Authored
Books:
PHILOSOPHY
AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE. New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers,
1991. (Paragon Issues in Philosophy) xvii + 170 pp. 2nd edition (revised
and expanded), 1996. xx + 191 pp.
Published in Portuguese translation under the title,
FILOSOFIA E CIENCIA COGNITIVA. Bauru, SP, Brazil: EDUSC, 2000. 194
pp.
COMPUTERS AND COGNITION: Why Minds are Not Machines.
Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. (Studies
in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 25) xix + 323 pp.
Co-Authored Book:
GLOSSARY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE (co-authored with Charles
E. M. Dunlop). New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1993. (Paragon
Glossaries for Research, Reading, and Writing) xii +146 pp.
Edited Book:
EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION. Dordrecht/Boston/London:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. (Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol.
6) xiii + 301 pp.
Co-Edited Book:
PHILOSOPHY, MIND, AND COGNITIVE INQUIRY. Resources for
Understanding Mental Processes (co-edited with David Cole and Terry
L. Rankin). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.
(Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 3) xi -+ 449 pp.
Guest Edited Journal Issues:
Rationality and Objectivity: Philosophical and Psychological
Conceptions, Part I, Synthese, Vol. 57, No. 2 (November 1983), pp. 127-266.
Rationality and Objectivity: Philosophical and Psychological
Conceptions, Part II, Synthese, Vol. 57, No. 3 (December 1983), pp.
267-442.
Epistemology and Cognition, Part I, Synthese, Vol. 82,
No. 2 (February 1990), pp. 175-306.
Epistemology and Cognition, Part II, Synthese, Vol.
82, No. 3 (March 1990), pp. 307-439.
Epistemology and Cognition, Part III, Synthese, Vol.
83, No. 1 (April 1990), pp. 1-177.
Articles and Reviews:
"Signs and Minds: An Introduction to the Theory
of Semiotic Systems", in J. Fetzer, ed., Aspects of Artificial
Intelligence (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1988), pp. 133-161.
Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why
Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001), pp. 43-71.
"Language and Mentality: Computational, Representational,
and Dispositional Conceptions", Behaviorism (Spring 1989), pp.
21-39.
Reprinted in D. Cole, J. Fetzer, and T. Rankin, eds.,
Philosophy, Mind, and Cognitive Inquiry (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 377-402.
Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why
Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001), pp. 73-98.
"Primitive Concepts: Habits, Conventions, and Laws",
in J. Fetzer, D. Shatz, and G. Schlesinger, eds., Definitions and Definability:
Philosophical Perspectives (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1991), pp. 51-68.
Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why
Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001), pp. 25-42.
"Connectionism and Cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn
are Wrong", in A. Clark and R. Lutz, eds., Connectionism in Context
(Heidelberg, FRG: Springer-Verlag, 1992), pp. 37-56.
Reprinted (in Finnish) in E. Marjomaa and T. Vaden,
eds., Ihmisen Tiedonkasittely, Symbolien Manipulointi ja Konnektionismi
(Tampereen Yliopiston Jaljennepalvelu, 1991), pp. 1-31.
"Goldman has Not Defeated Folk Functionalism",
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (March 1993), pp. 42-43.
"The Argument for Mental Models is Unsound",
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (June 1993), pp. 347-348.
"Mental Algorithms: Are Minds Computational Systems?",
Pragmatics and Cognition 2 (1994), pp. 1-29.
Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why
Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001), pp. 101-129.
"Creative Thinking Presupposes the Capacity for
Thought", Behavioral and Brain Sciences (September 1994), pp. 539-540.
"What Makes Connectionism Different? Discussion
Review: W. Ramsey, S. Stich, and D. Rumelhart, eds., Philosophy and
Connectionist Theory", Pragmatics and Cognition 2 (1994), pp. 327-348.
Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why
Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001), pp. 131-152.
"Minds and Machines: Behaviorism, Dualism, and
Beyond", Stanford Humanities Review 4 (1995), pp. 251-265.
Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why
Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001), pp. 3-21.
"Thinking and Computing: Computers as Special Kinds
of Signs", Minds and Machines 7 (August 1997), pp. 345-364.
"People are Not Computers: (Most) Thought Processes
are Not Computational Procedures", Journal of Experimental and
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (1998), pp. 371-391.
Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why
Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001), pp. 153-180.
"Deduction and Mental Models: A Discussion Review
of P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne, Deduction", Minds and
Machines (February 1999), pp. 105-110.
"Mental Models: Reasoning without Rules",
Minds and Machines (February 1999), pp. 119-125. Errata, Minds and Machines
(August 1999), p. 457.
"Computing is at Best a Special Kind of Thinking",
in B. Elevitch, ed., Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology,
Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6 (2000),
pp. 103-113.
"Consciousness and Cognition: Semiotic Conceptions
of Bodies and Minds", in Q. Smith and A. Jokic, eds., Aspects of
Consciousness (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 295-322.