are the only objects of observation. A man’s feeling at a given moment may have as strong a role in the process of reaching a conclusion as his sensation of sight.

7. Measure properties -- we conceive the number attached as relating the object to other objects within the model for guiding our actions.

8. Construct alternative hypotheses -- The alternatives should cover all possible outcomes and should not overlap (no more than one alternative should be true at a time). The number and kinds of alternative hypotheses depend on the purpose of the investigation. Sometimes we reconstruct hypotheses, which happens when an hypothesis is not in accordance with the observations. We have two alternatives, (1) we can re-examine the theory, or (2) we can re-examine the observations. Alternative hypotheses are never in complete disagreement; there must be a common ground behind them. These common notions are called presuppositions.

9. Measure errors

10. Weigh alternatives -- Since the inquiry is directed toward some specific goal, problems of values are always critical.

11. To gather information we need to know (1) how the observations are to be grouped, as well as the number of observations to be taken, and (2) an accurate description of the method used in the experiment. One way is to hold every aspect of the situation constant except two, and while systematically changing one of these, be measuring the other. This can be very inefficient since the researcher might want to measure other variables. There are now many techniques (see statistical methods) to vary several aspects of the experiment. As far as the number of observations, this depends on (1) the significance of the experiment, (2) the errors of the observations.

12. Confirm the analysis based on (1) how pertinent the observations were, (2) how narrow or loose the hypotheses are, (3) how established the prior information is, (4) extent of errors of observation, (5) the design of the experiment and number of observations, (6) method of analyzing the data and drawing conclusions.

13. Issue of scientist bias – this is not acceptable to pragmatism because they insist that the individual and social purpose be consistent with the purpose of science itself. So when a scientist has introduced “bias”, to the pragmatist, this means that the scientist was influenced by a purpose that runs counter to that of science. Pragmatism does not differentiate the science of discovery from the science of verification (which checks results already obtained). Both open up the new, otherwise it would not be science at all. The process of verification is no more than a discovery that what we hesitantly accepted, can now be more confidently accepted.

Types (and Qualities) of Other Inquiry Methods

Certain patterns of actions may not qualify the ideal requirements of science but are nevertheless useful in the process of science. For example:

1) Speculative inquiry – this is characterized by a heavy reliance on insight (intuition), much discussion, vaguely applied rules of logic, usually used in model construction at a very general level. Its aim is usually for “satisfying intellectual curiosity” (a vague notion that does not have any end)

2) Pure Empirical Inquiry – Characterized by data gathering, with intuition supplying the criteria of pertinence. This kind of testing leads to speculation and other types discussed below. This inquiry is usually followed by heavy statistical analysis (with little evaluation of why the statistics were chosen) but few conclusions. The result is worthy of “exploration”.

3) Conceptual Empirical Inquiry – This time a partial scientific model directs the data gathering and supplies the criteria of pertinence. The process of checking is often crude because many assumptions are made about the aspects of nature outside the model. Most “exact” sciences rely heavily on this method.

4) Mystical Inquiry – Characterized by heavy reliance on feeling with processes rarely expressed in precise terms. It does attempt to reach conclusions to guide action (e.g. psycho-analysis and the field of esthetics)

5) Practical Inquiry – The same as conceptual inquiry with some more immediate goal made explicit and which guides the inquiry, though with little use made of long-run objectives. This is commonly used in engineering.

6) Planning Inquiry – this method includes long-run objectives, but uses sporadic data gathering and relies heavily on speculative methods.

History of Inquiry in Disciplines

Nature of Causality

The metaphysical approach consists of trying to get at the essential (inner) nature of the causal connections or to conclude with the “ultimate cause” or “final explanation” to get a comprehensive picture of reality which will enable us to understand the world in its totality.

The positivistic approach to causality is essentially a mechanical image in order to enable us to predict with certainty future events from knowledge of the present, or to explain present or past events in terms of their antecedents, making explicit the meaning of a “causal law” so the positivist spends a lot of effort developing techniques (such as Mill’s canons) to formulate the meaning of “law” in science.

For the pragmatist the presupposed causal law is not something operating independently in nature, but as an instrument for dealing with natural phenomena in the pursuit of our particular objectives, enabling a progressive and continuous inquiry. So the pragmatist uses everything available to him to figure out the “cause” of the problem.

Nature of Biological Sciences

For biology to be a separate science, the first question that needs to be answered is whether or not all questions about living phenomena can be handled by physical science. This controversy appears as the mechanist-vitalist argument. Descartes explained all natural phenomena in terms of matter and motion. Spinoza maintained a naturalistic approach that combined both mechanistic and non-mechanistic approaches. Metaphysicians such as Bergson maintain that science is incapable of understanding life and that intuition and instinct are the ways of fitting life into a causal system. The logical positivists such as Carnap admit that we do not know whether biological laws are reducible to physical laws, we do know that biological concepts are reducible to physical concepts. So notions such as species, organisms, organs, and events in entire organisms can be defined in science by means of qualitative determinations such as “fertilization” (as the union of the spermatozoa). There is a strong tendency to define living matter in chemical terms, hence the terms “bio-chemistry” and “bio-physics”, where researchers are attempting to discover the mechanism of biological changes; by reducing it to chemical or physical ones (e.g. cancer cure by means of chemical means – chemo-therapy). Pragmatists such as Singer attempted to define life in terms of both functional and non-functional terms.

Nature of Psychological Sciences

The metaphysicians hold that the mind is known intimately by the individual, is completely private and non-physical. Mind is knowable to the metaphysician by introspection, by looking into ourselves and the science that will do this is introspective psychology.

The positivists develop a theory of mind built up out of sense experiences. Minds do not exist independently of the experiences (minds do not sense). To handle sensations Watson developed the concept of behaviorism. Behaviorism contends that if research was left to introspective psychology or gestalt psychology, which depend on verbal reports of the subject as to his reactions to stimuli, many areas of mental investigation are not researchable (such as child psychology and animal behavior). So behaviorism attends to what human beings do, rather than what they merely say (observe how humans behave). To find out what sensation is, the behaviorist defined “discrimination” and “operations”. For the behaviorists, sensations can be defined by the operation by which it is got, that is to say, by discrimination (the behavior of humans to choose one behavior instead of another). These researchers called the operationists (operational or positivistic behaviorists) wanted to reduce immediate experience to behavior. This reliance on observing behavior does not reduce the value of verbal reports, it provides an extra means of inquiry. It demonstrates that the concepts resulting from such practice can be no more definite than what is known of the meaning of the word in the mind of the subject (Stevens 1935). Hence, psychologists investigate thoroughly, using positivistic semantic analysis, all the terms in verbal reports.

The pragmatic analysis of mind defines molar behaviorism as “emergent phenomenon that has descriptive properties of its own” (mind is a class of an individual’s purpose). A certain behavior pattern that constitutes a functional class (e.g., transportation) is said to be purposive (function is limited to a class). A clock only has the function of recording time, but a human being can be said to have the purpose of telling time, because he can use many different behaviors to tell time. All purposive classes of behavior are functional, but not all functional classes are purposive. The final step is to define “mind” as the class of an individual’s purposive behavior. Purposive behavior is only displayed when there are alternative courses of action. The alternative courses of action are called means, and the product common to the morphologically dissimilar behavior displayed by one individual, is the end. Purposive behavior is the selection of a means to an end. This theory says therefore that psychological concepts such as “sensation”, “consciousness”, personality”, “trait,” are various kinds of properties of selection of means for various ends. In the positivistic approach, such concepts need to be reduced to protocol statements or “simple in sensation” or “directly observables”. For the pragmatist, meaning does not reduce to directly observables. All logical or psychological inquiries are provisional and complex (they are all indirect). His proof for this lies with the approach of Gestalt psychology, where observers grasp the entire complex object at once and not by adding simple elements together. We can use Gestalt psychology as basis for IS?? Even simple discrimination can be complex (e.g. tapping a table results in different responses). For example, when a doctor inquires a patient about a certain pain the stomach, the sensation of pain is not directly observable. The patient wishes he can better describe it, but he cannot. Additionally, if the purpose is critical (whether or not to operate), just asking a question based on sensation will not suffice. For pragmatism, science is always about seeking a more exact ways of responding to its questions, and hence the use of quantities or measurements. Pragmatists define the “directly observable” as (1) it is more or less immediately apprehended, (2) when an individual judges whether he observes a directly observable, he is almost always correct in his judgment. Without precise measurements, the pragmatist considers the inquiry pre-scientific. So what about “consciousness”? The empiricist says it is something that can be known immediately, through introspection and without description (this is related to the issue of qualitative measures). To the pragmatist, the empiricist had no idea what it is. The positivists, in the form of behaviorism, define consciousness as a discriminatory act (conscious of something instead of something else). However, this method depends on other complex methods such as “pointing”, or “agree”. The pragmatist agrees that discrimination is a response to a stimulus. A response is defined (Singer) as a change in living beings to enhance or lessen the organisms changes of attaining a purpose empirically assigned to it (e.g. find out if the clock is working). A stimulus is a change in the environment (clock ticking) which is necessary for the correlated response (listening to the clock). When this change is physical or morphological (clock ticking, as opposed to the functional properties, e.g. clock recording time) the response is called a sensation (hear a clock ticking -- the purposive response to the goal of finding out if the clock works is to choose to listen). A non-living being such as a photographic film cannot be said to have sensations, even though it changes (responds) to light, because its behavior cannot be interpreted as purposive. What if there is not observable response even though there is sensation? The pragmatist says, it is a matter of finding the right instrument to measure the response, even if it is a twitch (because the pragmatist says there is nothing wrong in using introspection because it fulfills the purpose as long as it is not abused). The instrument could be a question (that is why it’s called an instrument!!). It may not be very good instrument (and we have means of improving survey instruments).

The Nature of Social Science

1) The analogists view groups as separate and compares them to studies in other scientific areas such as biology (social mechanism or living organism), or to an individual mind (psychological analogy – this has had the greatest influence)

a) The study of the social group based on “argument by analogy”

b) Study of the social group based on social mechanics and physics (Sorokin). Examples include Haret and Barcelo where the individual is a material point within a field of forces (social environment), kinetic energy, etc and H.C. Carey’s Principles of Social Science who apply laws of gravitation, centralization and decentralization to social phenomena.

c) Social biologists such as Herbert Spencer who links (1) growth – from child to adult, from hoards to nations, (2) increasing differentiation of structure; and (3) increasing differentiation of function

d) Psychological analogists – the relationship between psychology and social science is very intimate so the psychological analogies are the most prominent analogies which reduce the social group. The psychological analogists claims that the social group is a distinct entity, but that it is not like a physical body, or a living organism, but is rather a “mind” and hence can be studied within psychology (Tozzer 1925). The social group is a “collective mind” (Le Bon’s The Crowd). The group mind does not operate like its members’ minds; it is not the mere sum of its parts. It has a history which gives it properties its members do not have individually. Mind for McDougall is “an organized system of mental or purposive forces”, a group has a mind. Mind is not merely the forces which produces action, but the action itself. All institutions are not only products of thought and creations of mind; they are mind “otherwise we have a building without a tenant, a body without a mind”. A group is “self-conscious” because it responds to its own objectives. Social psychology is a branch of psychology that studies the social mind.

2) The molecular analysts views group as aggregates of persons and its properties can all be inferred from the properties of these persons

a) Allport disagrees with McDougall and says that social psychology is part of the psychology of the individual, whose behavior it studies in relation to that sector of his environment. Group mind is actually a set of common ideals and feelings rendered more uniformly by the conscious effect of one individual upon another differing only in complexity. Collective consciousness and behavior are simply the aggregation of those states and reactions of individuals which, owing to similarities in constitution, training, and common stimulations, are possessed of a similar character.

3) The molar analysts view that groups do exist as a separate entity, but not as an entity which can be identified with the entities of any other sciences – it requires a distinct method. Churchman’s arguments against the other two are:

a) Against the analogists -- The argument of the analogist that a social group is a kind of physical body, (1) the problem is; which properties should we choose to compare? (Life is like chocolate, Forrest Gump) Analogies can be made up. They need to show that they are not ignoring critical properties if their method is to work. They must show that all the pertinent properties of the object under study can be included among the properties of the known subjects. He has other properties which make him different from physical objects such as the history of the object, (2) “there is no continuity of tissue between the units of the groups as there is between cells and organs of the body” (Allport), (3) “the organization of the individual’s body is based upon integration, or the welfare of the entire individual, whereas, the controlling principle of the organization is the interest of the parts, that is, the separate individuals” (Allport). Notwithstanding this argument, the analogists have opened up many avenues of fruitful research. The biological emphasis has turned attention to the evolution of group structures and functions and to social growth and development. But this is not a sufficient basis to understand all the phases of a new concept. The analogical method would reduce, in its extreme, all science to mechanics.

b) Against the molecular analysts -- Allport follows a positivists approach by considering that the primary objects, that which do not come from reflection or theorizing, are things like rock, tree, man alone constitute “individuals” or the simplest element of analysis. Allport considers those objects that are abstractions of our experience things which we can only analyze by thinking or talking about them (e.g. like groups, “relationship” or “strategy”) and therefore cannot be considered “individuals”. Wallis argues that even individual things such as Woodrow Wilson is not a single unit but a changing unit that is taken as one for convenience of study. So molecular analysis taken literally prevents our considering certain phenomena as distinct entities, and so forces us to give up what might otherwise be a fruitful line of attack.

The “molar” approach to the problem of the social group says that it regards the social group as a distinct entity that must be studied on its own terms. How is this study to be done? The speculative method to molar analysis has contributed little to the study of social science except for studies about the origin, values and possible destination of societies using terms such as “group spirit”, “national destiny” and “disintegrating forces”. The positivistic approach to molar analysis such as Lundberg’s avoids any mention of “psychic”, or “mental”, and maintains that social phenomena is a complex kind of electron-proton behavior that do not have purpose or motives, and that the physical facts exist independent of purpose and motives. The study of social groups is not analogous to electron and proton, but is a function of this basic mechanical behavior. The metaphysician says that this reduction of social phenomena to mechanistic concepts impoverishes social science, and introduces uncontrollable teleological concepts. The pragmatist incorporates the metaphysician’s claim that the social individual is a super-individual with the positivistic claim that it is compatible with the physical sciences.

Pragmatic Concept of Social Science

Hussong says that social behavior is dependent upon the behavior of its members but not related to the behavior of any particular member. Social behavior is a function of its member’s behavior; it is emergent behavior. This is analogous to the relationship between physics and mechanics. We measure the total effect of the system without needing to measure the effect of each individual component. To the pragmatist, there is not need to break down the group into its constituents (like Lundberg), although that is one way to analyze the group. Knowledge of the group and the members are complimentary. Sometimes we first study the group to understand the members (e.g. the anthropologist studies the general mores, religion and habits of the tribe as a group to understand the individuals). Psychology is not “prior” or “more basic” than sociology. Sociologists define the “social plurel” (and consequently “social behavior”) as social individuals – a collection of psychological individuals whose collective properties are expressed as a function of the properties of the individuals. We can study how a group acts without knowing the behavior of any individual member (e.g. we can study the behavior of a foreign army without knowing anything about its members). This is referred to as the “emergent” property of the plurel (an integrated group). Group is defined as “any collection of social beings who enter into distinctive social relationship with one another” (Lundberg 1929). Unfortunately the meaning of “interaction” and “social relationship” are not clearly defined. The way to define these words is to insist that the interaction has purposive behavior. Purposive interaction is communication. The communication need to be intentional or two-way, although sociologists usually are more interested in two-way communications (Cuber defines a social group as any number of human beings in reciprocal communication). The pragmatic approach defines the social group as any number of human beings who are in potential (or actual) communication. The social group is distinct from, though dependent on, the properties of its elements. In so far as the group displays purposive behavior, it has a mind that is distinct from but dependent on the minds of its members. This “mind” is not supernatural because it is capable of scientific investigation.

The Nature of Ultimate Value

The position that says values depend on facts is called “naturalism”, whereas the opposite to this is “non-naturalism”.

1) Speculative approaches to value

a) “Good” is independent of fact and is therefore not subject to scientific inquiry. Good is ultimately simple and indefinable (Moore). The method to assign “good” for this approach is to assign good as means (instrumental) and things which are good in themselves (intrinsic). Science can handle this (more efficient – good), but intrinsic good cannot be handled by science. Moore also says that instrumental good presupposes a determination of intrinsic good, but not vice versa. Intrinsic good is (1) simple and cannot be defined in any other terms (such as in terms of perceptions, feelings or ideas), and non-natural (Moore had difficulty defining this) which Moore says cannot be related to anything else that exist. Only intuition can “isolate” something “good”.

b) Some aspects of “good” is non-naturalistic, however, says that good is not simple and is definable (Ewing). For Ewing, Moore’s method is too arbitrary and that intuition, because it is the main method for metaphysics, has to be properly defined. He defines “good” partly in terms of the non-naturalistic “ought”, and partly by a naturalistic psychological predicate. “Ought” involves two concepts, “fittingness” and “moral obligation”. “Fittingness” is considered simple and non-definable (recognized by intuition). “Moral obligation” is defined in terms of “fittingness” and a psychological concept. In the case that intuition fails and two incompatible things are fitting in a given situation, Ewing falls back on the law of contradiction and requires that value intuitions be a coherent (non-contradictory) body of assertions. So for Ewing, value is measured in (1) an immediate intuition of fittingness, and (2) conformity of the intuition to a principle of consistency which itself is immediately given with certainty in intuition. So Ewing enables a system of value that does not need science.

2) Positivistic approaches to value

a) Some values are meaningless, and the rest can be reduced to questions of scientific fact (Ayer). Ayer as a logical positivist, resorts to language to analyze values. He distinguishes four types of ethical statements, (1) propositions expressing ethical terms or judgments about the legitimacy of words (killing is taking someone’s life), (2) propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience (killing causes social discord), (3) exhortations to moral virtue (thou shall not kill), (4) actual ethical judgments (killing is evil). The first belongs to linguistic study, what positivists call “ethical philosophy”. The second statement belongs to the science of psychology or sociology. The third is not a proposition and is not scientific (cannot be studies). The fourth is what the positivists study to see if it can be translated into empirical fact, so that they are capable of scientific investigation. Ayer rejects values based on opinions or equating it with pleasure, or satisfaction because the statement “x is good” can be against “x is pleasant” (what is pleasant can be evil and there is no way of contradicting that statement). Values must be considered absolute or intrinsic. What remains is that “statements of value are not controlled by observation, but only by a mysterious intellectual intuition (what we call fitrah). To avoid this speculative conclusion, Ayer says that the values are un-analyzable is because these ethical symbols in a statement does not add anything to its factual content (“stole” in “You stole that money” does not say anything, they just express feeling). Disagreement in values occur, according to Ayer, because we argue about the relevant facts on which the feelings are based. To Ayer, there cannot be an ethical science. We can study the moral habits of a group of people and what causes them to have those habits and feelings (as in social science), but we cannot evaluate them. One culture cannot be said to be better than another culture (cultural relativity).

b) All questions of value are meaningful and can be reduced to questions of fact (Lundberg). Social science is capable of verifying values. He disagrees with Ayer in saying that feeling is the basis for differentiating scientific and ethical statements. A person may say something but may feel differently. Lundberg uses the similarity that “should” and “ought” has with an expectation or prediction of an event (“if there is gas, the engine ought to start” and “he ought to be ashamed”). Expected behavior is implicit in all “ought” statements. Values are then valuating behavior of some sort and so can be studied like any other behavior. Studies on most choice behavior such as occupations and consumption are studies of human values. The statement “we ought to avoid war” can be analyzed using all “undesirable consequence” of war, the reliability of prediction on the war, etc. Although in human affairs the gap between what is expected (desired) and what is observed (what occurs) is still great. If ethical principles (conditions producing murder) can be brought more closely to the science of social occurrences, the gap between the two different propositions, ethical and physical, can disappear. Lundberg defines “good” in terms of what is desired, or instrumentally, relative to a desired end. Lundberg does not answer which end is desirable. The pragmatists consider this question.

3) Pragmatic Approaches to value

a) All questions of value are translatable into psychological or social questions of fact, and fact presupposes the answering of questions of value (Dewey). James considered a “true” statement as one, if acted upon, led to the successful culmination of an end-pursuit. Truth for James was efficiency of belief. “Good” for James is the other side of the same coin. “Good” for James is efficient action. This is a naturalistic approach provides for James a scientific way of deciding which of two choice is better (instrumentally) for any desired end. However, which end is to be selected? James gave this choice to the individual. Desire and value is considered synonymous. Because man is the measure of all things, ethics to James is reduced to psychology. Also, most people do not equate “ought” to with “desired”. By equating the ends a man wants to pursue with the ends he ought to pursue, James reduces ethics to technology and meaningful obligation with respect to ends disappears.

b) A revision to James position reflected in Dewey’s early writings did not fare any better. Dewey suggested that society’s desires should be the ultimate reference in the science of value. This recommendation reduces ethics to sociology rather than psychology. Value is measured in terms of their efficiency for social ends. The problem with this position is that we cannot compare different cultures. We do not believe that everything society wants is good. Dewey’s lagter writings suggest another position. A child’s cry is really a social activity because it is made in order to evoke a response in another person. So a cry “help” means (1) there is an undesirable circumstances, (2) the person crying out cannot handle it, and (3) someone else can help. By stating this, Dewey resolves the emotive theory of value (Ayer’s “meaningless” statements). Dewey goes on to say that evaluating ends is not independent of evaluating means. It is what a person does in pursuit of an end that indicates its worth (value) to him. The good end is the one we are led to select by intelligent appraisal of the problem situation (when intelligent investigation is restricted, a person may wrongly value something). Intelligent inquiry includes considering the consequences of any action. For Dewey intelligent action is ultimate value. So societies can be compared based on how they permit and encourage the free use of intelligence. These comparisons can be made by science.

c) Non-relativistic pragmatic theory of value – Believes that ALL of mankind should have a vote on what is truly valuable. It should be based on essentially unattainable objectives (ideals). The only possible way of voting for these is by way of trends of interest. The ultimately valuable ideals are those man collectively tends to want more and more. Because ideals have tended to crumble historically, pragmatists have avoided using them because they could not be done naturalistically. This new position accepts the naturalistic positions of the (second) positivistic approach and the first pragmatic approach but denies that question of value are translatable into question of psychology or sociology. This approach requires a new science called the science of value. This method says that:

i) How do we evaluate means with respect to an ideal? And

ii) How do we determine which ideal defines the good?

We do this by considering standard ends (or a classification of ends – the best writing pen, the best mode of transportation) and the deviations from that standard (approximation chain – we can never achieve the ideal but we continue to approach it by becoming more precise in measurement). When someone intends to each an ideal he is also intending to reach the standard. The “good” is that ideal which mankind (as a whole) tends eventually to desire with perfect intention. It is not necessarily the current ideal in which mankind has maximum intention, but the one for which mankind tends to have maximum intention. This allows for a scientific investigation for what is ultimately valuable – the most general social individual possible historically. It is possible to assume some ideal in order to further investigate what the correct ideal should be. So the investigation serves as a basis for testing his hypothesis. For example, we can create a hypothesis that the ideal consist of four aspects, (1) the ideal of plenty (perfect production and distribution), the ideal of truth (perfect knowledge), the ideal of moral good (perfect cooperation), and the ideal of freedom (perfect regeneration in ideal pursuit). Progress is made when nothing is lost with respect to the other paths when one path is taken. Using this statement, it is possible to analyze gay marriages (will it help give each individual perfect ways of doing whatever they want and attain their ends, will it allow them to choose the best possible means, will it help improve their mutual cooperation and cooperation with others and remove conflict, will it help them build themselves, regenerate and also become more aesthetic?

Table of Contents

Definitions of Research

In many cases, research is equated to scientific inquiry, although research exists within literature and the arts. The general definition of research should include research in all fields, the sciences or the arts.

Aristotle says:

"Hence, if the facts about a given area are grasped, our next task will be to set out the demonstrations readily. For if our inquiry leaves out none of the facts that truly hold things, we will be able to find and produce a demonstration of whatever admits of demonstration, and if something does not admit of demonstration, to make this evident also." (Prior Analytics, 46a17-27).

The University of South Queensland, Faculty of Arts Research and Research Degrees Committee defines research as:

"Research is taken to mean systematic and rigorous investigation aimed at the discovery of previously unknown phenomena, the development of explanatory theory and its application to new situations or problems, and the construction of original works of significant intellectual merit."

In the education field, Stenhouse (1975) defines research as systematic critical inquiry made public. Rummel and Ballaine (1963), drawing upon suggestions made by J. L. Kelly and J. Dewey, proposed a model with six steps: a felt need; the problem; the hypothesis; collection of data; concluding belief; and, general value of conclusion. This is a robust view which stands the test of time.

Charles Kettering, the famous inventor says:

Research is an effort to do things better and not to be caught asleep at the switch. It is the problem-solving mind as contrasted to the let-well-enough-alone mind. It is the tomorrow mind instead of the yesterday mind.

None of these definitions imply the scientific method, although in most other definitions of research, such an implication is made.

Mario Bunge argues that philosophy and the different areas of science intermingle:

“I will argue that all social studies, whether scientific or literary, are crammed with philosophical concepts, such as those of fact, system, process, theory, test, and truth. They also contain or presuppose some philosophical assumptions, such as that societies are (or are not) mere aggregates of individuals, that people can (or cannot) choose and act rationally, and that social facts can (or cannot) be studied scientifically. Regrettably, most students of society rarely pause to examine the philosophical ideas they adopt. When they do, they often fall under the influence of philosophies that do not match the practice of contemporary social science research. Most of the philosophers who have paid attention to the philosophy in or about social science have held some or all of the following three theses: that there is a clear divide between the social and the natural sciences, there being no mixed or socio-natural sciences; that science and philosophy are mutually disjoint, so cannot learn from one another; that the philosophy of social science is the same as that of the natural sciences -- or else that the two are utterly disjoint. I will argue that all three, and many more received opinions, are false.

Barnes (1977) offers a plausible definition of research as a “process whereby models of reality embodying potentially falsifiable hypotheses are continually matched against objective empirical evidence and are tentatively retained only until they can be replaced by better approximations to reality” (p: 61).

More restrictive definitions of research are often guided by the mission of the organizations that support that research. For example, the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) – the body that allocates funds to higher educational institutions in England – is understood as

“original investigation undertaken in order to gain knowledge and understanding. It includes work of direct relevance to the needs of commerce and industry, as well as to the public and voluntary sectors; scholarship*; the invention and generation of ideas, images, performances and artifacts including design, where these lead to new or substantially improved insights; and the use of existing knowledge in experimental development to produce new or substantially improved materials, devices, products and processes, including design and construction. It excludes routine testing and analysis of materials, components and processes, e.g. for the maintenance of national standards, as distinct from the development of new analytical techniques. It also excludes the development of teaching materials that do not embody original research.”

*Scholarship for the RAE is defined as the creation, development and maintenance of the intellectual infrastructure of subjects and disciplines, in forms such as dictionaries, scholarly editions and contributions to major research data bases.

(RAE Circular 5/99, Assessment Panels’ Criteria and Working Methods, Section I, Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), 1999)

The OECD defines research as the creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications

OECD Definition of Research & Experimental Development

Research and Experimental Development is creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.

Any activity classified as research and experimental development is characterized by originality; it should have investigation as a primary objective and should have the potential to produce results that are sufficiently general for humanity's stock of knowledge (theoretical and/or practical) to be recognizably increased. Most higher education research work would qualify as research and experimental development.

Research includes pure basic research, strategic basic research, applied research and experimental development.

RMIT defines the following support activities as research:

provision of professional, technical, administrative or clerical support and/or assistance to staff directly engaged in research and experimental development;
management of staff who are either directly engaged in research and experimental development or are providing professional, technical or clerical support or assistance to those staff;
activities of students undertaking postgraduate research courses;
development of postgraduate research courses; and
supervision of students undertaking postgraduate research courses.

Activities that do not support research should be excluded. Such activities may include:

preparation for teaching;
scientific and technical information services;
general purpose or routine data collection;
standardization and routine testing;
feasibility studies (except into research and experimental development projects);
specialized routine medical care;
commercial, legal and administrative aspects of patenting, copyright or licensing activities; or
routine computer programming, systems work or software maintenance (research and experimental development into applications software, new programming languages and new operating systems would normally meet the definition of research).

For the purposes of this collection, a “research publication” is characterised by:

scholarly activity, as evidenced by discussion of the relevant literature, an awareness of the history and antecedents of work described, and a format which allows a reader to trace sources of the work through citations, footnotes etc;
originality, that is, it is not a compilation of existing works;
veracity/validity through a peer validation processes or by satisfying the commercial publisher or gallery processes;
increasing the stock of knowledge; and
being in a form that enables dissemination of knowledge.

Method of Adding to Knowledge

The overriding goal of research is to add to the current stock of knowledge. Hillway (1964) identifies three elementary methods of adding to the sum total of knowledge – chance, trial and error and generalization from experience. A fourth method is logic. He traces the sources of knowledge beginning with mankind’s appeal to authority, to the Greek’s development of reason. Unfortunately the syllogistic system was abused to the point that it was possible to prove anything, largely by using false untested premises. Bacon attacked the Greek’s concept of deductive reasoning and emphasized the need to use inductive reasoning, and depend on empirical observations to draw inferences. This process of fact-gathering however, also failed to reach closure, so the hypothetico-deductico method was introduced as the scientific method. Produce a hypothesis and try to either prove or disprove the hypothesis.

Methods of Inquiry

Churchman and Ackoff (1950) summarize the different approaches of scientific inquiry.

Introduction

Science is usually passively defined as “an organized body of knowledge.” Science is not a mere state or accumulation; it is an activity as well as the products of that activity. Science is inquiry, but not all inquiry is scientific. Science differs from other inquiry by virtue of what it inquires into, or how it inquires; content or method or both. If we use these two criteria to compare “common sense” inquiry and “scientific” inquiry, we will find that science differs from common sense not by virtue of content, but by virtue of method. Science is controlled inquiry, and common sense is not. Science is really an organized way of obtaining knowledge. Science organizes its results, but so does philosophy, but science uses an organized and systematic method of inquiry. Control is defined as the degree of how efficiently the inquirer uses the method in solving problems. Efficiency refers to the inquirer leading the method, not the method leading him. In so far as the scientist can examine the adequacy of his steps and make an efficient selection, then he leads or controls his steps. A method of inquiry is under complete control when every aspect of the activity is itself subject to inquiry with respect to its adequacy for the problematic purpose.

To say that a method of inquiry is not under control is not to say that the conclusion it reaches is wrong, only that a controlled inquiry is more apt to produce correct answers than uncontrolled answers. In philosophy, the method of inquiry is studied under the branch of “epistemology”, which existed long before modern science. With the development of modern science, epistemology became more and more interested in the scientific method because epistemology asks the question “do we know what we know?”

Rationalism: The Role of Reason in Science

When science underwent its rebirth during the renaissance, modern man wanted no dogmas handed down to him that he could not check by his own faculties, so he turned to humanism – the organizing force that reside in man himself – his faculty of reason. An early description of reason is attributed to Heraclitus (500 B.C.) by Sextus Empiricus (200 A.D.): (Nahm 1945)

The natural philosopher is of the opinion that what surrounds us is rational and endowed with consciousness. According to Heraclitus, we become intelligent when we get his divine reason by breathing it in , and in sleep we are forgetful, but on waking we gain our senses again. For in sleep the opening of the senses are closed, the mind in us is separated form what is akin to it in what surrounds us, and its connection through openings is only preserved lie a sort of root (from which the rest may spring again); and being cut off it loses its former power of memory: but when we wake it looks through the openings of the sense, as through little doors, and entering into connection with what surrounds us it regains its power of reason (p. 97)

Reason in this description is taken to be a property of the natural world; it lies outside the human mind, and we partake in it by “breathing” it in. This means that it is not an inherent faculty of our minds, but rather something that lies in nature itself.

Plato in his Republic considers reason as an internal part of each man; reason is one of the four faculties of the soul: “reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last.” (Plato 1924 Vol III, p. 533) Plato views that the things we sense directly are but “shadows” of more perfect forms and these forms themselves derive their being from the purpose that governs the universe, which Plato calls the Idea of the Good (his analogy of the Sun enlightening the people in the cave). Reason for him is that faculty which deals with the ultimate forms (truth) of things, and not their copies in the world of sense. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), a pupil of Plato, subdivided the soul into three functions: the nutritive, the sensitive, and the rational. The active form of the rational faculty (he called the “active intellect”) has the ability of separating the form or meaning of a thing from its particular appearance. So if you are shown a clock, a watch, a sundial, an electric chronometer, you discern a common property among them all by the power of reason to grasp the essential in a set of diverse instances.

The Stoics, after Aristotle, elevated reason to the highest pinnacle and shared Heraclitus’ notion of reason and says that no one can willfully change its rationality; we are determined to act in certain ways, in accordance with the rational plan of the universe. We only have one freedom, that is the attitude of mind we hold with respect to this rationality. The wise man is one who appreciates that all natural events are rational no matter how terrible they may seem to his emotional side.

The Christians, based on Revelation, tried to reconcile reason with revelation. For Augustine (354-430 A.D.), man is endowed with a rational power so that he can penetrate and appreciate the plans of God. For Thomas Aquinas (influenced by Averroes and Aristotle), the rational faculty is separate from the revealed truth, they must be consistent, but not all revealed truth need fall within the scope of reason. Averroes felt that the mind has a rational insight of its own that did not necessarily have to be consistent with revealed truth. Only a few of us have the power to use reason in its purest form. This notion that reason resides within each individual dominated the Renaissance after Averroes.

Descartes, emphasizing reason, wanted to sweep away all questionable knowledge temporarily in order to see if he could get back to those truths which all of us as rational beings must accept, making the judgment of truth in individual and internal process. He regarded as such truths as the starting point of all knowledge.

By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the sense, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about what which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone

“I think, therefore I am” was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of philosophy for which I was seeking (Discourse on Method)

Descartes set the stage for philosophy as we know it, the things we start with are those that our rational intuitions cannot fail to accept. If all truth can be established in this way, then there will be an end to skepticism – that there is no certainty about anything. Each man has the power to construct it himself, if he will but follow the carefully prescribed rules. No outside mind, no outer world is needed to guarantee the correctness of the result. Spinoza, in rebellion against Holy Scripture, carried this further by saying that reason should not be tied down to any external authority. Spinoza proposes four modes of gaining knowledge (1) by looking at what comes before, (2) construct a universal axiom from experience, (3) mathematical inference, (4) proportions. For both Descartes and Spinoza, rational intuition provides us with the knowledge of essences, which cannot be known through sensuous perception. The method that was used by the rationalist to reach to the essences is what Euclid proposed many centuries before.

Deductive science

It was the Greeks that first systemized man’s knowledge of space (geometry) divorced from its practical application. Thales of Miletus was the first to propose abstract geometry, but did not formulate the method of geometry. This was credited to Pythagoras who formulated the science of geometry as follows;
1. State in as clear and precise terms as possible the meanings of the basic concepts: points, lines, angles

2. State the elements, the simple propositions which require not proof

3. Deduce the remaining, more complex propositions from the definitions and elements

Later, Euclid constructed the full scale system with the help of the third element of the construction, the deduction of the theorems. Aristotle’s contribution to this takes the form of “Formal Logic”, by showing the forms that are used to derive results from accepted premises. The “syllogism” is a form of reasoning in which there are two premises and a conclusion and in which only three terms are employed (Men, Mortal, Socrates). The idea was if we could show how all the theorems of geometry could be derived from the assumptions by means of the syllogism, then we would seem to have a very firm foundation for the deductive system. Euclid however, did not stick to the pure syllogistic method in deriving his proposition, and in fact did require that the reader’s observation be used in order to prove his proposition. That is why students that may have good logic, but don’t have visual imagination do not perform well in geometry. Euclid’s propositions also required that the student have the ability to see how a general reference applies to a specific instance. To make Euclid’s method precise, one would have to explain just what this imagination and ability really are, and what we can assume concerning them.

Spinoza applied the Euclidean technique to the problems of man, the universe, and God. His system, represented in his Ethics, represents the culmination of the rationalist’s dream of a perfect science. Spinoza relies heavily on the reader’s ability to find the right “reference card” and his method of deduction does not add to Euclid’s.

Non-Euclidean Geometry

Let's solve the following problem:

A fellow took a morning stroll. He first walked 10 mi South, then 10 mi West, and then 10 mi North. It so happened that he found himself back at his house door. How can this be?

Most people react with disbelief on hearing that the problem has solutions. The four directions (West, North, East, and South) are successively perpendicular to each other. So how can this be? Here's one solution. (The problem has a whole continuum of solutions so that not much will be lost if I give away one of them.) Consider the North Pole. Going 10 mi South from the Pole brings one on a parallel each point of which is located 10 mi South from the North Pole. Walking straight West one stays on the same parallel and, therefore, at the same distance from the Pole. To get there, just stroll 10 mi North.

Poles require a special consideration but everywhere else the four directions do form a cross with four right angles. Our solution to the problem shows that there is a triangle with two right angles at the base (which is already strange) and a nonzero angle at the top. There is no escaping it: there is a triangle whose angles sum up to more than 180o. This is not exactly what we are taught in high school. Every one who took a Geometry class knows that three angles of a triangle sum up to 180o.

The high school geometry is Euclidean. Laid down by Euclid in his Elements at about 300 B.C., it underwent very little change until the middle of the 19th century when it was discovered that other, non-Euclidean geometries, exist. I wonder about the source of the above problem. Was it invented in the last century? Before? After?

Discovery of non-Euclidean geometries had a profound impact on the development of mathematics in the 19th and 20th centuries. For more than two thousand years Elements served as a mathematical bible, the foundation of the axiomatic method and a source of the deductive knowledge. Euclid's postulates, however, have been based on our (or his) intuition of geometric objects. With the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, the Elements were scrutinized and logical omissions were found. As an upshot, axiomatic method has been divorced from intuition and formalized, which eventually led to the development of Metamathematics and Model Theory and ultimately to Godel's Theorems and Abraham Robinson's Non-Standard Analysis. Einstein's Theory of General Relativity is based on the idea that material bodies distort the space and redefine its geometry.

From our perspective, the situation was exactly the same as with Euclidean geometry. Euclid built an axiomatic theory by deriving a lot of theorems from his five postulates. No one had ever proved that continuing in Euclid's footstep would not lead to a contradiction. However, a 2000 year history elevated Elements on a pedestal of infallibility. Kant even stipulated that the universe had been built according to Euclid. Lobachevsky was quite aware of the problem and in later publications tried without success to redefine the notions of line and plane.

Besides artists and astronomers, many scholars have been shaken by non-Euclidean geometry. Euclidean geometry had been so universally accepted as an eternal and absolute truth that scholars believed they could also find absolute standards in human behavior, in law, ethics, government and economics. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry shocked them into understanding their error in expecting to determine the "perfect state" by reasoning alone. On the other hand, non-Euclidean geometry showed us that the human mind can defy intuition, common sense and experience in order to experience what worlds reasoning could create. The historian of mathematics, Morris Kline, summed up the meaning of these new geometries. The importance of non-Euclidean geometry in the general history of thought cannot be exaggerated. Like Copernicus' heliocentric theory, Newton's law of gravitation, and Darwin's theory of evolution, non-Euclidean geometry has radically affected science, philosophy, and religion.

Empiricism: The Role of Observation

There are many problems with rationalism. The one shown previously is that the human mind can defy intuition, common sense and experience in order to experience what worlds reasoning could create. The Euclidean world was created by reason, but it did not approach the truth that is experienced by people. Even Aristotle’s syllogism, the method thought to produce scientific facts only tells one how to derive a true conclusion from true premises, but does not tell one how to determine whether or not the premises are true, which was its major flaw, and that was why syllogisms can be created to prove anything. We must use another method to do this, otherwise the syllogism will go on indefinitely – infinite regress (Man is mortal because, all living things on earth are mortal and all men are living things….). So Aristotle says that when the process of proof leads to infinite regress, and regress will either lead to an infinitely large set of assumptions or a circular argument, no sound basis for science is provided. Tautology is the kind of reasoning using circular arguments, which does not establish any truth (Socrates is a man because he is rational and he is rational because he is a man)

Common sense tells “seeing is believing”. Unfortunately, many things that is seen or sensed, or simple or obvious at the beginning turn out to be extremely complicated by the time we have learned a little about them (white grains on the table can be sugar or salt, you cannot see “strategy”, but it exists). We have to understand what is meant by “learning from experience” or empiricism. What is observation? What kind of information can you get from sensations? How can we answer the question of whether there is a mountain on the other side of the moon? What knowledge can sensation provide and how it can provide it. The “sophists” were the first to raise objections against rationalism, saying that its products were artificial. Protagoras (500-411 B.C.) said that knowledge and sensation were identical (no difference between “seeing” the sun shining and “knowing” the sun is shining). To know is to perceive, to perceive is to know. However, he noticed that different people may see different things (e.g. reports from an automobile accident). So for Protagoras, men is the measure of all things, which means that each men is his own measure of what is true, so provided that all witnesses report what they saw in an accident, each will be correct (this is the basis of our legal system) and there would be as many truths as there are witnesses, and there may even be many truths for the same person (his report at 4 pm and at 6 pm) – this is called relativism of knowledge.

Aristotle admits that observations are essential to stop infinite regress in syllogism because we need a fixed and immediate truth as a starting point.

Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrable; on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate premises is independent of demonstration. (The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must know the prior premises from which the demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must end in immediate truths, those truths must be indemonstrable.) Posterior Analytics II, p. 19

Plato believed that these first principles (ideas) are innate in man. Aristotle disagrees because if man possesses these first principles, how could they not know something that is more accurate than something they want to demonstrate? On the other hand, if it is acquired, how could we have acquired them without any first principles? Aristotle believed that we must have a capacity of some sort to acquire them. He concludes that it is sense-perception that man keeps in memory, which later becomes experience is where man gets his knowledge. So his conclusion is that our basis for knowledge is sensation. Aristotle disagrees with Protagoras that knowledge is relative because he says that mental motions and images are the same for all men.

Aristotle’s Inductive Science

If our knowledge begins with experience, can we answer the question “Will the sun rise every morning?” Do we have knowledge about this? Can we get from sensation (the beginning of inference) to the general principles – knowledge (the end of inference)? We cannot “sense” the general principles. We cannot use syllogistic arguments here:

Premise 1 – The sun rose today (First term Sun)

Premise 2 – Today is like tomorrow??

Conclusion – The sun will rise tomorrow

Premise 1 is not a principle, it’s an observation. Premise 2 is a principle, but can it be proven. So this syllogism does not work because we need two principles. But we said earlier that knowledge begins with experience and observation, so syllogism as a method cannot be used to create knowledge.

We need another process which can take us from the specific to the general principles which guide our lives. This is called “induction”. Many specific instances of putting our hand in the fire tells us that fire burns. We know this by “induction”. However, how sure are we that a thousand special cases can establish a rule that is supposed to hold in every case. Aristotle says this is supplied by “intuition”.

It is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive. Now of the thinking states by which we grasp the truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error-opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowledge and intuition are always true: further no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive (using logic to reach a conclusion). From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of primary premises, and since except for intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises – a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be an originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge (p. 19)

In other words, we can perceive “universals” without having experienced all the pertinent sensations. We cannot say that induction is “complete” only when all instances by themselves confirm a result, because no induction of universal principles is ever complete. But by means of intellectual intuition, we can jump from an incomplete set of sensations to an absolutely general universal.

We know that the sun will rise tomorrow because we intuit from the many past instances of a general rule or law.

Locke’s Treatment of Ideas

Aristotle’s methods are still incomplete. It does not explain which sensations are elementary and which are constructed out of the elementary ones. For example, if we sense that an information system is “whole”, what combinations of sensations tell us that is the case? How does the mind build up complete ideas from simple ideas? We want to know what we can find from the world, granted that we find out everything from our sensations. The early work of Bacon and Hobbes in empiricism paved the way for a well-planned empirical philosophy. Locke following in the philosophy of Aristotle, says that all our knowledge springs from experience. Our mind is a clean slate, and by the operations of sensation and reflection, each individual writes on his own tablet of knowledge. The sensory elements are called “ideas”. Locke suggested the notion of “simple ideas” that cannot be manufactured by reason, only manipulated by them. These simple ideas precede all rational processes. He set on the path of showing how complicated ideas are built from simple ones. Whatever in an object has the power to produce an idea through sensation, Locke calls a “quality” of the object.

Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the idea of a white, cold and round, the power to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities, and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas

(Refer to Locke in Guide to Philosophers for more)

Primary qualities are resemblances of the objects and do exist in the bodies themselves, whereas secondary qualities are ideas produced in us and have no resemblance to the objects. According to Locke, the things outside us do have extension and figure; they do move about. The sensations we have of the objects are accurate representations on all these points. But the objects do not have color, taste or smells we give them. These qualities are put into the world of our senses by the mind during the process of sensation. Simple ideas cannot be described in terms of anything else. For example, solidity is a simple idea, and cannot be defined, it can only be sensed or pointed to. Yet ideas of sensation are not immutable because our judgment of them can change. A pencil bent in water is perceived as straight because on the basis of previous experience we pass judgment that it is straight. We can also confirm our judgment by feeling the pencil in the water. This is the same with a mirage. We do not doubt that we perceive the idea of water on the road; we can only doubt its existence with properties corresponding to our ideas inside our minds (reflection). This is Locke’s theory of knowledge – simple ideas arise from one or more senses, or from reflection, or from the combination of sense and reflection.

(What about feeling “wholeness?” Is it primary or secondary? Since the wholeness of a system is an idea given by the mind – it is secondary)

Developing on Aristotle’s philosophy, Locke defined “retention”, a mental faculty that keeps the idea for sometime, called “contemplation” or retrieving the idea, called “memory”. Our memory is the source of error, for when it fails to retain an idea, it causes ignorance, when it operates slowly, it causes stupidity or dullness. Locke also defined “abstract” ideas as ideas taken from particular beings becoming general representatives of all of the same kind, such as beauty, or triangularity. Such abstract ideas are created out of the mind, and they have no objective reference in the outside world. Distinguishing from Aristotle’s inductive process (going from fact to general principle), Locke defined the process of going from fact to fact. For example, the process of compounding the simple ideas of sweet, white, rough, etc combine to give us the idea of sugar. vAnother example is the idea of “precedence”, which allows us to construct complex ideas of one thing “A” preceding another “B” in a series. All complex ideas can be created using these three processes of abstracting, compounding and relating. The simple idea of space for example can create an enormous set of complex ideas such as immensity, figure, place and the like. Locke tried to show that empiricism (immediate observation and mental operation) is capable of building any complex idea. The next step is for Locke to show how facts of sensation can be developed into law.

Locke says that:

Knowledge, then seems to me, to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas.

Similarities and dissimilarities between idea may take on four different forms:

1. identity (blue is not yellow)

2. general relationships (two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal)

3. coexistence (iron is susceptible of magnetic impressions)

4. real existence (God exist)

In order to perceive these similarities and dissimilarities Locke suggest that we use:

1. Intuition – “the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other” (this sounds like Aristotle’s intuition, and it also smells of rationalism). “ This kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of” (Locke 1905)

According to Locke, the validity of sensation cannot be checked. Its very existence constitutes its validity. The validity of intuitions is self-contained and not subject to check because to check them requires another more basic criterion. Just as sensations provide factual information which cannot be doubted, so intuition acting on these facts provides generalizations which likewise cannot be doubted. For Locke, observation supplemented by intuition was sufficient for the whole construction of science. Locke disagrees with the rationalists by making observations play a fundamental role in science, but he agrees with them in making intuition a basic criterion of general scientific truth.

Locke also planted the seeds of the next stage of empiricism called “skepticism” by writing:

Probability, thus being to supply the defect f our knowledge, and to guide us where that fails, is always conversant about propositions where of we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them for true

Skepticism is a philosophy which there is an expressed doubt concerning all proposed truths of science. Locke says that we only have an imperfect knowledge of the outside world because we are restricted to a mere appearance of agreement and disagreement. Based on such appearance, our judgments provide us with information to which only a degree of probability, not absolute certainty, can be attached. Only subjective knowledge is perfect, objective knowledge is not.

The notion of probability as a substitute for knowledge becomes a central theme in subsequent philosophy. Gradual empiricism lad to the notion that there is no absolutely certain knowledge, but that science can only assert what is probably true.

Berkeley Attacks Locke

Thus a man born blind, being made to see, would at first have no idea of distance by sight, the remotest objects as well as the nearer would all seem to be in his eye, rather than in his mind. (Berkeley 1928)

For example, the understanding that the nearer of two objects of the same size appears to be larger gives us the sign or suggestion of distance. Berkeley reduced Locke’s list of simple ideas. Berkeley raises the issue of how do we actually determine what is immediately and irreducibly given? This is fundamental to the empiricist because they were trying to show how all our knowledge can be constructed from the irreducible senses. If we do not have a good basis for deciding what the simple ideas actually are, then the description of science in terms of them is futile.

If not by intuition, is there a more basic mental act that evaluates intuition?

Berkeley examined the ability of the mind to develop abstract ideas such as happiness, beauty and triangularity (“wholeness?”). Why? Because Locke said that all complex ideas can be created using the three processes of abstracting, compounding and relating. Locke tried to show that empiricism (immediate observation and mental operation) is capable of building any complex idea. Berkeley said that the “abstract” image of a house in the form of figures, colors and shapes are not abstract because you are calling up actual images of the house. Abstraction requires that not even the image of the body be present in the mind. To Berkeley, such “abstract” ideas do not exist. Instead, there is the “general” idea of beauty, characterized b a vague image of a couple of objects. So the process of abstracting from simple ideas does not work. So the building of science based on sensation and reflection is not as easy as Locke put it. In fact, a world that is based on sensation and reflection is much less than the world we have today. Locke said that by abstracting and compounding the simple ideas of color, size and shape we are able to figure out the “substance” called sugar (“united in one object”). This is the material substance. For Locke, material substance constitutes external (primary quality) objective reality. Mental substance constitutes subjective and internal (secondary quality) reality. The gap between the two is perception (or observation). Berkeley instead says that objective reality is actually non-existent, because if we can only know based on sensations, and by combining and abstracting simple ideas, objects exist only when we perceive these simple ideas. “To exist is to be perceived”. For Berkeley, only subjective reality remains. Their reality is internal in that they exist only as perceptions. So primary qualities do not exist because to believe in primary qualities is to believe in something that observation can never confirm. In other words, if we believe that all knowledge arises from observations, it is ridiculous to talk about what the world looks like when no one is observing it.

Berkeley’s philosophy also implies that if we cannot prove that material substances exist (based on observation), can we expect any better success in proving that mental substances, or minds, exist?

If we are not going to succeed in proving the existence of minds, than ALL substances or things will disappear out of this world.

So the question is does the room disappear when we leave it? Berkeley says no because, at all times, God is perceiving.

This brings us to Berkeley’s version of the cosmological argument to the existence of God. Sensations are passive, they do not affect each other. But our sensations and ideas change, and there must be a cause of this change. The cause cannot be an idea (because ideas are passive), so it must be existing as a substance. It cannot be a material substance because they do not exist, so the cause of the idea must be a non-substance, an incorporeal active being – God.

Those that do not agree with this argument say that if the mind exist, it is the mind that is causing these changes. Berkeley says “When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view…likewise in hearing…there is therefore some other will or spirit which produces them.

Is this an empirical proof? This proof hinges on the principle that every change must have a cause. What is the empirical evidence to this principle, if we want to be loyal to the empirical position? This is what Hume was to show in detail, cannot be proven on empirical grounds. Since we cannot empirically prove that, the principle cannot be used and the cosmological argument fails. Hume said that the causal argument is based on a mental habit that is of no certainty.

Berkeley now needs to answer the question of whether minds exist. If we say that material substance cannot exist because it cannot be known directly, so mental substances also do not exist since we also need to use ideas as a medium. If we say we can know mental substances directly, we have abandoned the empirical position that all knowledge comes from sensations and ideas. Berkeley chose the second alternative. It was Reid who pointed out Berkeley’s error.

Reid said that since the only basis of knowledge is existence of ideas, and ideas only exist when we are conscious of them, it follows that there is no object of our thought which can have a continuous and permanent existence.

“Body and spirit, cause and effect, time and space, to which we are wont to ascribe an existence independent of our thought, are all turned out of existence by this short dilemma. Either these things are objects of sensation or reflection, or they are not; if they are ideas of sensation or reflection, they can have no existence but when we are conscious of them; if they are not ideas of sensation or reflection they are words without meaning (how can we know of ideas if we need ideas to know in the first place – there is no sensation since we know ideas directly). But how does he evade this consequence with regard to the existence of spirits? He maintains that we have no ideas of spirits; and that we can think, and speak, and reason about them, and about their attributes, without having any ideas of them.”

Hume addressed this problem. The pure empiricist view restricts our realm of certain knowledge because if all that we can get from experience are perceptions, then the two most important aspects of our world (according to Spinoza), causality and substance, can NEVER be known because to show that a material substance exists, we have to “get outside” our perceptions, and this we can never do (“The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body. Nor can we show that mental substance exist because the only possible demonstration lies in our own perceptions, and introspection shows clearly that we never perceive directly the substance of our minds”).

From Facts to Causal Law

So far as per Locke, we can agree that we can get general laws by finding agreements and disagreements among discrete ideas, a search that was supposed to be based on “intuition”, but intuition is the problem. We have no idea what it is. The most important aspect of science is that of cause and effect, to create the “mechanical system” and reduce the many complex things of the world to a few simple “elements”. Democritus was the first to attempt this and many thought Newton’s theory had once and for all found the secret of the laws of the natural world. But how can we be really sure that these events are necessarily connected? Hume wanted to show this on purely empirical grounds. Locke and Berkeley resorted to “intuition” to guarantee causality. Hume started by asking how we can “project” ourselves beyond our current experience. If we are experiencing holding a book, we are projecting ourselves when we ask what would happen if we drop the book.

Hume’s Definition of Causal Relation

Hume says that there are three distinguishing marks of causal relationship between two impressions (ideas or sensations)

4. All objects causally related are in physical contact with each other. Even if they appear not to be in contact, we can find a set of connecting links using our sensations (this is partly influenced by the “atomic” theory of Hume’s time)

5. The cause is always prior to the effect in time. So as long as we can sense the notion of time out of experience we do not have to worry about the nature of causality at all

6. The cause and effect are “necessarily” connected. By this Hume is explaining sufficiency and necessity. If A causes B, if A is present, B must be present as well (A is “sufficient” for B). This is the one most problematic. How sure are you that a noise you hear was caused by a prior event (someone dropping something)?

Here we see that we cannot observe any necessary connection between two events directly. All we actually observe directly are the two events themselves.

“It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our outmost scrutiny, discover anything but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connection between it and the supposed effect” (Hume)

Yet as an empiricist in the wider sense, one who advocates that our preference for a theory over another must take account of experience, Hume had revealed a profound problem with the usual account of how to obtain knowledge and its certification as knowledge. He had revealed a dramatic conflict between:

1. The assumption that there are universal laws and regularities and that we can know these.

2. There can be no valid reasons justifying our belief in a universal law other than those based on experience.

3. There is no valid inference from observed cases to unobserved cases. Yet, universal laws cover an infinite number of possible cases throughout the whole of space and time, and therefore necessarily go beyond all actual and possible experience.

This is the notorious problem of induction.

So, Hume continues to ask:

The general question: Why does everything that comes into existence need to have a cause?

The specific question: Why is there any necessary connection between specific events?

In true empirical tradition, he answers the second (specific) question first before going to the more general (inductive). To explain causality in special cases we need to solve three problems:

What are the original observations that caused the ideas to be sensed?
Explain the transition from these observations to the idea of cause and effect
Determine the causal idea

Using Spinoza’s method (“such a penetration into their essence as may discover the dependence of the one upon the other”) – although this was unsatisfactory to most psychologists of Hume’s time – find in any two distinct objects something that necessarily connected them such that they had to follow one another, then we could never even think of one without the other. But we can always imagine two distinct events as not being joined together (e.g. putting finger into cool flame, feeling no pain – the cause, the fire, is not causing any effect – pain). The flame is neither necessary nor sufficient (flames are not necessary for pain – you can feel pain by using other ways, and the flame is not sufficient to cause pain – having a flame does not mean it will cause you pain) for the cause. There is no logical or essential relationship between the events. We cannot answer the three questions logically (using reason). To answer the first question (what is the observational origin of causality?), Hume says the origin does not lie in direct observations of single events, it can only lie in a repetition of events.

“..of certain objects, which have been always conjoined together, and which in all past instances have been found inseparable. We cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunction. We can only observe the thing itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction the objects acquire a union in the imagination. When the impression of one becomes present to us, we immediately form an idea of its usual attendant; and consequently we may establish this as one part of the definition of an opinion or belief, that ‘tis an idea related to or associated with a present impression”

The constant observation of two events together by itself does not supply the idea of necessity (as in the case of the finger and the flame), so any number of such events by themselves do not contain that idea. Hume says that the mind somehow comes to believe that one event will occur when the other occurs.

Answer to the first question: It is the conjoined events that causes the idea of causality

Answer to the second question: We get to the notion of causality from observation by the action of the mind. Causal relation is a relation that resides in the mind, and not in the objects themselves. This capacity of the mind to arrive at beliefs is very important to us, because it forms something of value in our everyday problems.

Hume differentiates “impression” from “ideas”. Ideas are copies of impressions that the mind calls up on various occasions. An impression is “stronger” because they are clear and forceful, we have no doubts that they occur. Ideas are less distinct, can be changed and have a quality of doubt. So we have various degrees of belief concerning our ideas, but we only have certain knowledge regarding our impressions. Ideas can be strengthened by an impression (e.g. the action of seeing a long lost friend – the impression – strengthened the idea that you had about him). If you repeat those impression, they will continue to strengthen the idea (beliefs) that you have. A repetition of such observations builds up the idea of a necessary connection between them. The past impressions are the producers of the present belief in the connection of the two events. This unconscious process of producing the belief is called custom or habit, since it is founded on past repetitions and not on any process of reasoning. Belief is “a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression”. (e.g. Pavlov’s experiments)

Habit of association is the basis of belief

Hume developed a psychological theory of association which had extremely important consequence for any scientific theory of knowledge. Unlike the rationalist, who assumes that such connection of events lies “in nature” itself, the connection is actually in our way of reacting to our impressions. Here, first, Hume defends the empiricists’ notion that belief in causality (or the idea of causal relations) is acquired through experience. Second, Hume makes a distinction between valid and invalid beliefs about the connection of events. Rationalists would say that valid events are what actually conforms to natural events. Hume and the empiricists instead say that natural events are impressions or observations, and then they put the law of causality into a tendency of the mind to react in a certain way to its impressions. Causality is “internal” not external. So the question is, what distinguishes true from false internal beliefs? Hume says that the valid internal beliefs are those that work well in experience. This brings us to the next step in beliefs, that we adopt the attitude that the event is likely to follow, or has some chance of following (probability).

How do you justify any belief? Hume proposes the following:

The cause and effect must be contiguous in time (no gap)
The cause must be prior to the effect
There must be a constant union between the cause and the effect
The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause
Where several different objects produce the same effects, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them
The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular, in which they differ (sugar and salt, both white, but the color is not what causes the different taste)
When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or diminution of its cause, ‘tis to be regarded as a compound effect, derived from the union of the several different effects, which arise from the several parts of the cause

Criticism: A Synthesis of Reason and Observation

Both rationalism and empiricism limits our ability to create knowledge. Rationalism is affected by the ability of the mind to create false knowledge. Empiricism is unable to predict future occurrences because direct observations are not predicted occurrences. So Kant attempted to synthesize rational intuition and direct observation. Kant proposed a psychology in which knowledge is the result of some sort of combination of the faculty of sensation and understanding. He sought to find the set of most general assumptions that remain fixed for all investigations, and that everyone has to use in making observations. For example in making quantitative judgments, we must always presupposed time and space (measure before and after, and lengths). The empiricists had taken time and space as derived from sensation. Kant objected to Hume by saying that the sensation of succession can only be perceived if time were presupposed as underlying them. He refers to them as a priori (prior to experience). This is the same with qualitative judgments such as color (we need to locate the object). What about taste and pain? This means that we are saying “I” experience pain. We relate the sensation to our own “ego”. Kant considers “I” as much a part of the world as the sensation themselves. Kant says that the problem with Berkeley was that he assumed that the meaning of the mind is given immediately, independent of its context. For Kant, “I” exists as a functioning entity, uniting the many discrete “sensuous intuitions”. “I” can only perceive “red” if I had seen “red” previously in time.

So for Kant, two ingredients make up his psychology, sensuous intuitions (something immediately perceived) and principles of understanding (general rules that are applied to the earlier sensuous intuitions, supplying the pure “form” and phenomena of the world, the synthetic). Space and time are a priori because they help shape sensuous intuitions. They are necessary to have any experience at all. We individuate two similar cars, not because of their color and shape (as per Leibniz, who differentiates according to their properties), but because they appear at different times. Police uses finger prints to identify people, but that assumes we know who the individuals are. If we did not, we could not differentiate the prints. Space is a priori because we need to refer to something outside of me to represent them as another object. Using space-time framework, we organize our sensuous intuitions into some pattern that is understandable (to tell time, we need to use something that is regular like the position of the sun). Causal determinism is not something that we take out of nature, but something we put into it. Hume considers causality as a subjectively derived concept, but Kant says, it is not derived or taken out from nature. Hume had to assume an objective causal relation before he can observe anything and that objective causal relation is the regularity in nature. Kant is describing an unconscious activity of the mind. Kant also considers the sciences of arithmetic and geometry to be a priori. In fact he comes up with the concept of synthetic a priori such as the proposition that 5 + 7 = 12 both contains analytic meaning (as in the numbers 5, 7) and also a synthetic meaning that adding the two makes 12. Kant has effectively reinterpreted rationalism. The rationalist tried to extend subjective laws (logic) to the objective (e.g. Existence of God). Kant says that objectivity refers only to the experienced world of “phenomena”, which is the result of the interaction of the a priori with sensuous intuition, whereas the “noumenal” world or the world that cannot be experienced cannot be shown objectively. Kant has found a compromise between rationalism and empiricism. To the rationalist he says, “It is true that there are certain a priori notions that are essential in the understanding of the world; but it is wrong to say that these carry any validity beyond the realm of possible experience”. To the empiricist, he says, “It is true that we must have sensuous intuitions in order to determine anything whatsoever about the real world; but it is wrong to say that such sensuous intuitions are all that we need, for we must also require in addition certain general rules of the understanding in order to convert observation into experience”.

Kant therefore had to show who these “general rules” can be applied to sensuous intuitions. He also had to show how we can determine what the general rules of understanding actually are. He could not answer both satisfactorily. For the first, he suggested we use time as both the general and specific mediator. For the second, since we need a priori laws to create the general understanding, how can we validate those a priori laws? They cannot be validated by experience because they are prior to experience. Kant says that “if we have a proposition which in being thought is thought as necessary, it is an a priori judgment…if then a judgment is thought with strict universality, that is, in such a manner that no exception is allowed as possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori”. Basically Kant resorted like the rationalist before him, to say that certain sciences (such as Euclidean geometry and arithmetic) could be validated by direct intuition (“all geometrical knowledge, grounded as it is in a priori intuition, possesses immediate evidence”). But as history showed, both these sciences were shown to be lacking and did not carry their own truths with them.

His contribution however, was that every experiment must presume some arithmetical laws, some geometry, some regularity. After Kant, we cannot go back to the native notion that the experimenter merely makes his direct observation undisturbed by any assumptions. Every observation demands prior assumptions. The scientific problem becomes one of showing how such a description of science can progress and solve problems, even though it must always make a priori judgments at each step. Further we need to show how it can examine the validity of these judgments, that is, bring them under control.

Modern Rationalism: The Speculative Method

Problem solving can be categorized into three methods:

Speculation – stems from the rationalist tradition (Aristotle) and argues that some truths are to be discovered by thought, speculation, insight, intuition, faith or some other uncontrolled observation.
Positivistic method – stems from empiricism and argues that truths are either analytic (depends solely on logic or language) or else must be verified directly or indirectly by empirical observation, and
Pragmatic method – truths is based on considerations of efficiency of action for accomplishing objectives

2) Metaphysics

Hegel was the one that gave impetus to the speculative method after Kant. Hegel says that the process of reason is NOT a deductive and analytic process (reduce a problem to its simplest parts), but a synthetic one in which the mind builds up to the solution by a series of steps, each of which in itself is inadequate. Hegels method is called dialectical. The dialectical method is as follows:

4. Choose a thesis (a position regarding a problem)

5. Recognize the inherent contradiction in the position and recognize the opposing position (the anti-thesis)

6. Proceed to the new position (the synthesis), which absorbs the first two but becomes far richer than either

Hegel believed the world progressed in this way, each epoch marking the formation of a new society. The process comes to an end when reason reaches it final conclusions (absolutes). Spinoza required the mind to proceed in an orderly fashion so that when a conclusion is reached, it can be traced back to verify or refute the process. The Hegelian method cannot be set down in a list of rigid specifications, no hard or fast rules that dictate the synthesis, no way of deducing whether the real synthesis has been reached. This form of speculation became the British version of idealism (Green and Bradley). For them, the empiricists reduce reality to separate and distinct entities, and is an outright contradiction of their description of the world. Bergson for example, argues that the process of composition is by itself speculative (it is creative) “we place outselves at the heart of the subject, and seek as deeply as possible an impulse, after which we need only to let ourselves go..”

Phenomenologists such as Husserl also share in this method. In summary, there is no consistent or systematic account of the method of speculation.

Arguments for the speculative method includes;

3. Eddington differentiates physical from epistemological knowledge, which is above the physical since the physical is based on observation and the epistemological dictates the plan for good observation

4. Whitehead says that faith in nature cannot be justified by any inductive generalizations and that induction is based on metaphysics since the process of induction is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. We must observe the immediate occasion and use reason to elicit a general description of its nature, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism, it presupposes metaphysics.

The Positivistic Method

“the impossibility of obtaining absolute notions; we give up the search for the origin and destination of the universe”

Comte’s system had the following characteristics which were later absorbed into logical positivism:

3) The descriptive generalizations (laws) are always subject to doubt, although “virtually” certain

4) The sciences are classified according to the order in which they attained the positivistic level (in decreasing order): mathematics (the simplest), astronomy, physics, biology, and ethics and society (the most complex -- which he believed have not arrived)

Other philosophers such as Mill, Spencer, Clerk-Maxwell, Clifford and Pearson adopted his system. Mill had the greatest contribution when he formulated the system of “inductive logic”

Mills Inductive Logic

Mill said that Hume was incorrect to say that repetition was an essential element in beliefs of causality. For example, when kids grow, you will find a close relationship between intellectual attainment and weight, and we can find numerous instances of this relationship, but the number of cases does not lead us to suppose there is any direct causal connection between weight and intellectual attainment. Also, if you see a dusty area that had a lot of instances of tuberculosis, is there a causal connection between coal dust and tuberculosis? It could be that undernourishment is the cause of tuberculosis, and undernourishment occurs in areas where coal dust is high. So a third object might be causing them both. Mill sought out to establish causal connection by not resorting to repetition. He suggested that we design certain ways of taking the observations (not the repetition) and through the design, establish the causal connection. If the right design was used, we need only a few observations to establish the belief in a necessary connection. He called these methods the “Canons of Induction”. These canons are “the modes of singling out from among the circumstances which precede or follow a phenomenon, those which it is really connected by an invariable law”.

Mills defined cause by saying that:

“we should believe not only that the antecedent always has been followed by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution of thing endures, it always will be so….Invariable sequence, therefore is not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional…We may define, therefore, the cause of a phenomenon, to be antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent”.

In other words, cause is something that must be a sufficient, and not merely a necessary condition (Blood is necessary for life, but having blood does not mean you will have life). We say x is sufficient for y if the presence of x guarantees the presence of y. If all the necessary parts taken together become sufficient, hence the total collection can be said to cause the effect. An indispensable part of the cause is a necessary condition for the effect.

Using this definition of causality, Mills sought experimental designs that will guarantee that one object or event is linked to another as its sufficient and/or necessary condition.

The Method of Agreement

“If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon” .

This explains a sufficient condition or cause (i.e., look for a variable that is common to all observations having the same outcome).

For example, if you become ill after eating a breakfast of juice, eggs and milk and later become ill after eating lunch of potatoes, fish and milk, the common circumstance, milk, is the cause of the illness. Here we have successfully dispensed with the need of showing Hume’s “constant conjunction”, many repetitions of two events to show causality. Because we have “controlled” other factors, we are led to the necessary connection between milk and illness only by using two instances. But this does not uncover the necessary condition for illness. Perhaps the illness was caused by the way the person is sitting down for the meal. What if milk was taken out of the experiment, will the person still become ill? This is shown using the second canon.

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	No	Yes

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	No	Yes
Europe	High rate of deaths from firearms	No	Yes	Yes

Here, violent media seems to be the “sufficient” cause of the high rate of deaths

Are there any other reasons for the high rate of deaths?

The Method of Difference

If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.

So, if you find that you do become ill after eating a meal with juice, eggs and milk but do not become ill after eating a meal of juice and eggs only (without milk), then milk is the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, because the two meals had everything in common except milk (including the way the person is sitting down). However, there might be other reasons why he got ill, perhaps because he was standing when he had the meal.

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canada	Low rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	No

These two cases suggests that violent media is a necessary condition of deaths because it is the only missing variable to cause the difference.

Joint Method of Agreement and Difference (Indirect Method of Difference)

We can also combine both canons to build a third canon to demonstrate both sufficiency and necessity. Combining the two strengthens our argument

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	No	Yes
Europe	High rate of deaths from firearms	No	Yes	Yes

Cases	Effect	X1 Lots of guns with the public	X2 Rock and roll music	X3 Violent Media
America	High rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canada	Low rate of deaths from firearms	Yes	Yes	No

“If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon”.

The Method of Residues

“Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.”

Method of Concomitant Variations

Currently, this method takes the form of the well-known statistical method called “correlation analysis”.

Limitations of Mill’s Inductive Logic

6) We cannot change or retain many aspects of the experiment at will. To solve this problem Mill suggested that we either assume that we have identified all the causes or ignore those aspects that are known not to have any influence on the result using our basic intuition

7) It assumes that certain events follow other events in time, otherwise we will confuse causes with effects

8) The causes work independently of each other, otherwise we can have a situation that an interaction of two causes is the sufficient and/or necessary event to cause the effect

9) Even granting that a particular time two events are necessarily connected, how can we show that they will always be so? The methods “depend on the assumption that every event must have some cause, some antecedent, on the existence of which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent” (the Universal Law of Causation). However, the scientist cannot be described as building up an inference to causal connections from observations alone, because he needs some assumption of causality in nature to start the process of induction.

10) The cause is viewed as deterministic, not probabilistic, whereas no matter how careful a scientist controls his causal experiments, errors creep in, such as errors of observation. That is why experiments should be repeated. This raises the question of how many observations should be taken before we can be sure. The critical problem is to find scientific techniques for making probability judgments.

Logical Positivism (20^th Century Empiricism)

What then did the logical positivists say was the recipe for real science? The most clear and influential statement of the Vienna Circle’s position was given by Alfred Ayer (1910-89, later Sir Alfred) in his Language, Truth and Logic first published in 1936.

The first claim of logical positivists is that a statement can only be true only if either (i) it is a self-evident analytic, deductive truth of the kind found in mathematics and formal logic (e.g. ‘2+2=4’) or because (ii) the statement matches reality precisely. A consequence of this was that statements had to be verifiable to be meaningful. For logical positivists the meaning of a statement was simply the conditions under which it could be verified. That is to say if a statement did not describe an ‘experiential proposition’ (i.e. a sensation or objective sensory event reflecting some feature of reality) then it could carry no significance. The consequence of this position was to render all philosophical speculation about ethics, religion and aesthetics meaningless since none of these areas had propositions that could be verified by experience. Philosophers, they said, could and should analyze the way language was being used in these areas but there could be no serious attempt to show that any particular ethical, moral or aesthetic position was ‘true’ or ‘false’. The essential problem of science is to make a “logical analysis of language” and this is what distinguishes the contemporary school of “logical empiricism” from the earlier, more psychologically oriented types of empiricism.

A scientific theory is an axiomatic system that obtains an empirical interpretation through appropriate statements called rules of correspondence, which establish a correlation between real objects (or real processes) and the abstract concepts of the theory. This solves Hume’s problem that science is not and never has been an explanation or shows the necessity of any sequence of perceptions. His point was that one cannot sanction a logical or probable inference from observed cases to unobserved cases. Using a formal system, the positivist brings explanation back into science because a formal system has an interpretation. Its axioms thus becomes necessary laws. Although these laws cannot be empirically confirmed, we can deduce theorems which can be tested empirically. Within the framework of such a formal system, a consequence or theorem which is empirically valid can be said to be “explained” by the laws of the system.

Thus in logical positivism there is a fundamental commitment to empiricism, which is, checking ideas against the world. Claims that have no empirical consequences are treated as meaningless. Building on this, the logical positivists argued that science should seek to describe the regularities of cause and effect in order to explain the world. All that was required was a theory to be expressed as a set of axioms (i.e. basic assumptions) with rules to link them systematically to objective measurements of the real world. An extreme example of this point of view in psychology was the behaviourist research of Clark Hull who conscientiously constructed elaborate formal, internally consistent sets of propositions about animal learning. The Vienna Circle argued that so long as a discipline formulated claims about the world that could be translated into physical actions to verify those claims then that discipline could be called scientific and could be counted a part of the unity of science program.

Crucially, logical positivism was clear that the scientific theories were theories about actual objects, processes and structures in the real world. It is through logical positivism then that psychology took on this assumption of realism which has characterized the discipline ever since. Thus terms like ‘intelligence’ and ‘attitude’ have up until recently been taken to be referring to real features in the psychological world rather than as merely useful models.

It is important to note that logical positivists had little or nothing to say about how one constructed these axioms or which of the many possible testable hypotheses that could be derived from them should be derived. In other words they had nothing to say about the process of discovery per se. They were simply interested in specifying what should be permitted as scientific, without trying to recommend which of the permitted ideas should be pursued. In that sense logical positivism was conservative, more interested in distinguishing between the correct and incorrect forms of science, rather than between the good and the outstanding.

The spread of logical positivism in USA came in early 1930s. Logical positivists found a favourable terrain in USA. They established solid relationships with American pragmatism. In 1929 and in 1932 Schlick was Visiting Professor at Stanford, while Feigl emigrated to USA in 1930, where he became lecturer (1931) and professor (1933) at the University of Iowa and afterwards at the University of Minnesota (1940). In 1932 the American Philosophical Association organized a discussion on the philosophy of logical positivism. Finally, it must be noted that logical positivism played a very important role in the development of contemporary philosophy not only for its philosophical principles, but also for its editorial and organizational activities. It is not superfluous to remember that Popper and Kuhn published their most known and seminal works in neopositivist's series. This fact do not prove that Popper and Kuhn were neopositivists; but it shows the broad-mindedness, the kindly disposition and the lasting influence of logical positivism.

Following up Hume, the logical positivists agree that we can never test a generalization of a specific observation. In other words, if the logical positivists are able to define using a language, stating conditions in which protocol statements can be deduced from, thereby able to perform a reduction. For example, if a biologist wishes to specify a certain new species of an animal, he reduces the sentence, “a is an animal belonging to species X” to a set of sentences such as “a has short hair”, “a has brown hair”, etc. If this set of protocol statements (as referred to by Carnap, or “atomic sentences” according to Bertrand Russell, “observation sentences” according to Ayer, “elementary sentences” according to Wittsgenstein), are all confirmed for a given “a”, then “a” belongs to the species, otherwise it does not. Hence, the definition of the species has been given by means of the reduction process. Any predicate which cannot be reduced in this manner is not itself an observable thing-predicate, is meaningless. So to the positivist, all meaning lies in what is immediately given in each discrete experience. Other complex terms can be built up out of these simple ones. Syntax informs us how reductions can be formed and transformed. Semantics considers that which is designated by a term.

The problem with this method is that for any particular generalization, the positivists agree that we can never test that generalization without testing all instances of that generalization. This is the problem of induction, the notion of a scientific theory cannot be confirmed. To do this the positivists say that we need to use both syntax and semantics. By syntax we mean finding what could and could not be deduced from the formal system of axioms and postulates. By semantics we mean, “interpreting” the system of postulates and axioms so that at least some of the consequences (theorems) can be tested directly in experience, i.e. so that some of the consequences are reduced to protocol statements.

Positivist do not “explain” the event, because as Hume says, we cannot present its necessary causes (as Pearson says “Science for the past is a description, for the future a belief; it is not and never has been an explanation if by this word is meant that science shows the necessity of any sequence of perceptions”. Instead, positivists brings explanation by means of his formal systems. The formal system is given an explanation. Its axioms become necessary laws. Although these laws cannot ever be confirmed empirically, we can deduce theorems which we can test empirically. Within this “limited” framework, a consequence or theorem which is empirically valid can be said to “be explained” by the laws of the system.

3) A set of statements asserting the occurrence of certain events, C1…Cn at certain time and places (e.g. cracking of an automobile radiator during a cold night. So set of statements states the initial and boundary conditions: the car was left in the street all night. Its radiator was completely filled and the cap was screwed tightly. The temperature dropped to 25F, the air pressure was normal. The bursting pressure of the radiator material is so and so much)

4) A set of universal hypotheses (Empirical laws stating that below 32F, the pressure of a mass of water increases if the volume remains constant with a quantitative law), such that

a) The statements of both groups are reasonably well confirmed by empirical evidence (by observation)

b) From the two groups of statements the sentence asserting the occurrence of events can be logically deduced (an explanation of the event has been established)

Feigl explains how logical empiricism solves the induction problem

“Logical empiricism cuts the Gordian knot by bluntly asking the question, “What can “justification” possibly mean here. The only clear meaning is deductive proof for one thing and exhibition of inductive evidence for another. The “great problem of induction” therefore, consisted in the impossible demand to justify the very principles for all justification. If we must have a Principle of Induction, though, it had better be formulated not as a piece of knowledge but as a rule of procedure….if you wish to discover reliable laws, you must try, try and try again to generalize from a maximum of past experience, and as simply as feasible. Then, if there is an order in nature, not too deeply hidden or too complicated, you will find it (Feigl; 389)

A law may not enable us to foresee future events…but is designed to aid in prediction. Prediction is not description. But when one is able to predict by the use of laws based on experience (but not a summary of experience) he has one of the essential characteristics of explanation (Miller, 245)

Hempel differentiates explanation and description

Prediction is the process of deriving a statement about a future event based on (1) statements describing certain known conditions, (2) suitable general laws, whereas explanation is where the final event has already happened, and its determining conditions have to be sought (reversed from prediction).

Confirmation of a Theory

The degree of confirmation of a theory depends on the number of instances in which the theory is confirmed. The positivists (at the time of Churchman) were still working on the statistical methods for this.

The positivists also have the notion of the “negative instance”, where if a single negative instance can be found, it will make the theory untenable. This is picked up b y Popper. Churchman already sees some dangers using this method.

1) Theories will be disconfirmed every day just by mere observation.

It could be that the experimenter is at fault: an inaccurately read instrument, lack of controls.

History has shown that after a theory becomes well established, there is a natural tendency to save the theory or reinterpret the supposedly disconfirming observation. The negative instance leads to a rejection or revision of the meaning of the instance. If there are instances that can disprove theorems, the goal is to find the simplest and most direct ones.

Simplicity

Simplicity is very critical to positivists. Language is built from the simplest elements. Similarly we can handle critical problems like confirming theories only when we have the simplest elements to deal with.

Carnap says that “both deductive and inductive logic, if their problems are to be soluble in an exact way, must be applied to a simplified universe (Carnap, Foundations of Logic..:136-137)

This is the culmination of all the philosophies we have reviewed. They depend on the understanding of the simple components out of which the method of science is constructed.

Physicalism

Physicalism is the doctrine which asserts that the language of each science can be reduced to statements in the thing-language. For example, in physics, thing-predicates and dispositional predicates (predicates that refer to properties that an object can assume under certain circumstances) such as the quantitative term “temperature” describes the temporary or permanent states of things or processes. “Sugar” can be defined to the simplest thing-predicates that describe its shape and the dispositional predicate that defines its sweetness. The thing-language for the positivist is extended to include all directly observable states. All other languages can be translated into thing-language, but the thing-language cannot be translated into any other language. From this basic language we build other languages of the sciences, beginning with physics and proceeding to biology, psychology and social sciences. This is referred to as the hierarchy of the sciences.

Feigl as a positivist criticizes metaphysics. He classifies them in terms of their method of procedure: (1) intuitive, (2) deductive, (3) dialectical, (4) transcendental, and (5) inductive. For the positivists, metaphysics may either be reduced to the precise methods of science or else they are meaningless.

Pragmatism

Pragmatists say that attempts to found science on combining observation and theory has failed. All previous methods conclude that no truths can be immediately known, out of which other truths and knowledge can be built. So if science cannot begin with the truth, can it end with the truth? Pragmatisms avoids the problems associated with looking at first principles, supposed necessities (a priori), and instead looks towards last things, consequences, and facts (James 7, p. 53). The scientific method concerns itself with “practice” and the “practical”; it asks of science “what for?” not “what from? Science is viewed as a means (an instrument) for obtaining objectives, and the various aspects of science are themselves viewed functionally as means for enabling science to work effectively in the task assigned to it.

“Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which we can rest. We don’t lie back on them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid (James 7:53)”

Theories and observation are used because they can work by aiding us to go “prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor (James 7:58)”

Pattern of Inquiry for the Pragmatist

Dewey says that inquiry is the process of problem solving. It attempts to transform a problematic situation (the “indeterminate”) into a non-problematic or determinate one.

1) We start with the problem. Indeterminate situations are disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure (3:105). It is problematic because we cannot determine what its consequence will be. It is confused if its outcome cannot be anticipated. It is obscure when its course of movement permits of final consequence that cannot clearly made out. It is called conflicting when it tends to evoke discordant responses (3:106).

2) The individual interacts with the environment (laboratory or natural). His objective is to find out what the problem is and to formulate it properly. “To find out what the problem and problems are which a problematic situation presents to be inquired into, is to be well along in inquiry. To mistake the problem involved is to cause subsequent inquiry to go astray…the way in which a problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structure (theories) (3:108). In the very statement of the problem, a possible solution is usually suggested because no situation is ever completely indeterminate. The suggested solution may become an idea.

3) Apply the process of reasoning. For Locke, ideas are what is given in sensation. For Dewey, ideas are anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to observed conditions” (3:109). Dewey uses a pragmatic transformation and defines ideas according to its functionality, that is with respect to its purpose in problem solving. Dewey says that unless the problem very familiar, ideas will rapidly appear and pass. “They occur as suggestions…but not every suggestion is an idea. The suggestion becomes an idea when it is examined with references to its functional fitness; its capacity as a means of resolving the given situation” (3:110)

4) Because ideas do not have physical existence, we must invent symbols, words, numbers or signs so that in reasoning we can talk about it with ourselves. The positivists reduced suggestions to mental copies of physical things and assume that they are identical with ideas. They ignored the function of ideas in directing observation and in ascertaining the relevant facts. The rationalist school saw that “facts” cannot be separated from ideas, otherwise they lose their significance, however, they treated ideas as the ultimate structure of reality. The Kantian approach “perceptions are blind and conceptions empty” saw the need to bring them together, but could not formulate a solution that could accept that they are from different sources. For Dewey, the conceptual and perceptual are correlatives: they interact and arise together. Both are evaluated not from where they came from (the mind or the outside world), but by their usefulness in solving the problem at hand. In science, the final idea is stated as an hypothesis.

5) Formulate the hypothesis. To arrive at an hypothesis, reason examines the relation of suggestions arising in this situation to suggestions that arose in others (using past experience). It is framed in familiar terms and to make use best what is already known. Reason related the present problem to the past. This is done by taking observed facts, not as given, but taken with forethought for the sake of solving the problem. They serve as evidence and serves as a basis for testing suggested solutions, not as the answer themselves. We must therefore find relevant facts. (Knowing that the cloth is green does not help us find the reason why there is a hole in it). Theory and observation are brought together by using relevant facts that become evidence for the case (facts-of-the-case). The beginning of the problem is not the issue, it is the end.

6) What about the case where there are conflicting goals or purpose for an inquiry, since for the pragmatist, the scientists is faced with the problem of deciding which purpose shall be made the criterion of successful solution. It can be either two, (1) truth as a personal matter, or (2) truth as a social term. James and Schiller feel that “truth, then, to be safe, has to be more than an individual evaluation; it has to win social recognition, to transform itself into a common property” (12:58). For Schiller, to be safe, truth must be social and public. But to be true, Schiller took an individual evaluation to be sufficient. For Peirce and Dewey, truth is not to be given in individualistic terms. Dewey says that “the best definition of truth from the logical standpoint which is known to me is that of Peirce: ‘The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth’ (3:345) (very close to Kuhn’s approach. But this is not merely an agreement by an aggregation of individuals. Society carries with it a residual of the past, so if an individual’s purpose conflicts with a social one, the social purpose has priority. Singer goes further and argues for a coherent theory of truth that go beyond individuals or societies and called it “non-relativistic”.

Non-Relativistic Pragmatism

The first tenet of this doctrine is that “all problems of science are interrelated; there is no fundamental separation of the branches or aspects of scientific inquiry. So science is anti-hierarchical. The second tenet is that it is necessary to evaluate scientific efforts with respect to a criterion of progress that is not relative to particular individuals or societies. This implies that there are things scientists should be doing, which introduces an ethical dimension that is still being worked on today. To continue using this method, it is necessary to show that science is non-relativistic. The non-relativistic method assumes that answers “exists”, they just need to be found. Although the pragmatic scientists agree that science cannot give absolutely certain answers to any question, this does not mean that an individual cannot feel certain. That depends on how critical the answer needs to be. So, truth at least depends on the purpose of the investigation. Pragmatism distinguishes between ends and ideals, between responses and answers. Ends are always attainable, not ideals, but may be approached, closer and closer. To the pragmatist, responses and answers are two aspects of the same process. Responses are deviations from a riskless assertion or answer. Notions developed in on one field give meaning to, and get their meaning from notions developed in another field.

The Inquiry Process: Use prior information effectively

All problems gain significance from past solutions. A single experiment is just an element in a chain of experiments. A physicist cannot define variables such as “weight” in any manner he pleases. The meanings of these concepts come out of the history of physics and the same with other sciences. All terms and the historical difficulties already experienced should be discussed in order to arrive at the “true” meaning of the term, so that the researcher will not be wasting his time and the time of others who are reading his results (this is the thorough literature review). Each term has a history (background) and foreground (purposes it is to serve relative to further scientific progress). The true definition of a concept is that question which is in best rapport with all past, present, and future endeavors to approach answers to questions involving the concept. The true meaning of a scientific concept is as much a problem of science as the method used to study any problems of science. Some concepts are not based on purely physical notions. Researchers have to resort to non-physical notions from fields such as psychology as the bases for some aspects of experiments. Poincare defined these concepts as “conventions”. These conventions are true not on physical grounds but on psychological or social grounds and they are adopted because they efficiently serve the explanation of the world; and the problem of finding out whether a certain law will or will not prove convenient and simple is a psychological or sociological problem. The prior information the researcher brings to his experiment assists him not only in defining his terms, but also in establishing the “best confirmed evidence” at his disposal. This is difficult, because no one researcher can hope to read all the literature that is pertinent to his problem. Yet if he neglects to do so, he may conduct a very inefficient experiment. So the goal of finding prior knowledge is so that he finds methods whereby the maximum information will go into the experiment with the minimum waste of time and energy on the researcher. The pragmatist believes that no experiment, even on the most specialized topic can be run independently. Experiment means control, and control means the ability to investigate the validity of any and every aspect of scientific activity. A complete experiment requires the services of all the sciences. This applies to methodological sciences, because it is but on “cog” in the scientific machine.

The Inquiry Process: The Scientific Model

The scientific model (research framework) is a scheme by means of which the experimenter can conveniently relate the aspects of his experiment and understand the underlying processes involved. Positivism has been helpful in defining the language for this scheme. A complete scientific model would encompass all the possible concepts and relations and hence is an ideal of science. The construction of a complete model is to the pragmatist, the collective task of science to which each branch contributes. Partials models are numerous (e.g. Woodger’s in biology, Tolman’s, Hull’s and Lewin’s in psychology). To start building a model, the scientist starts by using concepts he believes he has a right to take for granted. He uses terms and words that he does not bother to define. But pragmatists believe, contrary to the positivists, that there are no undefinable basic notions. In theory, every action, every definition must be subject to check and investigation by other scientists. To systematize the methods of checking, we cannot rely on “direct observation” or basic rational intuitions, we must be able to find definitions for those ideas themselves. According to Singer, all concepts of science are defined in terms of one another (which opponents might say is circular). This is not circular because doing so will enable us to make progress towards our objectives. So for example, if we define “mass” in physics in terms of certain operations, we must show how those operations are defined, which leads us to determine whether the operations are carried out correctly. This leads us to the field of psychology. These psychological concepts are in need of defining. And in doing so, we might have to use of certain concepts such as “mass” again. So the psychologist acts as a check on the physicists, and the physicists acts as a check on the psychologists.

Model construction is a continuous process, there are always new concepts to be included and old ones to be revised (there are no hierarchies of the sciences – no one science or set of concepts are basic). The model of science is a “formal” structure. This means that the model is expressed in the language of formal science, but by including all other fields of science. Peirce wrote in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” that the definition of meaning turns to ends, not beginnings; the meaning of a concept is conceived as its practical (purposive) consequences. Meaning is not defined in terms of what a term refers back to (designates), but in terms of what it points forward to – the response the term is designed to evoke. Thus the problem of scientifically defining a concept is to show how it effects inquiry when it is involved in that inquiry. So when we define “length” we must state the conditions under which, the operations by which length can be determined with absolute accuracy and precision (therefore we need to define the temperature and pressure in the environment) under which a specified operation of comparison between an object whose length is questioned and the standard meter rod should be made. So pragmatists allow us to adjust observations made in a non-ideal environment so as to get pertinent data regarding the concept in question.

The Inquiry Process: The Criteria of Pertinence

The pragmatist does not just go out and make observations without considerable preparation. Just by observing people celebrating on a soccer field does not mean that they won the game. The observation may not be pertinent (as Dewey says, it reveals a fact, but not the fact-of-the-case). We must approach the task of gathering observations equipped with the criterion that tells use how to gather our data, otherwise we are just collecting chaotic facts. We may choose to observe which toy a child plays the most to find out which toy he most prefers. This may not be a pertinent observation, because he could be playing with the toy that is least broken, but not most preferred. So pertinence involves making specific what “preference” means. We must show how to specify the act and the conditions under which the act would constitute a preference for an object. To do this, we construct a scientific experimental model, which means that we must lay down the conditions which would reveal what acts under what circumstances are to be regarded as evidence of preference. So we get the child to use both toys (to make sure he is familiar with both and familiarity is not an issue), we observe it at a time when he is not with anyone else (to make sure he is not affected by anyone) and so on. As we go on and make these assumptions explicit, we discover other additional concepts such as the child needs to show “interest” in both toys. What is “interest”? We then need to define “concentration of interest”. In short, to specify pertinence of an observation, we must set up operations in an idealized experimental model. To the pragmatist, not only so-called elementary forms of experience, such as color, smells and tastes, are the only objects of observation. A man’s feeling at a given moment may have as strong a role in the process of reaching a conclusion as his sensation of sight. Pragmatism does not advocate a scientists who removes all his emotions, sympathies, and the like from his experimental process. The goal is to enrich the scope of the scientific model so that we can understand the role of other types of experiences, and see how they too can be checked and controlled.

The Inquiry Process: Measurement

Measurement provides us a means or instrument for telling us how to adjust our actions. For example, if we know it is going to rain, measurement of that rain (drizzle or downpour) tells whether we need bring out an umbrella or wear a raincoat. Measurement theory is an aspect of the construction of the experimental model. When we measure an objects property, we conceive the number attached as relating the object to other objects within the model for guiding our actions.

The Inquiry Process: Construct Alternative Hypotheses

An ideal of scientific inquiry is to state all the possible alternative answers to any given questions in any context. The alternatives should cover all possible outcomes and should not overlap (no more than one alternative should be true at a time). The number and kinds of alternative hypotheses depend on the purpose of the investigation. So in determining whether a business process has changed 50%, there will be two alternatives, whether the business process has changed 50% or whether the process has not changed more than 50%. The second hypotheses can be sub-divided to say that if the process has changed 25%, it is successful. So there will be three hypotheses, (1) more than 50% -- excellent, (2) more than 25% but less than 50% -- successful, (3) not more than 25% -- failure.

One aspect of the hypotheses development is reconstructing hypotheses, which happens when an hypothesis is not in accordance with the observations. We have two alternatives, (1) we can re-examine the theory, or (2) we can re-examine the observations. Pragmatism says we should be able to check all aspects of the experiment, including the criterion of pertinence (e.g. Kepler decided to change the theory since he had a lot of trust in Brahe’s observations).

Alternative hypotheses are never in complete disagreement; there must be a common ground behind them. These common notions are called presuppositions. For example, we may presuppose a certain kind of logic, a certain kind of arithmetic, or geometry (a meta knowledge). We must state the common basis of agreement, the presuppositions.

Which presuppositions should be made depends on (1) whether or not they are well established by previous tests or by common experience (e.g. atmospheric pressure does not affect drug testing so is not mentioned and is not the subject of inquiry), (2) presuppositions that cannot be substantiated by any available information. The researcher must fall back on his insight. We do not use insight as evidence, but at the same time, we cannot ignore it completely as long as it is able to grasp the fruitful next-steps.

The Inquiry Process: Errors Inherent in the Test

The error is defined by the chance that the method of experimentation may go wrong (the probability that the method will lead to the wrong conclusion). If we express the observations along quantitative scales we can compute the chance of making a mistake easier although using numbers is no substitute for the problem of pertinence of observation. This is the realm of statistical theory. It gives us the magnitude of the error quantitatively and how to use the estimate of error to determine the change of choosing the wrong hypothesis. Even statistical theory is a presupposition because it assumes how the results will be distributed. So, statistical theory is just another aspect of the total experimental model. Their value is that they give us a very precise way of estimating the probability of a mistake.

The Inquiry Process: Weighting the Alternatives

The risk we run in an experiment is a function of the chance of making a mistake and the significance of the mistake once it is made. For example the risk associated with estimating the alcohol content of a liniment as opposed to estimating the arsenic content has two very different risk levels. This introduces the concept of values in experimentation. Since the inquiry is directed toward some specific goal, problems of values are always critical.

The Inquiry Process: Instructions of the Experiment

We now have estimates of which hypotheses are to be tested, which mistakes are critical, what observations are pertinent and the like. We now need to know how to gather information. This means we need to know (1) how the observations are to be grouped, as well as the number of observations to be taken, and (2) an accurate description of the method used in the experiment.

One way is to hold every aspect of the situation constant except two, and while systematically changing one of these, be measuring the other. This can be very inefficient since the researcher might want to measure other variables. There are now many techniques (see statistical methods) to vary several aspects of the experiment. As far as the number of observations, this depends on (1) the significance of the experiment, (2) the errors of the observations. The determination depends on what kind of risk we are willing to run. What is critical is that the experiment can be understood by other workers in the field. He wants to feel reasonably sure that if some one else should perform the same operations, using the same presuppositions and equipment, he would come up with “essentially” the same results. The task of making operations “clear and precise” is no easy one. It demands considerable knowledge of the way people react to written or oral instructions, for its proper solution. The whole field of human computer interaction (HCI) can be helpful in designing the best interfaces to collect information. We must continue to find ways to make operations of experiments more exact.

The Inquiry Process: Formulating a Response (Data Analysis)

The researcher needs to analyze the data in a certain manner. Most methods involve statistics. How confident should the researcher be in the conclusions? Within science we can make a distinction between results that are “well confirmed” and the ones that are partially or very poorly confirmed. How can we confirm the results (or how can we determine that we have made progress?) Some scientists link the degree of confidence with the number of instances in which it has been confirmed. The pragmatist does not depend solely on confirming observations. He depends on all the aspects of the experiment. First, it depends on what we take a pertinent observation to be. If you or I do not agree as to what makes a pertinent observation, how can we agree as to whether the observations help to confirm or refute the hypothesis? Second, the degree of confirmation depends on the formulation of the hypothesis. If the formulation leaves little wiggle room, then it is easily confirmed. But if the alternatives are many, then no one of the hypotheses are highly confirmed. Third, the degree of confirmation depends on the prior information we are willing to accept. If the prior information are well established, and our experiment is so designed that we make use of these results, then our degree of confirmation is greater than when we are not sure of the results. Many experiments have been shown to be unreliable because the instruments used (from prior information) were found to be unreliable. Fourth, the degree of confirmation also depends on the errors of the observation. Fifth, the degree of confirmation also depends on the design of the experiment as well as the number of observations. It is not always true that an increase in the number of observations will increase confidence. Finally, sixth, the degree of confidence depends on the method of analyzing the data and drawing conclusions. One way of simplifying all these criteria is to assume that every scientific conclusion is really a course of action for some specified goal. So we can replace them with two measures (1) how efficient the course of action is for the objective, and (2) how important the objective is. This raises two new problems, (1) how to determine the efficiency of a course of action, and (2) the method of determining the importance of an objective, which is a question of value

The Inquiry Process: Evaluating the Results of an Experiment

The conclusions of an experiment are merely “responses” to the questions raised, it is not the “answer”, which is an experimental conclusion that has a perfect degree of confirmation (or the course of action that is sure to lead to the successful attainment of an end or objective). The responsibility of science is to show how its responses can be improved. This does not mean that the interest in improving the responses depends solely on whether society accepts the “answer” because as a non-relativistic pragmatist, the researcher goes beyond society. To avoid depending solely on the point of view of one society or culture, the pragmatist adopts the viewpoint that there is an “historic” interest which directs scientific activity in addition to the practical significance. Science purpose is not just to increase the knowledge of any particular nation but of everyone’s knowledge. This generality of the ideal of science enables us to define the notion of objectivity in science. A scientist is objective when he frees himself of any influence by individual, social or historic purpose. This does not mean that observations can take place in isolation, independent of any pragmatic pressure because at the very minimum the instruments used to measure observations are “bias” to at least one individual, the observer. We cannot remove the observer’s purpose from the experiment itself. Pragmatism argues that experimentation is always a purposive activity. Science does not try to remove individual or social purpose from experimentation; rather, science insists that the individual and social purpose be consistent with the purpose of science itself. So when a scientist has introduced “bias”, to the pragmatist, this means that the scientist was influenced by a purpose that runs counter to that of science.

Pragmatism Reference List

Feigl, H., Logical Empiricism. In Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. By D. Runes, Philosophical Library, 1943.

Hempel, C. G. “The Function of General Laws in History,” Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), 1942, p. 35-47.

Miller, D. L. “The Meaning of Explanation”, Psychological Review, Vol 53, No. 4 (1946) p. 241-46

Pearson, K., The Grammar of Science, Chas. Scribner’s and Sons, 1892.

Peirce, C. S., Collected Works, ed. By C. M. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, Harvard University Press, 1931-35.

Peirce, C. S. The Philosophy of Peirce, ed. By J. Buchler, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940

(7) James, W. Pragmatism, Longmans, Green and Co. 1908.

(8) James, W. The Meaning of Truth, Longmans, Green and Co., 1911.

(12) Schiller, F. C. S., Humanism, Macmillan and Co., 1912.

(3) Dewey, J., Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Henry Holt and Co., 1938.

(4) Dewey, J., The Quest for Certainty, Minton, Balch and Co., 1929.

(5) Dewey, J., The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed., by J. Ratner, Henry Holt and Co., 1928.

(14) Singer, E. A. Jr., Mind as Behavior, R. G. Adams an Co. , 1924

(15) Singer, E. A., Jr. On the Contented Life, Henry Hold and Co., 1932.

(16) Singer, E. A., Jr., Experience and Reflection (to be published)

Comparing Pragmatism, Positivism and Metaphysics

Metaphysics

Positivism

Pragmatism

Makes the method of common experience applicable to the solution of critical problems

Language and observation are enough. Insight, feeling and intuition are not essential

Metaphysics assumes that the methods can stand on their own without other sciences

The positivist method is not complete

The problem of whether the world is “inside” the perceiving mind is not a real problem, because whether it is real or not depends not on observation alone, but on the question of which conception of the world best serve’s man’s purpose (The pragmatist asks why the issue is raised in the first place)

Pragmatism does not differentiate the science of discovery from the science of verification (which checks results already obtained). Both open up the new, otherwise it would not be science at all. The process of verification is no more than a discovery that what we hesitantly accepted, can now be more confidently accepted.

Types (and Qualities) of Other Inquiry Methods

Our discussion does not mean that we cannot immediately try some sort of inquiry in the beginning that is not a thorough design of experiments. Certain patterns of actions may not qualify the ideal requirements of science but are nevertheless useful in the process of science. For example:

7) Speculative inquiry – this is characterized by a heavy reliance on insight (intuition), much discussion, vaguely applied rules of logic, usually used in model construction at a very general level. Its aim is usually for “satisfying intellectual curiosity” (a vague notion that does not have any end)

8) Pure Empirical Inquiry – Characterized by data gathering, with intuition supplying the criteria of pertinence. This kind of testing leads to speculation and other types discussed below. This inquiry is usually followed by heavy statistical analysis (with little evaluation of why the statistics were chosen) but few conclusions. The result is worthy of “exploration”.

9) Conceptual Empirical Inquiry – This time a partial scientific model directs the data gathering and supplies the criteria of pertinence. The process of checking is often crude because many assumptions are made about the aspects of nature outside the model. Most “exact” sciences rely heavily on this method.

10) Mystical Inquiry – Characterized by heavy reliance on feeling with processes rarely expressed in precise terms. It does attempt to reach conclusions to guide action (e.g. psycho-analysis and the field of esthetics)

11) Practical Inquiry – The same as conceptual inquiry with some more immediate goal made explicit and which guides the inquiry, though with little use made of long-run objectives. This is commonly used in engineering.

12) Planning Inquiry – this method includes long-run objectives, but uses sporadic data gathering and relies heavily on speculative methods.

History of Inquiry in Disciplines

Nature of Causality

The metaphysical approach on the problem of causality consists of trying to get at the essential (inner) nature of the causal connections or to conclude with the “ultimate cause” or “final explanation” (usually God). The metaphysician claims that although the scientific method is useful but they fail to get a comprehensive picture of reality. He tries to develop a more comprehensive notion which will enable us to understand the world in its totality. They believe that science can only capture parts of the reality. Examples include Leibniz description of the real world in terms of “monads” which were conceived as purposive entities (entelechies), with God as the perfect monad. Another is Whitehead’s process philosophy that states that ‘'scientific materialism” is “entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which we have now arrived."[7]

The assumption of scientific materialism is effective in many contexts, says Whitehead, only because it directs our attention to a certain class of problems that lend themselves to analysis within this framework. However, scientific materialism is less successful when addressing issues of teleology and when trying to develop a comprehensive, integrated picture of the universe as a whole. According to Whitehead, recognition that the world is organic rather than materialistic is therefore essential, and this change in viewpoint can result as easily from attempts to understand modern physics as from attempts to understand human psychology and teleology. Says Whitehead, "Mathematical physics presumes in the first place an electromagnetic field of activity pervading space and time. The laws which condition this field are nothing else than the conditions observed by the general activity of the flux of the world, as it individualizes itself in the events."[8]

The end result is that Whitehead concludes that "nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process."

The positivistic approach to causality is essentially a mechanical image in order to enable us to predict with certainty future events from knowledge of the present, or to explain present or past events in terms of their antecedents. The positivistic theory of explanation and prediction is designed to explain the method by which such explanation and prediction takes place using three ingredients (1) the event to be explained, (2) a set of statements asserting the occurrences of certain events, and (3) a set of laws by using it with (2) such events can be explained by empirical evidence. The critical part of this method is making explicit the meaning of a “causal law” so the positivist spends a lot of effort developing techniques (such as Mill’s canons) to formulate the meaning of “law” in science. For some empiricists, laws are just an assertion about the outcome of a set of possible observations (e.g. Galileo’s law of falling bodies consist of the assertion of what was observed, is observed and could be observed when a ball is allowed to fall freely). The confirmation of a law is measured in terms of the number of times the predicted observation does actually occur. However, the basis for “positivistic law” or theory is not based on empirical notions but counter-factual notions (if “a” happens, “b” happens, even though “a” has never happened) and to date no solution has been provided by positivists.

To the pragmatist the notion that causal laws is conceived from observing sequences of observable events is flawed because there is nothing in the observable aspects of the events that can justify the causal connection. For the pragmatist the presupposed causal law is not something operating independently in nature, but as an instrument for dealing with natural phenomena in the pursuit of our particular objectives, enabling a progressive and continuous inquiry. For example, positivists will conclude when a person is shot that the death is “caused” by a bullet entering the heart, etc. A pragmatist will, depending on the goal of the inquiry (why he was killed – the cause could be an accident), take the “response” from the experiment as a means of getting the “answer” by refining the “mechanical imagery” that will yield statistically consistent responses, consequently the experimenter will approach the true answer. Here no one observation can disconfirm a causal theory; each instance must be incorporated into a set of observations that will be used to further refine the mechanical imagery. Sometimes no single imagery satisfies all the observations. At this point, scientific research has to rely on intuition to open up new possibilities. So the pragmatist uses everything available to him to figure out the “cause” of the problem.

Nature of Biological Sciences

For biology to be a separate science, the first question that needs to be answered is whether or not all questions about living phenomena can be handled by physical science. This controversy appears as the mechanist-vitalist argument. Like Democritus, Descartes sought to explain all natural phenomena in terms of matter and motion. God was necessary to explain the origin of the universe but not its operation. Newton improved on this “science of mechanics” using his experimental data. Descartes however, did believe in the soul that frees man from the mechanistic view. Spinoza insisted that mind and matter are both subject to the deterministic nature of life. Spinoza differentiated between “active behavior” which is caused internally and are the basis for personal “freedom” and “passive” behavior which is caused externally. Spinoza maintained what is called a naturalistic approach that combined both mechanistic and non-mechanistic approaches. Leibniz’s monad on the other hand was essentially mental or vitalistic atomism. However, mechanism dominated this discipline starting in the nineteenth century and especially in the current century because of the growth of chemistry.

Metaphysicians such as Bergson maintain that science is incapable of understanding life and that intuition and instinct are the ways of fitting life into a causal system. The logical positivists such as Carnap admit that we do not know whether biological laws are reducible to physical laws, we do know that biological concepts are reducible to physical concepts. So notions such as species, organisms, organs, and events in entire organisms can be defined in science by means of qualitative determinations such as “fertilization” (as the union of the spermatozoa). There is a strong tendency to define living matter in chemical terms, hence the terms “bio-chemistry” and “bio-physics”, where researchers are attempting to discover the mechanism of biological changes; by reducing it to chemical or physical ones (e.g. cancer cure by means of chemical means – chemo-therapy).

The pragmatist believe that there is truth in both sides, leading to a naturalistic position. Pragmatists describe objects according to its mechanics, physics, morphology as well as function. Life can be defined in terms of its function and still be compatible with the mechanistic view. Examples of functional qualities are irritability, reproduction, self-preservation and metabolism. However, some non-living objects (crystals) reproduce. So pragmatists such as Singer attempted to define life in terms of both functional and non-functional terms.

Nature of Psychological Sciences

The metaphysicians hold that the mind is known intimately by the individual, and the mental process (e.g. consciousness or thinking) defies quantification, is completely private and non-physical. It cannot be conceptualized in scientific language. The mind is something other than matter, and it is this psychic stuff that has sensations, is conscious, desires, likes and feels. Mind is knowable to the metaphysician by introspection, by looking into ourselves and the science that will do this is introspective psychology.

The positivists must develop a theory of mind that is defined in terms of elementary sensations which are the beginnings of knowledge. Mind is a logical construction built up out of sense experiences. Minds do not exist independently of the experiences they have; in fact, minds do not have sensations, as the metaphysicians hold. Sense data are neutral and they combine to form our notion of mind. In order to help the psychologists handle theses sensations, Watson developed the concept of behaviorism. Behaviorism contends that if research was left to introspective psychology or gestalt psychology, which depend on verbal reports of the subject as to his reactions to stimuli, many areas of mental investigation are not researchable (such as child psychology and animal behavior). So behaviorism attends to what human beings do, rather than what they merely say (observe how humans behave). To find out what sensation is, the behaviorist defined “discrimination” and “operations”. These terms were given significance by research in relativity that says that physical entities, like space, can be understood only in terms of the operations for observing them. For the behaviorists, sensations can be defined by the operation by which it is got, that is to say, by discrimination (the behavior of humans to choose one behavior instead of another). These researchers called the operationists (operational or positivistic behaviorists) wanted to reduce immediate experience to behavior. These acts of discrimination are all that constitute the mind because that is all that is observable. For example, if we wanted to know if someone is thinking of red, we ask him to choose a red card from a set of different colored cards. What about the criticism that the subject chooses the card for other reasons other than thinking about it? The operationist would reply that the subject has been observed to discriminate red in similar circumstances at other times. This reliance on observing behavior does not reduce the value of verbal reports. It demonstrates that the concepts resulting from such practice can be no more definite than what is known of the meaning of the word in the mind of the subject (Stevens 1935). Hence, psychologists investigates thoroughly, using positivistic semantic analysis, all the terms in verbal reports.

The pragmatic analysis of mind was defined by Singer (1924) in terms of “molar behaviorism”. The behaviorists define molecular behavior as “terms of its strict underlying physical and physiological details”. The pragmatist defines molar behaviorism as “emergent phenomenon that has descriptive properties of its own”. The pragmatist classifies behaviors into different classes based on its function and purpose. One class of behavior patterns becomes the producer of another (or same) class of behavior patterns or classes of objects. Walking is the producer of where we are now. Saying “hello” produces a “hello” in another person. A carpenter’s behavior produces a book-shelf, a book produces an individual’s shivering. When an individual displays different behavior patterns that constitute a functional class (such as riding, flying, walking, all of the transportation class), that functional class (transportation) is said to be purposive. The distinction between purpose and function is that the terms of purpose, the functional property is restricted to behavior of a single individual. A clock only has the function of recording time, but a human being can be said to have the purpose of telling time, because he can use many different behaviors to tell time. All purposive classes of behavior are functional, but not all functional classes are purposive. The final step is to define “mind” as the class of an individual’s purposive behavior. Purposive behavior is only displayed when there are alternative courses of action. The alternative courses of action are called means, and the product common to the morphologically dissimilar behavior displayed by one individual, is the end. Purposive behavior is the selection of a means to an end. This theory says therefore that psychological concepts such as “sensation”, “consciousness”, personality”, “trait,” are various kinds of properties of selection of means for various ends. In the positivistic approach, such concepts need to be reduced to protocol statements or “simple in sensation” or “directly observables”. For the pragmatist, meaning does not reduce to directly observables. All logical or psychological inquiry are provisional and complex (they are all indirect). His proof for this lies with the approach of Gestalt psychology (where observers grasp the entire complex object at once and not by adding simple elements together). We can use Gestalt psychology as basis for IS?? Even simple discrimination can be complex (e.g. tapping a table results in different responses). For pragmatism, science is always about seeking a more exact ways of responding to its questions, and the use of quantities or measurements. Pragmatists define the “directly observable” as (1) it is more or less immediately apprehended, (2) when an individual judges whether he observes a directly observable, he is almost always correct in his judgement.

The Nature of Social Science

Very few metaphysicians and positivists (Lundberg and Felix Kaufman) have worked on social science. The pragmatists are the only ones working in this field according to Churchman. Various controversies exist in social science which surround the question of whether the social group is to be taken as a “separate” entity or is to be taken as an aggregate of persons

4) The analogists view groups as separate and compares them to studies in other scientific areas such as biology (social mechanism or living organism), or to an individual mind (psychological analogy – this has had the greatest influence)

a) The study of the social group based on “argument by analogy”

d) Psychological analogists – the relationship between psychology and social science is very intimate so the psychological analogies are the most prominent analogies which reduce the social group. The psychological analogists claims that the social group is a distinct entity, but that it is not like a physical body, or a living organism, but is rather a “mind” and hence can be studied within psychology (Tozzer 1925). The social group is a “collective mind” (Le Bon’s The Crowd). The group mind does not operate like its members’ minds, it is not the mere sum of its parts. It has a history which gives it properties its members do not have individually. Mind for McDougall is “an organized system of mental or purposive forces”, a group has a mind. Mind is not merely the forces which produces action, but the action itself. All institutions are not only products of thought and creations of mind, they are mind, “otherwise we have a building without a tenant, a body without a mind”. A group is “self-conscious” because it responds to its own objectives. Social psychology is a branch of psychology that studies the social mind.

5) The molecular analysts views group as aggregates of persons and its properties can all be inferred from the properties of these persons

6) The molar analysts view that groups do exist as a separate entity, but not as an entity which can be identified with the entities of any other sciences – it requires a distinct method. Churchman’s arguments against both are:

a) The argument of the physical analogist that groups have physical properties is trivial. What they are saying over and above this is to claim that a social group is merely a kind of physical body and that there is nothing more to understand it than what is needed to understand any ordinary physical body. They established this by comparing the properties of physical bodies and the properties of groups. The question is, which properties should we choose to compare? (Life is like chocolate, Forrest Gump) Analogies can be made up. They need to show that they are not ignoring critical properties if their method is to work. They must show that all the pertinent properties of the object under study can be included among the properties of the known subjects. For example, every human being can be shown to belong to the class of physical objects, but the humanity of an individual cannot just consists of his membership in the class of physical objects. He has other properties which make him different from physical objects such as the history of the object. Similarly, Allport’s criticism of Spencer’s biological analogy, “there is no continuity of tissue between the units of the groups as there is between cells and organs of the body. Secondly, the organization of the individual’s body is based upon integration, or the welfare of the entire individual, whereas, the controlling principle of the organization is the interest of the parts, that is, the separate individuals”. Notwithstanding this argument, the analogists have opened up many avenues of fruitful research. The biological emphasis has turned attention to the evolution of group structures and functions and to social growth and development. But this is not a sufficient basis to understand all the phases of a new concept. The analogical method would reduce, in its extreme, all science to mechanics.

b) Allport considers that the group and the mind are members of objects that are abstractions of our experience with which we deal only by thinking or talking about them (e.g. like “strategy”) as opposed to objects that do not come from our own reflection such as rocks, trees and man. Allports views that all physical objects are directly-observable (unlike the positivists, who view that only “observable-thing-predicates” are directly observable). Lunberg views that whatever we take as “concrete” are merely pragmatic constructs, the only justification for any unit or classification is its utility for our purpose. So molecular analysis taken literally prevents our considering certain phenomena as distinct entities, and so forces us to give up what might otherwise be a fruitful line of attack.

The “molar” approach to the problem of the social group says that it regards the social group as a distinct entity that must be studied on its own terms; the dispute concerns the method of such a study.

The speculative method to molar analysis has contributed little to the study of social science except for studies about the origin, values and possible destination of societies using terms such as “group spirit”, “national destiny” and “disintegrating forces”.

Pragmatic Concept of Social Science

The Nature of Ultimate Value

The position that says values depend on facts is called “naturalism”, whereas the opposite to this is “non-naturalism”.

4) Speculative approaches to value

5) Positivistic approaches to value

6) Pragmatic Approaches to value

i) How do we evaluate means with respect to an ideal? And

ii) How do we determine which ideal defines the good?

References

Stevens, S. S. “The Operational Basis of Psychology,” American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 47 (1935) 323-30

Watson, J. B., Behaviorism, The People’s Ins. Publ. Co., Inc., 1924.

Boring, E. G., “The Use of Operational Definitions in Science,” Psychological Review, Vol. 52 (1945), p. 243-45.

Dewey, J., Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Henry Hold and Co., 1938.

Singer, E. A., Mind as Behavior, R. G. Adams and Co., 1924.

Tozzer, A. M. Social Origins and Social Communities, the Macmillan Co., 1925

Lundberg, G. A., Foundations of Sociology, The Macmillan Co., 1939

McDougall, W., The Group Mind, G. P. Putnam’s and Sons, 1920.

Allport, F. H. Social Psychology, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924

Allport, F. H., Institutional Behavior, The University of North Carolina Press, 1933.

Allport, F. H., “The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 28 (1924) p. 688-706

Can science save us? Lundberg, George Andrew, book 1961 UM DULUTH Library Book HM38 .L8 1961 Regular Loan

Foundations of sociology / Lundberg, George Andrew, book 1979 UM DULUTH Library Book HM51 .L8 1979 Regular Loan

Social research; a study in methods of gathering data. Lundberg, George Andrew, book 1968 UM DULUTH Library Book HM48 .L8 1968 Regular Loan

Find positivistic roots of semantic analysis to place where survey opinion research lies

Cuber, J. F. “Sociology” D. Appleton and Co., Inc., 1947.

The Design of Inquiring Systems

The goal of this book is to investigate the systems that can improve the creativity of science – in actions that lead to new knowledge. Design is defined as a goal seeking (teleological) thinking behavior that selects among sets of complete behavior-pattern alternatives the one set that leads to the desired goal such that if anyone follows the designer’s thought processes, the design can be converted into a specific set of actions. Design is characterized by:

1) Distinguishing in thought between different sets of behavior patterns

2) Estimate how well each set will serve the goals

3) Communicate to others so that they can accomplish the same

4) Document the methodology (a standard design), such that he can say why the design is good, and the what, when and how.

5) The system designer must decide on the scope of the relevant system (is hypothesis testing sufficient?) and how far the boundaries of the design should go

This “other” mind could be a computer that the processes can be programmed in. The result of this process could be to find what cannot be designed.

Inquiry is an activity that produces knowledge. The process of design is related to defining knowledge. A library for example is not a collection of information (if knowledge is defined as a collection of information and therefore is said to have knowledge), because it has no way of saying which strings of symbols are meaningful and which is not, it does not always speak the language of the user, it cannot provide the right information if the user does not know what to ask and it cannot value the user’s questions. Knowledge can be said to reside in the user and not in the collection, and can be defined as a potential for some person to do something correctly (action conception). The design of inquiring systems is to improve the process of research. Churchman reconstructs the ideas of previous philosophers in the language of the design of an inquiring system.

Inquiring System Principles	Inquiring System Characteristics	Implementations/Implications	Problems with the system
Cartesian System Man wanted no dogmas handed down to him that he could not check by his own faculties, so he turned to humanism – the organizing force that reside in man himself – his faculty of reason Sciences should be made to yield results as certain as those of mathematics The solution was to say that God is the guarantee of the validity of the clear and distinct ideas	The system of doubting The system must show that (1) there is an origin of the sentences (2) this origin cannot produce false sentences that are assumed true by the system		Too much doubt Cannot verify any knowledge Tautological (Cartesian circle) God is the guarantor Cannot explain how different objects affect each other (causality)
Spinoza Avoided defining the simplest sentences Defined different levels of knowledge, (1) opinions or imagination from reading or hearing, (2) common notions shared by others, (3) intuition from the essence of things Construct a universal axiom from experience, using mathematical inference, using propositions	Design in inquiring system based on intuition Methods of inquiry are (1) hearsay (storing information in memory), (2) Vague experience (pattern-matching machines that compare alike patterns, (3) knowledge of an essence of a thing deduced from other things (game playing machines -- recognizing a checkers game based on a chess game) The concept of an “executive” or controlling module whose level of design depends on Spinoza’s level of inquiry (1) simple controlling module, (2) a heuristic AI routine, (3) executive can examine whether the a method can be successful but cannot ask about the inputs given or to create new methods of proof (they are pre-programmed as in chess playing games) (4) This is an advanced (free) executive that can know what the inquirer knows, to understand the inquirer (like a good librarian)	Two approaches: 1. The theory of levels agrees with modern-day concepts of organizations, where every issue between two systems can be resolved by a higher level system which includes both systems and defines their function. 2. The higher level is distinct from the lower level, and must have the ability to discern all possible pathways	Did not explain “intuition” The system cannot understand the inquirer (fourth kind of knowledge) God is still guarantor Still cannot explain causality
Leibnizian Spiritual soul and physical body exist in pre-established harmony (by God) We recognize things because of innate ideas that we have, not because of experience The universe is made up independent souls (monads), each conscious and can combine with other elements to create more complex entities Humans are given the ability (clear and distinct ideas) that are not from outside (reason itself or innate ideas)	Leibnizian Logic Processor (internal reasoning processor) 1. Innate ideas (no inputs) 2. Recognize sentences and tautologies (which ones are consistent and which contradictory) 3. Has a precise dictionary (can classify any unit or symbol) 4. Recognize “contingent” sentences (processing a stream of symbols) those that are not consistent nor contradictory but contingent on other contingent truths (e.g. contingent statement “It will rain today’, is compared with what is stored in memory, “It will rain March 5, which happens to be today” making the first statement true) -- can form nets of units by a given set of relations or operators These contingent truths belong to fact nets, stored in the processor to process other contingent statements. 5. The larger the fact net, the better the processor. -- can rank the nets – the lower nets are more closer to truth The processor needs an executive to control possible senseless proliferation of contingent truths 6. Needs a method of processing symbols and building nets so that the system will eventually arrive at an optimal net or know that it is converging What controls this model? God.	Resolves Spinoza’s problem by saying its both monistic and pluralistic Algorithm Machines Heuristic Search Machines Theorem proving machines The practice of tying together results in the form of a “fact net” in science and when a discipline is governed by a theory is an example of Leibnizian model. Examples of knowledge the basis of which is false (e.g. Evolutionary theory) is based on this model, if the fact net is pulled from the bottom, it is possible to pull away everything at the top Leibniz’s concept of the whole system – to optimal design of a part of a system is possible without prior knowledge of the whole system (we cannot solve crime without understanding economics) For science to be a management (a full understanding of management) is to conceive of management as a science. The system’s designer does not understand his system until he understands it in terms of all its basic functions Systems have the same functions whose objective is to increase the clarity of their apperception. All systems can be analyzed into sets of irreducible subsystems Chemists that work on analytical organic chemistry (e.g. using mass spectrometry to identify a molecule ) have no rigorous procedure to lead them from data to hypothesis. The Leibnizian method would entail: 1) Deciding what data to collect, when to stop. 2) Adjust data in light of theory. Decide on data that is significant and pertinent 3) Suggest classes which contain plausible hypothesis. Singer suggests here to set up its own requirements for data. Some a priori theory is needed (Kantian) to partition the observations. 4) Consult outside experts, increase theoretical base – supply rules for better discrimination 5) Construct plausible hypothesis – narrowed due to previous step 6) Make predictions for each candidate hypothesis – can skip step 3 and 4 and go straight here if able to spend time disconfirming 7) Assign degree of satisfactoriness to candidates 8) Recycle if no hypothesis is satistfactory Both deduction and induction happens here. Using certain theories of organic processes, we can deduce that certain isomers are unstable. Given certain observations describing bar graph, we can induce other sentences in organic chemistry (theories) E.g. Leibnizian inquirers cannot study a game of checkers unless it already has a similar game in its fact net. Assuming that it has, it will accept sentences and try to use its innate ideas to answer inquiries about moving in checkers. Slowly it will grow its fact net until it is able to understand any sentence given to it.	Does not accept inputs Fact nets can be arbitrary (objectivity cannot be verified, ranking is difficult) Control is only on the inside of the system (cannot control model builder) Forces inquiry to look at whole system before studying it (separability) Does not explain the functions of the basic functions of all systems Did not show whether simple systems existed System guarantor is still God, there is no guarantee outside God that the designer’s intentions will be realizable Efforts in research may still be wasted Does not support induction well since, induction requires “highly warranted” observational statements about specific events. Since “highly warranted” means “well agreed upon”, this system does not have general agreement outside its own system
Lockean Inquiring Systems The universe as made up of material bodies, which in turn are made of "insensible particles," which interact mechanically. Immaterial bodies have sense organs, which when stimulated produce "ideas of sensation." These ideas are operated on by our minds to produce "ideas of reflection." Primary and secondary qualities (Genuine knowledge cannot be found in natural science, because the real essences of physical objects that science studies cannot be known) We should use intuition – “the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other”. For Locke, observation supplemented by intuition was sufficient for the whole construction of science	Observation is the prime source of high-quality fact nets. One way of doing this is to design a “community of minds” which agree about their sensory responses and therefore input observations that are simplest (distinguish between reality and non-reality – e.g. getting the right intelligence even though the enemy is flooding the system with false reports). The Lebnizian inquirer uses experts. The problem with this is that the inquirer does not know how the experts do it. To solve this, the Lockean system depends on the assumption that simple sensations constitute reliable information. After receiving the simple inputs, the system observes its own processing by means of “reflection” (like a filing system that can grow its own categories). After a simple sensation takes place, all the community recognize as simple, the inquirer generates a truth statement. The network is built based on acceptable empirical data. They are referred to as “conventional Lockean” systems if the basis of their agreements is a choice of the designer and depends on his personal value.	Are Libraries Lockean system? (1) They agree on a labeling system (2) Together they solve the problem of the simple input, (3) they decide together what an acquisition should be. Because the design of the classification is up to the designer, Libraries are conventional Lockean systems. To become un-conventional, the Library has to be objective about their method of classification and storing. Aa human element can provide this objectivity. The Lockean inquirers is designed to develop a learning process, in which they attempt to generalize their experience, supposedly by induction from their agreements about specific observations. How is this done? One way is by overwhelming agreement. E.g. In understanding how a game of checkers work, The Lockean system will observe the game, store elementary types of information describing the specific moves, pays attention to certain movements and ignores others (based on the strategy) based on the guiding rules for input, and will struggle to determine by means of its generalizing sector, what rules govern the two players and what their objectives are.	Requires a plurality of inquirers (in order to agree on something) What if the community cannot agree? Terminates inquiry as a result of agreement may be a wrong mode of design (because they can still be wrong, and e.g. forecasting is not possible in this system) Although the system can assign properties to “substances”, it cannot explain how this ability to assign properties work Kant answered this by saying that there must be a priori knowledge (space-time framework) The system does not explain how the a priori commitments affect the inductions it makes Do not handle exceptions well (that go against previous agreements) Can only process simple inputs “Conventional” Lockean inquirers depend on designer’s personal values Does not explain what human agreement is and therefore cannot provide level of confidence in agreement Does not measure cost-effectiveness of knowledge (its usefulness) Still has a guarantor problem for inputs. Without a reality guarantor, it becomes conventional (capable of receiving any information regardless of quality) Dependent on the design of the communication system, here the design of the community depends on heavy a priori commitments. The guarantor problem for the Lockean system is to design a community with an explicit formulation of its legal structure and how it should shape the data. The empirical inquiry is assumed (simple inputs), so how observations should be made is not explained (related to a priori presuppositions that color observation – the problem of representation). Limited economics of information, need to be part of a larger system.
Kantian Inquiring Systems Two ingredients make up his psychology, sensuous intuitions and principles of understanding (a priori, supplying the pure “form” and phenomena of the world)	Inquiring system is capable of examining its own methodology of receiving inputs and of discovering the presuppositions underlying this methodology To determine how the a priori structure influences the decisions of the generalizing sector of the inquirer: 1) Every inquiring system must be able to individuate what it receives as a sensuous intuition (putting it into a space-time framework). This clock will affect how observations are made (e.g. sales forecasts will change with how the data is collected). But if the forecasts is done using theory and based on a determination of what could have occurred under proper sales management, it will work. 2) It can either keep a priori separate from the generalizing or look at both together. 3) If separated – minimal a priori, just enough to receive inputs, e.g. the time clock. Problem is who guarantees the behavior of the clock?	E.g. A Kantian inquirer trying to understand checkers, because it has a priori knowledge of chess, sees “directly” what is relevant, and sifts out a great deal of irrelevant data (the conversation between the players, the time between moves) and might conclude that checkers is a game of twelve bishops on each side. It would guess by simple induction that the bishops are constrained to move forward only and that the rule of “taking” is modified, and so on. So the mode of representations of information strongly influence the success or failure of the inquirer in arriving at a solution. The input sector should develop a strategy of representing information which will minimize the effort of the generalizing sector to solve its problems.	What a priori structure is appropriate? How to sift out exactly the relevant inputs to process through its models? How should the input be translated within the language of a model? How does the executive decide to judge whether the translated inputs provide a good basis for solution? How is the executive to judge whether a solution has occurred?
Hegelian Dialectic System	Objectivity means: 1) No one is forced to accept the results 2) Each inquirer may learn how any other inquirer conducted its inquiry 3) Each inquirer is free to test the methods used thus confirm or refute the results 4) Object gains its objectivity by virtue of it being observed. This last criteria is used as a design principle An observer can be observed by observing himself directly or by another observer. Subjectivity – I alone know the inner states of my mind, and can never be aware of someone else’s pain. Leads to solipsism and the inability to compare utilities. To solve this: consider the observer as a physical input-output device that receives impressions (physical stimuli), the design problem of objectivity can be described precisely. The observer can determine whether two inquirers agree. Hegel refers to this process of observing as “self-reflection”. The problem with objectivity is that there is a dichotomy between the mechanical (observations as a reaction to stimuli) and the teleological (observations taken to serve some purpose). The mechanist philosophy assumes that fact dominates the subject and will reveal the information that is true. Most observers use this philosophy to collect information about anything. Auditors can guarantee the statement of ‘assets” of a company, but they can never tell us anything about the social value of those assets. This is the nature of subject as a slave to the “master observer of the subject (authority, auditors). A position is the subject as a manager – delegating authority when necessary (can permit the master observer to rule if the net benefits decide). This is the teleological approach. It is a way of observing the world so that the resulting information is useful to a purposive being. To know that a subject has observed “objectively” we need to know the total system in which the subject acts (e.g. like in inventory control – the whole system including history, leads, lags, suppliers). This approach raises other questions – What are the costs and benefits of trusting the master, who establishes the evidence?	One way of designing a system of inquiry based on the teleological philosophy is to build an image of the world – a Weltanschauung—that provides a picture of the inquirers alternatives, e.g. to travel to meet provides three means, whereas to communicate, the model provides two means, phone and fax. So the piece of information is valid only when embedded in a certain Weltanschauung, way of viewing the entire system. The inquirer attains objective information only if he chooses the right Weltanschauung. Who is the master observer who can decide? Hegel provided the answer after Kant provided the idea by bringing together two seemingly opposite thesis (and antithesis) demonstrating Kant’s synthesis. Hegel suggested exposing the mind to a vast array of psychic events (loading with as much data as possible), then generate a conviction about some fundamental thesis, select a Weltanschauung that maximizes the credence of the thesis (looking at reality and data such that the thesis is supported). The observer of the subject looks at the conviction “objectively”, wondering why he is so convinced. This mind conceives another conviction and asks what it would be like to be equally convinced of the antithesis. Kant argued that the truth behind thesis and antithesis can only be found is they both try to extend reason beyond its proper domain. Another observer of the subject is introduced who tries to see how the opposition arises out of the particular kinds of minds that clash in their convictions. He builds a new world view at a higher level Weltanschauung (Father observing two children fight). The bigger mind is called the synthesis.	Problems with subjectivity 1) Cannot compare values of members 2) Excludes direct observation by another of a subject’s state of mind 3) Assumes maximum accuracy of one’s own direct observation 4) Leaves no room for an explicit design or scrutiny Problems with Hegel’s dialectic The “subjective” has been transferred to the observer We cannot represent how a person feels when he sees a clear blue sky. So under what circumstances does a set of representations of an object capture he essence of the object? The Hegelian Dialectical Problems 1) Not clear where the original thesis comes from 2) How to acquire conviction 3) How can the inquiring system select the thesis whose credence is to be maximized 4) Can possibly lead down a blind alley 5) Belongs to a leisure class where time and money is plentiful (economics of information)
Singerian Inquiring Systems	Most philosophers were busy using logic to study science thinking that if there is a basic design of science, logic will uncover it. Although it was successful in revealing how problems ought to be solved, it did not provide what problems needed to be solved. Singer views that the “whole scope of inquiry” should be used in the design task (not limited to one discipline) 1) Measure -- Uses measurements to show progress (if today we can measure up to 2 decimal places and tomorrow 5 decimal places we have progress) 2) Replicate – repeat the experiments until we get to the level of refinement we need 3) Partition – When all readings are similar shift to a higher level of refinement. Although quantifying permits a way for the system to explore alternative explanations of natural events, it may exclude whole aspects of nature that do not partition (the qualitative descriptors) Analyze the variation (analysis of variance) to decide which of the cases is true 4) If the readings do not fit the hypothesis – (1) revise the hypothesis by adding new variables or change the form of the hypothesis, (2) revise the procedure of adjusting the readings, (3) tolerate the inconsistency until more evidence is available 5) Conclude with imperative statements (“ought” instead of “is)) 6)		How or when the revise the a priori (Weltanschauung)? This depends on the purpose and measure of performance of the system.

Inquiring System Principles

Inquiring System Characteristics

Implementations/Implications

Problems with the system

Cartesian System

Man wanted no dogmas handed down to him that he could not check by his own faculties, so he turned to humanism – the organizing force that reside in man himself – his faculty of reason

Sciences should be made to yield results as certain as those of mathematics

The solution was to say that God is the guarantee of the validity of the clear and distinct ideas

The system of doubting

The system must show that

(1) there is an origin of the sentences

(2) this origin cannot produce false sentences that are assumed true by the system

Too much doubt

Cannot verify any knowledge

Tautological (Cartesian circle)

God is the guarantor

Cannot explain how different objects affect each other (causality)

Spinoza

Avoided defining the simplest sentences

Defined different levels of knowledge, (1) opinions or imagination from reading or hearing, (2) common notions shared by others, (3) intuition from the essence of things

Construct a universal axiom from experience, using mathematical inference, using propositions

Design in inquiring system based on intuition

Methods of inquiry are (1) hearsay (storing information in memory), (2) Vague experience (pattern-matching machines that compare alike patterns, (3) knowledge of an essence of a thing deduced from other things (game playing machines -- recognizing a checkers game based on a chess game)

The concept of an “executive” or controlling module whose level of design depends on Spinoza’s level of inquiry (1) simple controlling module, (2) a heuristic AI routine, (3) executive can examine whether the a method can be successful but cannot ask about the inputs given or to create new methods of proof (they are pre-programmed as in chess playing games)

(4) This is an advanced (free) executive that can know what the inquirer knows, to understand the inquirer (like a good librarian)

Two approaches:

1. The theory of levels agrees with modern-day concepts of organizations, where every issue between two systems can be resolved by a higher level system which includes both systems and defines their function.

2. The higher level is distinct from the lower level, and must have the ability to discern all possible pathways

Did not explain “intuition”

The system cannot understand the inquirer (fourth kind of knowledge)

God is still guarantor

Still cannot explain causality

Leibnizian

Spiritual soul and physical body exist in pre-established harmony (by God)

We recognize things because of innate ideas that we have, not because of experience

The universe is made up independent souls (monads), each conscious and can combine with other elements to create more complex entities

Humans are given the ability (clear and distinct ideas) that are not from outside (reason itself or innate ideas)

Leibnizian Logic Processor (internal reasoning processor)

1. Innate ideas (no inputs)

2. Recognize sentences and tautologies (which ones are consistent and which contradictory)

3. Has a precise dictionary (can classify any unit or symbol)

4. Recognize “contingent” sentences (processing a stream of symbols) those that are not consistent nor contradictory but contingent on other contingent truths (e.g. contingent statement “It will rain today’, is compared with what is stored in memory, “It will rain March 5, which happens to be today” making the first statement true) -- can form nets of units by a given set of relations or operators

These contingent truths belong to fact nets, stored in the processor to process other contingent statements. 5. The larger the fact net, the better the processor. -- can rank the nets – the lower nets are more closer to truth

The processor needs an executive to control possible senseless proliferation of contingent truths

6. Needs a method of processing symbols and building nets so that the system will eventually arrive at an optimal net or know that it is converging

What controls this model? God.

Resolves Spinoza’s problem by saying its both monistic and pluralistic

Algorithm Machines

Heuristic Search Machines

Theorem proving machines

The practice of tying together results in the form of a “fact net” in science and when a discipline is governed by a theory is an example of Leibnizian model.

Examples of knowledge the basis of which is false (e.g. Evolutionary theory) is based on this model, if the fact net is pulled from the bottom, it is possible to pull away everything at the top

Leibniz’s concept of the whole system – to optimal design of a part of a system is possible without prior knowledge of the whole system (we cannot solve crime without understanding economics)

For science to be a management (a full understanding of management) is to conceive of management as a science. The system’s designer does not understand his system until he understands it in terms of all its basic functions

Systems have the same functions whose objective is to increase the clarity of their apperception.

All systems can be analyzed into sets of irreducible subsystems

Chemists that work on analytical organic chemistry (e.g. using mass spectrometry to identify a molecule ) have no rigorous procedure to lead them from data to hypothesis. The Leibnizian method would entail:

1) Deciding what data to collect, when to stop.

2) Adjust data in light of theory. Decide on data that is significant and pertinent

3) Suggest classes which contain plausible hypothesis. Singer suggests here to set up its own requirements for data. Some a priori theory is needed (Kantian) to partition the observations.

4) Consult outside experts, increase theoretical base – supply rules for better discrimination

5) Construct plausible hypothesis – narrowed due to previous step

6) Make predictions for each candidate hypothesis – can skip step 3 and 4 and go straight here if able to spend time disconfirming

7) Assign degree of satisfactoriness to candidates

8) Recycle if no hypothesis is satistfactory

Both deduction and induction happens here. Using certain theories of organic processes, we can deduce that certain isomers are unstable. Given certain observations describing bar graph, we can induce other sentences in organic chemistry (theories)

E.g. Leibnizian inquirers cannot study a game of checkers unless it already has a similar game in its fact net. Assuming that it has, it will accept sentences and try to use its innate ideas to answer inquiries about moving in checkers. Slowly it will grow its fact net until it is able to understand any sentence given to it.

Does not accept inputs

Fact nets can be arbitrary (objectivity cannot be verified, ranking is difficult)

Control is only on the inside of the system (cannot control model builder)

Forces inquiry to look at whole system before studying it (separability)

Does not explain the functions of the basic functions of all systems

Did not show whether simple systems existed

System guarantor is still God, there is no guarantee outside God that the designer’s intentions will be realizable

Efforts in research may still be wasted

Does not support induction well since, induction requires “highly warranted” observational statements about specific events. Since “highly warranted” means “well agreed upon”, this system does not have general agreement outside its own system

Lockean Inquiring Systems

The universe as made up of material bodies, which in turn are made of "insensible particles," which interact mechanically. Immaterial bodies have sense organs, which when stimulated produce "ideas of sensation." These ideas are operated on by our minds to produce "ideas of reflection."

Primary and secondary qualities (Genuine knowledge cannot be found in natural science, because the real essences of physical objects that science studies cannot be known)

We should use intuition – “the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other”. For Locke, observation supplemented by intuition was sufficient for the whole construction of science

Observation is the prime source of high-quality fact nets. One way of doing this is to design a “community of minds” which agree about their sensory responses and therefore input observations that are simplest (distinguish between reality and non-reality – e.g. getting the right intelligence even though the enemy is flooding the system with false reports). The Lebnizian inquirer uses experts. The problem with this is that the inquirer does not know how the experts do it. To solve this, the Lockean system depends on the assumption that simple sensations constitute reliable information. After receiving the simple inputs, the system observes its own processing by means of “reflection” (like a filing system that can grow its own categories). After a simple sensation takes place, all the community recognize as simple, the inquirer generates a truth statement. The network is built based on acceptable empirical data. They are referred to as “conventional Lockean” systems if the basis of their agreements is a choice of the designer and depends on his personal value.

Are Libraries Lockean system? (1) They agree on a labeling system (2) Together they solve the problem of the simple input, (3) they decide together what an acquisition should be. Because the design of the classification is up to the designer, Libraries are conventional Lockean systems. To become un-conventional, the Library has to be objective about their method of classification and storing. Aa human element can provide this objectivity.

The Lockean inquirers is designed to develop a learning process, in which they attempt to generalize their experience, supposedly by induction from their agreements about specific observations. How is this done? One way is by overwhelming agreement.

E.g. In understanding how a game of checkers work, The Lockean system will observe the game, store elementary types of information describing the specific moves, pays attention to certain movements and ignores others (based on the strategy) based on the guiding rules for input, and will struggle to determine by means of its generalizing sector, what rules govern the two players and what their objectives are.

Requires a plurality of inquirers (in order to agree on something)

What if the community cannot agree?

Terminates inquiry as a result of agreement may be a wrong mode of design (because they can still be wrong, and e.g. forecasting is not possible in this system)

Although the system can assign properties to “substances”, it cannot explain how this ability to assign properties work

Kant answered this by saying that there must be a priori knowledge (space-time framework)

The system does not explain how the a priori commitments affect the inductions it makes

Do not handle exceptions well (that go against previous agreements)

Can only process simple inputs

“Conventional” Lockean inquirers depend on designer’s personal values

Does not explain what human agreement is and therefore cannot provide level of confidence in agreement

Does not measure cost-effectiveness of knowledge (its usefulness)

Still has a guarantor problem for inputs. Without a reality guarantor, it becomes conventional (capable of receiving any information regardless of quality)

Dependent on the design of the communication system, here the design of the community depends on heavy a priori commitments. The guarantor problem for the Lockean system is to design a community with an explicit formulation of its legal structure and how it should shape the data.

The empirical inquiry is assumed (simple inputs), so how observations should be made is not explained (related to a priori presuppositions that color observation – the problem of representation).

Limited economics of information, need to be part of a larger system.

Kantian Inquiring Systems

Two ingredients make up his psychology, sensuous intuitions and principles of understanding (a priori, supplying the pure “form” and phenomena of the world)

Inquiring system is capable of examining its own methodology of receiving inputs and of discovering the presuppositions underlying this methodology

To determine how the a priori structure influences the decisions of the generalizing sector of the inquirer:

1) Every inquiring system must be able to individuate what it receives as a sensuous intuition (putting it into a space-time framework). This clock will affect how observations are made (e.g. sales forecasts will change with how the data is collected). But if the forecasts is done using theory and based on a determination of what could have occurred under proper sales management, it will work.

2) It can either keep a priori separate from the generalizing or look at both together.

3) If separated – minimal a priori, just enough to receive inputs, e.g. the time clock. Problem is who guarantees the behavior of the clock?

E.g. A Kantian inquirer trying to understand checkers, because it has a priori knowledge of chess, sees “directly” what is relevant, and sifts out a great deal of irrelevant data (the conversation between the players, the time between moves) and might conclude that checkers is a game of twelve bishops on each side. It would guess by simple induction that the bishops are constrained to move forward only and that the rule of “taking” is modified, and so on. So the mode of representations of information strongly influence the success or failure of the inquirer in arriving at a solution.

The input sector should develop a strategy of representing information which will minimize the effort of the generalizing sector to solve its problems.

What a priori structure is appropriate? How to sift out exactly the relevant inputs to process through its models?

How should the input be translated within the language of a model?

How does the executive decide to judge whether the translated inputs provide a good basis for solution?

How is the executive to judge whether a solution has occurred?

Hegelian Dialectic System

Objectivity means:

1) No one is forced to accept the results

2) Each inquirer may learn how any other inquirer conducted its inquiry

3) Each inquirer is free to test the methods used thus confirm or refute the results

4) Object gains its objectivity by virtue of it being observed. This last criteria is used as a design principle

An observer can be observed by observing himself directly or by another observer.

Subjectivity – I alone know the inner states of my mind, and can never be aware of someone else’s pain. Leads to solipsism and the inability to compare utilities.

To solve this: consider the observer as a physical input-output device that receives impressions (physical stimuli), the design problem of objectivity can be described precisely. The observer can determine whether two inquirers agree. Hegel refers to this process of observing as “self-reflection”.

The problem with objectivity is that there is a dichotomy between the mechanical (observations as a reaction to stimuli) and the teleological (observations taken to serve some purpose). The mechanist philosophy assumes that fact dominates the subject and will reveal the information that is true. Most observers use this philosophy to collect information about anything. Auditors can guarantee the statement of ‘assets” of a company, but they can never tell us anything about the social value of those assets. This is the nature of subject as a slave to the “master observer of the subject (authority, auditors). A position is the subject as a manager – delegating authority when necessary (can permit the master observer to rule if the net benefits decide). This is the teleological approach. It is a way of observing the world so that the resulting information is useful to a purposive being. To know that a subject has observed “objectively” we need to know the total system in which the subject acts (e.g. like in inventory control – the whole system including history, leads, lags, suppliers). This approach raises other questions – What are the costs and benefits of trusting the master, who establishes the evidence?

One way of designing a system of inquiry based on the teleological philosophy is to build an image of the world – a Weltanschauung—that provides a picture of the inquirers alternatives, e.g. to travel to meet provides three means, whereas to communicate, the model provides two means, phone and fax. So the piece of information is valid only when embedded in a certain Weltanschauung, way of viewing the entire system. The inquirer attains objective information only if he chooses the right Weltanschauung. Who is the master observer who can decide?

Hegel provided the answer after Kant provided the idea by bringing together two seemingly opposite thesis (and antithesis) demonstrating Kant’s synthesis. Hegel suggested exposing the mind to a vast array of psychic events (loading with as much data as possible), then generate a conviction about some fundamental thesis, select a Weltanschauung that maximizes the credence of the thesis (looking at reality and data such that the thesis is supported).

The observer of the subject looks at the conviction “objectively”, wondering why he is so convinced. This mind conceives another conviction and asks what it would be like to be equally convinced of the antithesis. Kant argued that the truth behind thesis and antithesis can only be found is they both try to extend reason beyond its proper domain. Another observer of the subject is introduced who tries to see how the opposition arises out of the particular kinds of minds that clash in their convictions. He builds a new world view at a higher level Weltanschauung (Father observing two children fight). The bigger mind is called the synthesis.

Problems with subjectivity

1) Cannot compare values of members

2) Excludes direct observation by another of a subject’s state of mind

3) Assumes maximum accuracy of one’s own direct observation

4) Leaves no room for an explicit design or scrutiny

Problems with Hegel’s dialectic

The “subjective” has been transferred to the observer

We cannot represent how a person feels when he sees a clear blue sky. So under what circumstances does a set of representations of an object capture he essence of the object?

The Hegelian Dialectical Problems

1) Not clear where the original thesis comes from

2) How to acquire conviction

3) How can the inquiring system select the thesis whose credence is to be maximized

4) Can possibly lead down a blind alley

5) Belongs to a leisure class where time and money is plentiful (economics of information)

Singerian Inquiring Systems

Most philosophers were busy using logic to study science thinking that if there is a basic design of science, logic will uncover it. Although it was successful in revealing how problems ought to be solved, it did not provide what problems needed to be solved. Singer views that the “whole scope of inquiry” should be used in the design task (not limited to one discipline)

1) Measure -- Uses measurements to show progress (if today we can measure up to 2 decimal places and tomorrow 5 decimal places we have progress)

2) Replicate – repeat the experiments until we get to the level of refinement we need

3) Partition – When all readings are similar shift to a higher level of refinement. Although quantifying permits a way for the system to explore alternative explanations of natural events, it may exclude whole aspects of nature that do not partition (the qualitative descriptors) Analyze the variation (analysis of variance) to decide which of the cases is true

4) If the readings do not fit the hypothesis – (1) revise the hypothesis by adding new variables or change the form of the hypothesis, (2) revise the procedure of adjusting the readings, (3) tolerate the inconsistency until more evidence is available

5) Conclude with imperative statements (“ought” instead of “is))

How or when the revise the a priori (Weltanschauung)? This depends on the purpose and measure of performance of the system.

Churchman analyzes inquiry as a goal-seeking system

1) A system is teleological -- Basic research has a set of goals

2) Has a measure of performance – amount of new and significant knowledge produced per unit of research effort

3) Has a client – All persons with intellectual curiosity

4) Has teleological components that coproduce the measure of performance – scientific disciplines, within each discipline are researchers

5) Interacts in an environment – Legal, budgetary and social constraints

6) Has a decision maker – Community of scientists

7) A designer -- Community of scientists

8) Designers intention is to maximize performance – They plan for the best development of basic research

9) Stable with regard to the designer

Issues with Rationalistic Designs

How can we preserve the traditional freedom of inquiry and yet become more objective in its value structure? This has to do with the boundaries of basic science systems. Should funding be internal or external, and therefore outside the control of its decision makers? Science therefore cannot be distinguished from its politics. The positivistic position is that thinking or observing are separable parts of a research system. Descartes and Leibniz say it is not. This is not logical because in order to collect data, the design of the system cannot be separated it. Opponents say that it is possible to do a temporary separability in order to get going with observations. It is possible to design systems that act like its separable for the purpose of its subpart and then submit results to the other parts for action. Regardless, the designer still keeps his eye on the various segments of the system, when there are problems he moves to modify the segment (dynamic design system). The world is a fight between pluralism and monism. The pluralist is a problem solver, incrementalist, individualist, empiricist. He does not believe that the system has objectives. Pluralism is more popular today, it calls for freedom but supports military forces to bring about a freer world. For the rationalist (monist), existence has a purpose, and hat purpose is good, because it is the only possible world (Spinoza) or designed by a perfect designer (Leibniz).

Karl Popper

Chapter 1: Fundamentals

The Problem of Induction

Introduced the concept of the “logic of knowledge” as opposed to the prevailing “psychology of knowledge” and see epistemology as the logic of science, not psychological. He defines “inductive logic” as an inference passing from “singular statements” (actual observations) to universal statements (hypothesis or theories). Induction must be a synthetic statement because it cannot be analytic (otherwise there would not be a problem of induction). So it is logically possible to reject it (to say it is false). To justify induction on rational grounds we could go to Hume or try to use another inductive inference to prove it, which leads to infinite regress. Kant tried to say that induction is a priori. He considers like Reichenbach, that it is the “principle of induction” that needs to be studied in order to justify inductive inferences. He considers inductive logic too problematic even if based on probability therefore logically inadmissible.

Elimination of Psychologism

Psychologism is the doctrine that statements can be justified by perceptual experience. Popper distinguishes his method of science from psychologism defining the “logic of knowledge” as the process of “investigating the methods employed in those systematic tests to which every new idea must be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained” (p. 31) from the act of conceiving or inventing a theory – “how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man” (p. 31). The latter is psychological not logical. Testing of this idea is the “rational reconstruction” of knowledge.

Deductive Testing of Theories

Deduce singular statements (predictions) from the theory (or idea) – especially those that are easily tested. Some of these statements may contradict the theory. Compare the results with practical applications and experiments. If the conclusions are acceptable (or “verified”), the theory passes the test. If not, the conclusions are “falsified”, and their falsification also falsifies the theory. If the theory withstands severe tests it is “corroborated”.

The Problem of Demarcation

Popper says that “induction does not provide a suitable ‘criterion of demarcation’” (p. 34) for empirical science, to distinguish it from metaphysics. Both the older positivists that depend on concepts derived from experience, and the later positivists that reduce concepts to a system of logical statements (Wittgenstein’s atomic propositions), use induction to derive knowledge. So the “problem of demarcation” becomes critical. Popper agrees that sometimes scientists have to resort to metaphysical methods to get ideas, and with Schlick that there is no such thing as logical justification for universal statements, and accuses that “positivism leads to an invasion of metaphysics into the scientific realm” (p. 37).

Experience as a Method

To solve this problem, he defines an empirical theoretical system as (1) synthetic – it must represent a non-contradictory, possible world (not Euclidean geometry), (2) must satisfy the criteria of demarcation, it must not be metaphysical – it must represent possible experience, (3) it must be distinguished from other systems. This is the theory of the empirical method.

Falsifiability as the Criterion of Demarcation

Schlick and other positivists say that “a genuine statement must be capable of conclusive verification”. Since induction is logically inadmissible, theories are never verifiable. And if we accept this, no natural system is verifiable. Because we do accept the existence of universal and natural laws, our method is not verifiability but falsifiability – “I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience” (p. 41). (“It will rain or nor rain tomorrow” is not empirical, but “It will rain tomorrow” is). This principle is based on the asymmetry of verifiability and falsifiability, because universal statements can be contradicted by singular statements.

Scientific Objectivity and Subjective Conviction

Following Kant, Popper defines “objective” to indicate that scientific knowledge must be justifiable, independent of anybody’s whim. A justification is “objective” if in principle it can be tested and understood by anybody. He defines “objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested” (p. 44). He agrees with Kant that objectivity of scientific statements is closely connected with the construction of theories – “only when certain events recur in accordance with rules or regularities, as in the case with repeatable experiments, can our observations be tested-in principle—by anyone” (p. 45). Subjective experience or conviction can never justify a subjective statement, and should remain a psychological inquiry. Even a psychological hypothesis calls for inter-subjective testing, and therefore deduces certain predictions about my behavior. “There can be no ultimate statements in science: there can be no statements in science that cannot be tested” (p. 47). This does not solve the problem of ad infinitum testing, only that “every scientific statement must have in fact been tested before it is accepted. I only demand that every such statement must be capable of being tested:” (p. 48).

On The Problem of A Theory of Scientific Method

Why Methodological Decisions are Indispensable

Why do we need rules of scientific method? So that they can be revised, criticized and superseded by better ones; we cannot just characterize empirical science by formal statements because statements can be concocted, but if we have a norm for scientists to follow, so we can learn and improve.

The Naturalistic Approach to the Theory of Method

Positivists believe that there can only be logical tautologies and empirical statements. If methodology is not logic then to them it must be empirical – the study of the scientists’ behavior or the procedure of science is naturalistic. Popper disagrees because to him an observed procedure is just a convention and it is likely to turn to dogma.

Methodological Rules as Conventions

These rules are not logic just as the rule of Chess has little to do with logic.

1) Science is without end. If any theory do not call for any more tests, science is over.

2) A verified hypothesis may not be allowed to drop out without good reason.

Theories

Causality

A causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which describes it, using as premises of the deduction on or more universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the initial conditions. Universal statements are hypotheses of the natural laws. Singular statements are initial conditions that apply to a specific event (can be a singular prediction). The initial condition is the cause and the prediction is the effect.

Strict and Numerical Universality

There are two kinds of universal synthetic statement: the strictly universal are theories or natural laws, the numerically universal are certain singular statements that can be enumerated (found example of – no human being is more than 8 ft tall). A universal concept is a non-specific statements or proposition that can be tested (all ravens are black) as opposed to the individual concept or names which refers to a specific case bound by space, time or other variables resulting in the use of a proper name in its reference. In every singular statement individual concepts or names must occur (Joe’s raven). Statements in which only universal names and no individual names occur are called “strict” or “pure” statements (e.g. “many ravens are black” or “there are black ravens”). Most important of them are strictly universal statements (e.g. all ravens are black”). These statements are to be distinguished from strictly existential statements (“there-is” statements, such as “there are black ravens”). The negation of a strictly universal statement is always a strictly existential statement and vice versa. “Not all ravens are black” is the same as “there exists a raven that is not black” or “there are non-black ravens”. The theories of natural science have the logical form of strictly universal statements or non-existence statements (“there is not” statements, e.g. “there is no perpetual motion machine”) and so become falsifiable. Strictly existential statements cannot be falsified. No singular statement can contradict the existential statement (there are non-empirical).

Theoretical Systems

A theoretical system that is axiomatized is a system that contains assumptions (axioms) such that all other statements can be derived from the assumptions by purely logical or mathematical transformation. It is possible to investigate the mutual dependence of various parts of a theory that is axiomatized (a common practice in branches of physics). Investigations of this kind is important to falsifiability because the falsification of a logically deduced statement may affect the whole system. An axiom is either a convention or an empirical hypothesis. If they are conventions, they determine what statement-equation is admissible or inadmissible in the theory. It is difficult to use empirical hypotheses as axioms because it is difficult to develop an empirical way of defining a concept unless it is already used in an older system.

Levels of Universality

The statements on the highest level of universality are axioms, statements on the lower levels are deduced from them, and higher level statements can be falsified by less universal statements.

Falsifiability

How far can falsifiability be used in systems of theories? Poincare and his conventionalist group say that laws of nature are not falsifiable by observation. This is because to them “laws of nature” are our creations and inventions and conventions (a logical construction) which determines the properties of an artificial world, and this is what science refers to. That is why these laws cannot be falsified because they are required for observation. This is unacceptable to Popper because it makes science too changeable, and by merely changing the conditions will make any hypothesis agree with the phenomena which does not advance our knowledge. “A theory is to be called ‘empirical’ or ‘falsifiable’ if it divides the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the two following non-empty classes of statements (1) all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent – potential falsifiers, (2) those that it does not contradict. A theory is falsified if we find reproducible basic statements that refute the theory.

The Empirical Basis

If statements of science are not to be accepted dogmatically, we must be able to justify them. If we use reasoned argument as justification, then we are saying that statements can be justified only by statements. This leads to an infinite regress. Our only recourse appears to be psychologism which most epistemologists resorted to (“In immediate experience we have immediate knowledge, whereas by immediate knowledge we can justify mediate knowledge” (Fries) – basically induction again). Science then appears to be merely an attempt to classify and describe this perceptual knowledge, “it is the systematic presentation of our immediate convictions” (p. 94). Popper claims that “psychologism” still underlies all modern theory of empirical basis, even though its advocates do not use the words experiences or perceptions, but, instead, use ‘sentences’. They are called “protocol sentences” by Neurath and Carnap. Neurath views protocol sentences as revocable (they can be rejected – unlike Carnap who views them as ultimate). Popper says we need to go further and set rules so that these sentences can be distinguished from other non-empirical sentences. Popper wishes to distinguish “objective science from on the one hand, and ‘our knowledge’ on the other” (p. 98). Although observation gives us knowledge concerning facts, they do not establish the truth of any statement. Instead we should be asking “how can I, having had the experience S1, justify my description of it, and defend it against doubts” (p. 98), that is the non-psychological approach that will make the theory inter-subjectively testable. Long ago, logic was thought to be a science dealing with mental processes and their laws-the laws of our thought, because we could not think any other way. Today, having a “conviction” is insufficient, yet, “empirical science” has done exactly this with protocol sentences.

Basic Statements

Basic statements are required to decide whether a theory is falsifiable (empirical). It must satisfy the following conditions, (1) from a universal statement without initial conditions, no basic statement can be deduced (there must be initial conditions), (2) a universal statement and a basic statement can contradict one another. From (1) and (2), a basic statement must have a logical form such that its negation cannot be a basic statement in its turn. It follows that “basic statements have the form of singular existential statements” (p. 102). So basic statement will satisfy condition (1) since a singular existential statement cannot be deduced from a strictly universal statement (we cannot say “there is a white raven in sector A” from “all ravens are black”), and condition (2) since from every singular existential statement, a purely existential statement can be derived simply by omitting any reference to any individual time-space region (from “there is a white raven in Sector A” we can get “there is a white raven”).

The Relativity of Basic Statements

Every test of a theory must stop as some basic statement which we decide to accept. Although even basic statements can be continually tested ad infinitum, the decision to stop at some point is innocuous (harmless) and do not force infinite regress.

Theory and Experiment

Basic statements are accepted as a result of a decision or agreement, and so are conventions (but governed by rules). One of the rules is NOT to accept stray basic statements. This agreement (or rejection) is reached on the occasion of applying a theory. The process starts by deciding what the experiment must find (based on the theory). The theory that passes the severest test is accepted. Unlike the conventionalist, Popper does not accept universal statements based on simplicity, but accepts basic statements that have undergone severe testing. Unlike the positivists, Popper does not justify basic statements based on immediate experience, but from a logical point of view by an act of free decision.

List of References

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Berkeley, G. "A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge," in: The Works of George Berkeley, G. Sampson (ed.), George Bell and Sons, 1928.

Churchman, C.W., and Ackoff, R.L. Methods of Inquiry Educational Publishers, Inc., St. Louis, MO, 1950.

Hillway, T. Introduction to Research, (2nd ed.) Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1964.

Locke, J. "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," in: The Philosophical Works of John Locke, J.A.S. John (ed.), George Bell and Sons, 1905.

Nahm, M.C. Selections from Early Greek Philosophers F.S. Crofts Company, 1945.

Plato "The Republic," in: The Dialogues of Plato, Oxford University Press, London, 1924.

Stenhouse, L. An Introduction to Curriculum Research and Development Heinemann, London, 1975.